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ABSTRACT 
 
Notions of citizenship in the Netherlands are increasingly shifting away from 
liberal models of civic citizenship that, in theory, promote diversity, pluralism and 
multicultural understandings of citizenship and are moving, instead, towards a mono-
cultural and assimilationist understanding of national identity and belonging. This trend, 
known in the literature as the ‘culturalization of citizenship’ constitutes the primary topic 
of this project. 
In this dissertation, I argue that official and populist discourses concerning non-
western Muslim immigrants in Dutch society today work to inscribe difference onto 
“foreign” (“allochthonous”) residents of the Netherlands while upholding an idealized 
notion of “Dutch identity”. My research revealed that it was not just government-
sponsored integration programs that reproduced dominant understandings of belonging or 
difference through integration activities, but also the everyday discursive practices of 
Dutch “natives” (called “autochthons”) who, at times inadvertently, reproduce 
exclusionary notions of national identity and belonging. 
My ethnographic research, based in three different neighbourhoods in Rotterdam 
(Bergpolder, Liskwartier, and Nieuwe Westen), revealed how local and national 
discourses of belonging are expressed in everyday practices. Although other scholars 
have explored immigrants’ integration and the politics of belonging in the Netherlands, 
this project makes a contribution by exploring ideas of belonging using space as an entry 
point for analysis, paying particular attention to how individuals use, access, and 
understand neighbourhood public places. Using Ryan Centner’s concept of ‘spatial 
capital’, I argue that “autochthonous” individuals are more spatially privileged in their 
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ability to define and design public places in the neighbourhood than individuals who 
would be perceived as “allochthonous”. Contrary to the declared objectives of official 
citizenship “tests” and integration programs, the process itself reproduces boundaries and 
differences between “autochthons” and “allochthons”.   
 
Keywords: belonging, integration, citizenship, everyday spatial practices, Dutch national 
identity, ‘spatial capital’, Rotterdam, the Netherlands 
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INTRODUCTION:  
NEGOTIATING BELONGING TO THE IMAGINED COMMUNITY OF THE NETHERLANDS 
 
In 2009, I met Hendrijk, a retired Dutch anthropologist who moved to the 
Netherlands in 1957 from Indonesia, a former Dutch colony. For years he worked with 
the municipal government of Rotterdam, designing immigration policies for the city. As 
the father of three and husband to a municipal politician, Hendrijk was involved in 
numerous community projects and local political activities. Although he has lived 
elsewhere in the Netherlands, he and his wife settled in Rotterdam 30 years ago and they 
have no intention to move from this diverse and ever-changing city. During one of our 
interviews, he told me an interesting story. 
A few months earlier, he and his wife had taken the tram into the city-center. The 
tram was very busy and there were no seats available until two young Turkish men 
offered their seats up. They proceeded to strike up a conversation with Hendrijk and his 
wife. One of the young men asked Hendrijk’s wife: “We’ve seen you on the television 
before, haven’t we?” to which his wife agreed, having been involved in a dramatic 
political story concerning Rotterdam’s finance minister just a few months before, 
explaining her role as the party spokesperson to the press. Their conversation eventually 
came to the question of belonging. One of the young men asked: “So what do you think? 
Are we Dutch, or not?” to which Hendrijk responded, “Well, of course, why not?” The 
young man’s question and Hendrijk’s response illustrate the dominant discourse of 
national belonging in the Netherlands which draws a distinction between Dutch ‘natives’ 
and those perceived as ‘foreigners’ living in the country.  
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Hendrijk went on to express his views concerning the importance of belonging 
and its current representations in the popular media by saying:  
They (the young men) were born here and have grown up here, but the media 
gives them the idea that they are not welcomed here. I think that is why they were 
asking us for confirmation ‘Do you think we are Dutch, or not?’  
  
Hendrijk’s account suggests that larger social and political narratives, present in the 
media and in the political sphere, have influenced the ways in which individuals who are 
non-European immigrants or their descendants see themselves in relation to a Dutch 
‘majority1’.  
Hendrijk’s encounter with the Turkish men in the tram has to be placed in its 
historical context. In the last two decades, when national boundaries were said to be 
dissolving, in practice, Europe became “Fortress Europe” tightening and securitizing its 
borders against immigrants and asylum seekers, and has witnessed a re-inscription of 
national borders, and the rise of conservative political trends and Islamophobia. 
Unsurprisingly, citizenship rights in liberal democracies and the more subjective question 
of national belonging have shifted. In the Netherlands, as in other European countries, 
“culture” has emerged as a euphemism to distinguish “us”, meaning white, Christian 
Europeans, from “them”. Dutch sociologists Jan Willem Duyvendak, Menno Hurenkamp, 
and Evelien Tonkens (2010) have argued, in this context, that the ‘cultural integration’ of 
individuals into Dutch society now takes precedence over their ‘socio-economic 
                                                 
1
 The terms the ‘majority community’ or ‘moral majority’ are used by Dutch sociologist, Jan Willem 
Duyvendak, to denote those citizens and residents who are thought to be a part of a majority group of 
citizens known as “the Dutch” who have a collective progressive and liberal set of values and norms 
(Duyvendak and Scholten 2009). I acknowledge that this term is problematic because the idea of a 
‘majority’ is connected to modernist politics of governing bodies over their citizens through the 
manufacturing of a 'naturalized governance' that limits contestations against said governing bodies (Shore 
and Wright 1997, 24). It is also problematic for its assumption of ‘progressiveness’ which automatically 
assumes the backwardness of those who do not fall within this group. The use of this term in my own work 
is problematized as the ethnographic examples show how the ‘moral majority’ has dissenting, subjective 
interpretations despite contemporary political understandings.  
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integration’. Duyvendak et.al call this phenomenon the culturalization of citizenship 
which they define as “a process in which more meaning is attached to cultural 
participation (in terms of norms, values, practices, and traditions), either as an alternative 
or in addition to citizenship as rights and socioeconomic participation” (2010: 237). 
Dutch scholar Willem Schinkel has also argued that discourses concerning integration 
policy for immigrants in the Netherlands today are best categorised as ‘culturalist’. He 
believes, however, that the shift in understanding citizenship is best described as the 
moralization of citizenship which effectively works to exclude those individuals who do 
not live up to the ideals associated with Dutch identity and who fail to meet the criterion 
of ‘active citizenship’ (2008). In a later publication, Schinkel and van Houdt describe 
moral citizenship as “an extra-juridical normative concept of what the good citizen is 
and/or should be” (2010: 698). 
In the context of this dissertation, I understand citizenship as a concept that 
changes over time. Croucher defines it as a “socio-political formation of belonging that 
draws upon nationhood and ethnicity for its content” (2004: 193). Turner on the other 
hand proposed that the definition of citizenship includes not just a connection to rights 
and obligations toward the nation-state but also ideas of cultural norms and practices of 
belonging to the wider community (van de Veer 2002: 97). Ideally, liberal democratic 
systems are supposed to promote civic citizenship or civic nationalism that are based on 
the principles of equality and individual freedoms and rights, in contrast to ethnic 
nationalism and other xenophobic forms, which privilege a particular culture, religion, or 
an “ethnic” group over another.   
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When looking at how ideas of citizenship today unite or divide citizens of the 
Netherlands, however, it is clear that civic citizenship is giving way to a Eurocentric ideal 
based on what is dubbed by many scholars and officials as “cultural citizenship”. 
Schinkel argues that it is non-western immigrants2 and Muslims who are predominantly 
identified as lacking cultural integration and therefore are seen to exist on the ‘periphery’ 
of society (2008; van den Berg and Schinkel 2009). Dutch researchers at the University 
of Amsterdam –Duyvendak, Tonkens, and Peter Geschiere – describe this cultural 
understanding of citizenship as a “restorative” response in the wake of global and 
national stresses that have left understandings of “Dutch identity” uncertain. This 
restorative response identifies new citizens (such as recently-landed immigrants) as being 
left out from the imagined community3 of the Netherlands and in need of integration 
(Duyvendak et al. 2010; Hurenkamp et al. 2011; Tonkens and Hurenkamp 2011). 
According to the authors, those identified as outsiders are thus unable to find a way to 
belong to the majority community and to feel at home in the country where they reside.  
In my own work, I have also found evidence that supports a culturalist turn in 
citizenship that takes perceived “Dutch” characteristics as a marker of one’s belonging to 
the imagined community of the Dutch “nation”. I argue that larger social and political 
discourses, which at times are overtly racist and prejudiced, are reproduced through the 
mundane practices of everyday life. As I considered the government-led initiatives to 
                                                 
2
 Non-western immigrants are defined by the Dutch national statistical bureau, Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 
as those immigrants who were born, or have one parent who was born in Turkey, Africa (referring 
predominantly to immigrants from Morocco), Latin America, and Asia (with the exception of Indonesia 
and Japan) (2011).  
3
 The imagined community refers to Benedict Anderson’s (1991) definition of the “nation” which he 
defined as an ‘imagined political community’ where individuals imagine their connection between one 
another through “deep, horizontal comradeship” (6-7). I use this definition of the “nation” because it 
highlights the social construction of this political entity. As Mitchell (2000) argues, social understandings 
of the “nation” can be politically forged (Hague 2004: 20).    
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integrate (and, at times, assimilate) non-western immigrants and Dutch Muslims, it 
became evident that everyday actions of ordinary citizens also reproduce, at times 
inadvertently, exclusive understandings of Dutch belonging4. Therefore, this dissertation 
focuses on the processes of culturalizing citizenship through the actions of government 
officials and “native” residents of Rotterdam. 
Rotterdam is an ideal site in which to conduct research on belonging and the 
politics of “Dutch” identity, since it is one of the most diverse, poorest, and historically 
politically-conservative cities in the Netherlands (one only has to remember that 
Rotterdam was the stomping ground for Pim Fortuyn5). The ethnographic material for 
this dissertation was collected in 2009 and 2010. I used ‘the neighbourhood’ as an entry 
point for my analysis and conducted research in three different neighbourhoods. Two 
neighbourhoods, called Bergpolder and Liskwartier, were located in Rotterdam North and 
the other, called Nieuwe Westen (New West) in Delfshaven was located in the city 
centre. I chose the first two neighbourhoods because they had a diverse population. 
Furthermore, Bergpolder was part of a list of ‘problematic neighbourhoods’ for which it 
received increased funding for social and integration programs. Although these 
neighbourhoods were quite diverse, I also conducted research in Nieuwe Westen, 
Delfshaven where immigrants were the majority population and which was known as one 
                                                 
4
 This question of belonging has been explored by other scholars like Oscaar Verkaaik (2010), Willem 
Schinkel (2008, 2010, 2011), Marnie Bjornson (2007), and Peter Geschiere (2009). 
5
 Fortuyn was the first politician to take an open stance against non-western immigration and what he saw 
to be conservative values in Islamic rhetoric. Fortuyn was murdered for his views by a “native” citizen of 
the Netherlands who viewed Fortuyn’s politics as too brutal and stigmatizing. 
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of the most problematic neighbourhoods in Rotterdam, in terms of what government 
officials regarded as low levels of social cohesion, safety, and security6. 
In these neighbourhoods, I had opportunity to observe how exclusionary 
distinctions between the Dutch and “non-native” Others are expressed through, and 
inscribed in, space. I considered, for example, how exclusionary notions of belonging are 
enacted through: 1) the securitization of particular neighbourhoods and groups; 2) 
behaviours implicitly or explicitly promoted or discouraged in public places; and 3) 
mundane spatial practices, like gardening. In analyzing these practices, this dissertation 
sheds light on the ways in which dominant constructions of Dutch identity, perceptions of 
‘active citizenship’, and understandings of belonging fit in within the trend of 
culturalizing citizenship in the Netherlands. 
 
Background Context 
I was interested in conducting research in the Netherlands because my mother was 
born there, and, for a time, lived in the southern province of Maastricht. Although I did 
not learn the Dutch language while growing up, the Netherlands held a particular 
fascination for me throughout my life. While I completed my Masters at the University of 
Sussex in Brighton, England in 2004, I began to read news stories of social unrest in the 
Netherlands that quite surprised me. I had perceived the Netherlands as a land of 
tolerance, typified by the legality of soft drugs, prostitution, and euthanasia. I had 
pictured it as a quiet landscape with windmills slowly rotating against the backdrop of 
lush green polders. 
                                                 
6
 My approach follows that of other anthropologists who have previously demonstrated the importance of 
neighbourhoods in forming community and individual identities and (re)producing social difference (Billig 
2005, Bestor 2010, Engle Merry 2010, Low 2010). 
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 Yet, 2004 was a year of turmoil for the Dutch, as one of their ‘own’, Theo van 
Gogh, was murdered by an Islamic extremist, who was born and raised in the 
Netherlands. According to the frenzy of news reports, Mohammed Bouyeri had killed van 
Gogh for his role as director of a film that criticised what the film-maker believed was the 
Quran’s views on women. Subsequent news stories spoke of this event resulting from 
ineffective integration politics and representative of the lack of social unity and cohesion 
across different communities living in the Netherlands (van der Veer 2006). This act, and 
others leading up to it (see Chapter 1), were seen to signal the presence of a community 
of outsiders, officially categorized as “allochthons” (literally ‘foreigners’) by Dutch 
authorities, who lived alongside the so-called “autochthons” (literally ‘natives’) 
population, but not as part of one cohesive community. The murder of van Gogh was 
thought of as the culmination of a series of happenings that signalled the worsening state 
of separation among the Dutch population and the ‘last straw’ for those Dutch who still 
supported a multicultural approach to integration for the country’s immigrants (Buruma 
2006). From this point on, everyday life changed for the “allochthonous” population and 
for those residing in urban centers where the majority of this population lives. 
In response to such events, the government changed its integration approach to be 
more assimilative, capitalising on this moment to tighten immigration standards and 
methods of naturalization that had steadily grown more strict since the late 1990s. 
Furthermore, after the murder of van Gogh, definitions of this outsider community were 
more explicitly outlined not only in the rhetoric of Dutch officials but in the everyday 
language of ordinary citizens (cf. Penninx 2006). There emerged a hierarchy of 
immigrants distinguished according to their level of integration. There were those 
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immigrants from previous colonies who were seen as being sufficiently integrated 
because they spoke Dutch well and their children mixed freely with the white, “Dutch” 
children. Then there were those immigrants from Turkey and Morocco whose general 
inability to speak Dutch marked their inadequate integration into the economic, social, 
and political spheres of Dutch society, and who were seen to predominantly socialize 
within their own communities (Duyvendak et al. 2009a: 15). Here, Turkish and 
Moroccan background was not considered the leading factor in negatively affecting this 
group’s failure to meet Dutch standards of integration. Instead, the majority of this 
‘problematic’ population were primarily identified as Muslims (van den Berg and 
Schinkel 2009). This religious identity became the most significant attribute associated 
with perceived difference vis-à-vis the “autochthonous” community by politicians and 
policy makers alike because Muslims are perceived to have divided loyalties that stops 
them from fully integrating into the progressive ‘moral majority’ of the Netherlands 
(Allievi 2006; Sunier 2009b).  
In the name of tolerance then, the Dutch are intolerant of certain ‘cultural’ 
differences. Whether it be through imams who denounce homosexuality, a lifestyle 
choice that has come to signify tolerance in the Netherlands (Mepschen et al. 2010), or 
through the perceived oppression of Dutch Muslim women, signified by their wearing of 
headscarves in the ‘free’ open public places of urban city spaces throughout the 
Netherlands (Moors 2003), in popular consciousness, Islam has largely come to be 
viewed as essentially fanatical, and Muslims as potentially violent. Since the 1970s, 
religious identity has increasingly gone out of favour among the majority of “Dutch” 
inhabitants (van der Veer 2006). The fact that the majority of past integration programs 
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used Islamic institutions as a means for integration is lost on many ordinary citizens and 
is a fact that is often ignored by Dutch officials (Entzinger 2006).  
 
Literature Review 
When discussing the politics of belonging in the context of the Netherlands today, 
I am inevitably talking about social labels or identity categories such as citizen and 
immigrant, ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, and ‘native’ and ‘foreigner’ in the Dutch context. My 
understanding of ‘identity’ here aligns with other social scientists who regard identity as 
a social construction as opposed to something that is primordial or essential (cf. Eriksen 
2002, Gupta and Ferguson 1992: 13, Hall 1997, Massey 2004). The process of identity 
construction is embedded in power formations and relations of inequalities within larger 
economic structures and specific discursive fields (Sunier 2005: 322). Many scholars 
have argued that identity is created in relation to other individuals; in this manner, the 
process of creating one’s ‘self’, automatically creates an ‘other’ (cf. Said 2000, Hall 
1997, Baumann and Gingrich 2004). As argued by Stuart Hall, in a culturally diverse or 
pluralistic society, any difference deemed significant by the majority population usually 
results in the creation of binary categories of “us” and “them” (1997: 229). In the 
Netherlands, Muslim immigrants have come to be seen by many as the source of all 
Dutch societal problems, and are thus categorized as the ultimate ‘other’ in relation to the 
Dutch “us” (van der Valk 2002, van Bruinessen 2006, Sunier 2005, Lechner 2008). This 
dichotomy, however, ignores the ways in which these categories have changed over time.  
Instead, I understand identity formation as a process that is not singular or 
something which happens in isolation, but as a relational process involving other 
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individuals and larger social, cultural, political, gendered, “ethnic”, and historical 
perceptions of oneself in relation to others, and as a process that is ever changing (Soysal 
1997, Abu-Lughod 1991), at once chosen and imposed. This literature allows me to see 
the constructed nature of identity in a manner that allows for the possibility of 
contestation and change. It further allows me to understand the construction of national 
identity in the Netherlands as an ongoing process which, in the current political context, 
and for the reasons mentioned above, is becoming sharply fixed around specific “Dutch” 
traits.  
The Dutch cabinet defined an individual with “Dutch identity” as someone who 
was an ‘active citizen’ and has a “‘Dutch’ and liberal acculturation” (Schinkel and van 
Houdt 2010: 700). According to Schinkel, the requirements of such ‘acculturation’ 
include: speaking the language; completing education; gaining income; contributing to 
the economic welfare of the state; raising one’s children in a Dutch manner; and ensuring 
one’s own (and one’s children’s) ‘curiosity’ about the Dutch culture (2008: 24). That is, 
one’s identification as “Dutch” is based on an understanding of citizenship that is defined 
in cultural and moral terms. In highlighting these determinants for integration, 
“autochthonous” Dutch culture and behaviour are normalised and represent the standard 
against which “allochthonous” behaviours are measured, and in this case understood as 
being deviant and problematic (ibid; see also Roggeband and Verloo 2007). 
Peter Geschiere (2009) has argued that categories of “allochthons” or ‘foreigners’ 
and “autochthons” or ‘natives’ have gained increasing social purchase 7 in the 
                                                 
7
 With regard to the use of the “allochthon” and “autochthon” terms, there is a growing disfavour with the 
use of these terms among politicians and social scientists. Scholars have requested that social scientists not 
use these terms because it oversimplifies a very complex group of individuals and glosses over a very 
complicated issue. I agree that the use of these terms is problematic; however, these terms came to 
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Netherlands (see also Ceuppens and Geschiere 2005). These discourses are often bred 
and maintained in the popular imagination through what he sees to be the growing 
exclusionary politics and support for right-wing political parties since the year 2000. 
These fears and exclusion of the “allochthon” community were exacerbated by the 
marginalisation of these people’s place in relation to the Dutch “nation” (2009: 37). One 
result of this, as noted above, has been a drive on the part of Dutch integration authorities 
at the national and municipal levels to increase efforts to integrate, and at times 
assimilate, “allochthonous” residents into Dutch society. 
Ceuppens and Geschiere (2005) argue that citizenship and nation-building 
processes result in a quest to understand belonging, which instead of creating a sense of 
certainty among ‘native’ populations, increases levels of uncertainty. These processes 
tend to negatively and disproportionately focus on immigrants as outsiders in an attempt 
to delineate insider status. Evidence of this in the Netherlands can be seen in Essed and 
Trienekens’ recent report (2008) on news coverage in the Netherlands between 1995 and 
2005. According to Essed and Trienekens, in the mid-nineties, the focus of news stories 
about multiculturalism (which included the themes of immigration and non-western 
immigrants) was on discrimination against immigrants, in a general sense. From 1999 
until 2002, however, media attention turned to the criminality of immigrants and the rise 
of asylum claims. Between 2002 and 2005, there was a steep increase in the number of 
articles concerning (perceived) cultural differences and integration of immigrants, a 
theme that coincided with a focus on Muslim extremism in and outside of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
represent the lines by which ‘difference’ was marked. My interlocutors would often use these terms when 
defining themselves, not necessarily with negative connotations, but as a way to describe their social and 
cultural understandings of societal positioning and contexts. In this dissertation, I use these terms because 
dismissing these terms altogether would ignore the importance placed on these categories and their role as 
social frames (Goffman 1974) of perception among my interlocutors. 
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Netherlands. Trends in language shifted away from ‘asylum seekers’ toward perceptions 
of immigrants’ ethnic origins and to the more all-encompassing “allochthon” category. 
News coverage of “allochthons” peaked in 2002 until the category of Muslims eclipsed it. 
According to the authors, 54 percent of news articles in 2005 discussed Muslims and 
questioned their place in a ‘liberal’ and ‘multicultural society’8. 
In a report released in 2008, the European Commission against Racism and 
Intolerance (ECRI) found that “Muslims of the Netherlands have been the subject of 
stereotyping, stigmatising and sometimes outright racist political discourse and of biased 
media portrayal and have been disproportionally targeted by security and other policies” 
(36-37). While these negative accounts coexist with other accounts that provide a more 
diverse, balanced, and positive representation of ethnic minorities, there is a persistent 
negative representation in the press and on the television (van der Valk 2002: 7). The 
accumulated result of these discourses creates what Hall defines as a “regime of 
representation”, that is, an entire collection of imagery and visual effects through which 
difference is represented at any one historical moment (Hall 1997:232). This negative and 
homogenised view of Islam and Muslims fosters the perception of a radical difference 
between the Dutch majority on one hand and Muslim immigrants on the other 
(Silverstein 2005).  
In the Netherlands, the politics of belonging must also be contextualized within 
the global trend of Islamophobia, defined as the fear of Muslims and vilification of Islam 
(Werbner 2005) which has become commonplace in ‘the global North’ (cf. Asad 2003, 
Said 2001, Sunier 2009b). Within Europe today, the banning of minarets, the prohibition 
                                                 
8
 The idea of the Netherlands as a multicultural society has been debated by Dutch scholars. For most, the 
idea of Dutch multiculturalism could be better described as disassociation in the past, and, more recently, as 
assimilation for non-western immigrants (see Vink 2007 and de Leeuw and van Wichelen 2008). 
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of burqas in public (all in the name of protecting the ‘liberal’ values of Europe) signal the 
trend towards intolerance vis-à-vis Muslims. Within the Netherlands, “good Muslims” 
and “good immigrants” are often judged by their willingness to participate in local events 
as a means to demonstrate their level of integration in Dutch society (Kaya 2009). This 
idea of participation is related to understandings of active citizenship (cf. Putnam 2007). 
Those who do not participate, then, are seen to have other loyalties. For the “native” 
Dutch, participation in the public sphere (in civil society) is a positive attribute, but is not 
a requirement for belonging; in other words, they belong because of who they are, not 
because of anything they contribute to society. In contrast, immigrants and especially 
Muslims have to show evidence of their belonging, measured by the attribute described 
earlier as “active citizenship”. Participation in local community events, or the lack 
thereof, for example, was one way in which “native” residents of the neighbourhoods 
where I worked could establish and confirm their integration into the broader community. 
As other social scientists (Modood and Kastoryano 2006: 171, Vijver et al. 2007) have 
found, immigrants are often asked to conform when in public spaces, which points to the 
significance of carrying out ethnographic work in public places in my own research.  
As argued by Adrienne L. Burk (2010) in her recent ethnography of the process 
and effect of erecting women’s monuments in Vancouver’s public parks, it is important 
to consider how a public space functions in order to understand how exclusions are 
internalized by those who experience these spaces (Burk 2010: 92-93). She looks at how 
both physical exclusions in public parks (e.g. bylaws or arrest), as well as exclusion 
through more subtle means (e.g. refused service or harassment), influence one’s use and 
perception of that space over time. Burk goes on to argue that:  
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Public space is profoundly implicated in the process of “othering”, that is, of 
defining not only what (and who) is dominant, but what (and who) is deviant, and 
holding these elements in a hierarchical tension centered on the illusion of 
agreement about social norms of non-disturbance (2010: 93).  
 
Burk’s approach to public places is instructive for my study as it shows how different 
individuals might come to understand one another through their use of, and experiences 
in, places that provide opportunities for interaction among them. Her approach is 
informed by Henri Lefebvre (1991 [1974]), who argues that the interaction between 
individuals in space (and with the space itself) valorizes certain relationships between 
people in particular places, which in turn creates particular understandings about how one 
should use/act in a particular shop, café, open park, or sidewalk (2010: 93). Over time, 
these “consensuses” are shared among individuals who use that space. Neither Burk nor 
Lefebvre argue that these consensuses cannot change over time, but instead provide a 
framework by which to analyse how certain individuals’ understandings of public places 
are privileged over others.  
In my research, I consider how language, the practices of bodily comportment in 
space, and public participation in the community were used to identify difference among 
members of Rotterdam’s population. These became telltale factors as to one’s place 
within the imagined community of the Dutch “nation”. It was through my investigation of 
behaviour modelled in public places that I was able to explore the manner in which the 
Dutch government and “native” residents impose a cultural understanding of citizenship.  
 
Spatial Practices and the Politics of Belonging 
My theoretical perspective draws on Michel de Certeau’s focus on everyday 
spatial practices and Lefebvre’s ideas on the social production of space. During my 
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research, I explored how individuals establish and imagine the connections among 
themselves, the larger understandings of cultural identity, and the place they were in, by 
paying attention to their ‘spatial practices’. By spatial practices, I mean those practices by 
which people construct or define place. Here, I followed Certeau’s focus on the practices 
of ‘everyday life’ and on how people “produce” the spaces they inhabit by insinuating 
their own intentions and desires onto those spaces usually designed by others (1984). For 
example, as de Certeau shows, through their choice in direction to a destination, their 
unique style of walk, and their selection of important places along the way, pedestrians 
create their own space in the city. I find de Certeau’s focus on the everyday practices of 
ordinary people, rather than just on the practices of those who are in charge of creating 
and enforcing behaviours in space, valuable, because it resonates with anthropologists’ 
interest in how ordinary people experience and negotiate structures in everyday life.  
De Certeau’s theories about spatial practice are also useful because he 
acknowledges the differential power of individuals over space. De Certeau argues that 
dominant space is formally shaped by “strategies” of the “strong”: the architects, city 
planners, and government officials of a city, who have ‘formal authority’ over space 
(1984: xix, 117). These dominant understandings of space and their intended use, 
however, can be resisted at certain times by the creative use of that space (what de 
Certeau calls “tactics”) by the “weak” (1984:xiv). De Certeau argued that while on the 
surface these tactical actions might appear to be conforming to the strategies of those in 
power, they are, in fact, attempts at consuming space in a more individualised manner 
(1984:xiv). Despite these creative incursions in space, de Certeau does not believe that 
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the “weak” can actually challenge the authority of the “strong” because the “weak” lack 
official authority and power over space (1984: xix).  
De Certeau’s theory of space has been criticised for the rigidity of his categories 
of the “strong” and the “weak”, for his failure to consider the effect that interplay or 
feedback between these two groups would have on the outcome of spatial practices, and 
for the antagonistic relationship he presumes to be the case between these groups. While 
de Certeau’s binary perspective is somewhat limited, his understanding of how 
individuals are placed within a larger spectrum of weaker and stronger positions allows 
me to better understand the potential social hierarchies that influence individuals’ 
interactions in place, and their potential influence over that place. In my study it seemed 
useful, for example, to distinguish between those with ‘official power’ over space (Dutch 
authorities) and the role that ordinary citizens, the “autochthons”, could play. De 
Certeau’s ideas are also useful because of his attention to how individuals, regardless of 
their social dominance, can “subvert” dominant understandings of space. Here, I am 
referring to ways in which Muslim immigrants are seen to challenge Dutch dominance 
through their behaviour or appearance in public space in ways that denote their religious, 
cultural, and social difference (see Chapter 4; cf. Sunier 2005, van Bruinessen 2005). 
This is an important avenue for anthropological research, however, this project focuses 
more on the processes associated with the culturalization of citizenship from the 
“autochthonous” perspective. 
Henri Lefebvre’s concept of space is also instructive when looking at the 
composition of space. In The Production of Space, Lefebvre argues that the analysis of 
space should include three interrelated (and simultaneous) aspects of space that he calls 
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the spatial triad: first, spatial practices (perceived space); second, the representation of 
space (conceived space); third, representational space (lived space) (1991[1974]:33).  
Lefebvre’s perceived space can be understood as representing the material aspects 
of space (physical space), which aid or deter a person’s sense of location and the manner 
in which a person behaves (Merrifield 2006:110). Lefebvre’s conceived space represents 
the dominant space in society as it is conceived through symbols, codifications and 
abstract representations. Like Michel de Certeau, Lefebvre argued that the primary 
creators of this space are scientists, planners, urbanists, etc. who play a significant role in 
providing official knowledge and understanding of how space ought to be used (1991:38-
39; 41). Lefebvre’s lived space represents “the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’” 
(1991:39). According to Lefebvre, lived space is alive and fluid (ibid), and it is also a 
space where individuality, deviation and diversity are produced and reproduced (Watkins 
2005:213).  
 Lefebvre’s spatial triad allows one to envision the possible interconnections and 
feedback between the practices of everyday users, dominant representations and 
understandings of space, and the physical make-up and construction of particular places. 
In this sense it provokes one to consider the power dynamics involved in the production 
of space without assuming apriori that power rests with any one actor. Lefebvre, like de 
Certeau, invites me to recognize the way in which those marginalized groups within 
Dutch society assert their individuality and “difference” on dominant space. Yet, unlike 
de Certeau who over celebrates these “subversive” acts, Lefebvre forces me to make 
room for the difference that access to formal authority and material resources makes in 
asserting one’s understandings of space. Ultimately, as will be shown throughout this 
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dissertation, the power to change, influence, and control space in the Netherlands today 
remains with those urban planners, government officials, and “autochthonous” 
individuals who have a monopoly on cultural and material capital.  
Another theorist that I have found helpful is Pierre Bourdieu. In an Outline of a 
Theory of Practice (1998[1977]), Bourdieu demonstrates the importance of individuals’ 
ad hoc decisions, tactics, and strategies, which he believed were based on socialized 
dispositions that could neither prescribe nor predetermine individuals’ actions. Using this 
approach, Bourdieu provides a dual focus for everyday events: one that acknowledges 
societal and environmental influences on human action, and the other, on the ways in 
which humans (through their daily practices) reproduce, change, and transform larger 
social structures, relationships, social understandings, and the environment itself. In this 
way, Bourdieu’s everyday practices, like Lefebvre’s understanding of space, explore the 
interaction between human agency and larger material, social, political, economic, and 
historical frameworks.  
Concerning one’s position within society, Bourdieu sees class and social 
inequality as the product of four types of capital: economic, cultural, social, and symbolic 
(Webb 2002). Symbolic capital is the form that the other capitals (economic, cultural and 
social) take when they are perceived and recognized by others as legitimate (van den 
Berg 2011: 504). In this way, class and social inequality are not only based on political 
and economic structures but also on cultural tastes and social networks. Those that have 
access to such capital, through their successful portrayal of tastes and access to social 
connections (which include the ability to convince others of these capacities), are the 
individuals who most likely decide what is valued among particular social groupings 
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(ibid). I argue that like social, cultural, and economic capital that are linked to Dutch 
citizenship, having “spatial capital” is also important to facilitate community belonging.  
Ryan Centner uses the concept of spatial capital to discuss how dot-commers, 
whom he regards as the privileged class in San Francisco during the dot-com boom, are 
able to use and exert privilege to shape places in everyday life (2008). Centner’s work 
focuses on how these individuals were able to enact “a much more geographically free-
ranging engagement with the city” (2008: 294). Centner’s theory of place-making shows 
how the privileged (those rich with social, cultural, and economic capital) are able to 
access and ‘take place’ (the spatialized form of symbolic capital). This finding was 
reiterated in my own investigations of spatial practices in the neighbourhood.  
Centner’s work is also instructive because, like my own, he uses both elements of 
Lefebvre’s spatial triad (lived, conceived and perceived spaces) and Bourdieu’s elements 
of capital and habitus in his analysis of everyday practices. For Centner, acquiring spatial 
capital entails using other forms of capital (social, cultural and economic), as displayed 
through a particular ‘habitus’ (which could also be seen as Lefebvre’s “lived space”), 
which enables particular claims on material space (Lefebvre’s “perceived space”), that 
must then be recognized as a legitimate claim to that space (2008: 197-198). The use of 
space in relation to one’s social, cultural, and economic position, is central to my 
investigation.  
 
Methodology 
In line with the standards of anthropological research, I conducted fieldwork for a 
period of 12 months in Rotterdam, Netherlands (Bernard 2006). I began my research by 
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approaching one of the neighbourhood centres in Rotterdam North, the Bergpolder 
Neighbourhood Centre (BNC) and asking if I could volunteer and participate in weekday 
activities. Here, I was able to volunteer as a bicycling instructor and a homework leader, 
and I gave English lessons to residents living in the local community. I conducted 
participant observation on a weekly basis during Dutch language programmes, scheduled 
coffee times, arts and crafts workshops, holiday celebrations and ‘women’s hours’. This 
centre was also used to give citizenship courses, which I attended once a week, and was 
the meeting spot for a committee of residents and officials who took ‘walk-abouts’ 
around the neighbourhood to surmise its level of safety and security. Although I relied on 
some contacts that I had made during my preliminary fieldwork trip, the majority of 
people I worked with during this research I met through my explorations of the 
neighbourhood and my participation in local events.  
In addition to the neighbourhood center, there was another office where 
neighbourhood affairs were coordinated by community workers (Opbouw workers9) who 
were employed by the district government, which also became an important place for me. 
Here, I was able to join the neighbourhood committee for Liskwartier, the heritage group 
for the Hofbogen (defunct) train line, the planning committee for the Independence Day 
celebration, and the residents’ committee for the gentrification project in Bergpolder 
South. This office was located around the corner from where I lived and thus became a 
‘check-in’ spot throughout the week. 
                                                 
9
 These employees have a support role that focuses on bettering the quality of life in a neighborhood or 
district (territorial) for targeted groups (categorical). These workers also seek to develop and maintain a 
high quality of services and good relationships among residents, pertinent institutions, and companies. See 
What is Opbouwwerk at: http://www.movisie.nl/smartsite.dws?id=116493. 
21 
 
As a foreigner myself, albeit a “western immigrant”, I was allowed insight into 
some of the official integration processes. These activities included language courses and 
immigration appointments. For example, on two occasions I had to present myself to the 
‘Aliens Police’ upon my arrival in Rotterdam in order to extend the duration of my visa. 
As mentioned above, I was able to participate in citizenship classes that provided a 
different insight into my ‘expat’ language courses. During these and other associated 
activities, I was able to explore how educational facilities prepared citizenship candidates 
for the use of public places, and learned which places had particular kinds of behaviour 
ascribed to them. I was also able to discuss with the instructors and other students their 
experiences of the integration system and how these services have changed in relation to 
changing social and political processes, for example, how immigration policies have 
changed over the last decade.   
In total I conducted 82 interviews, of which 54 were tape recorded. These 
sessions ran between 45 minutes and three and a half hours. During these interviews, I 
used non-standardized, open-ended methods which allowed for the interviewees to take 
the lead in determining the path of our conversations, albeit revolving around the themes 
of my study. These interviews shed light on individuals’ experience with, and 
understandings of, “Dutch identity”, “allochthon” versus “autochthon” categories, and 
prescribed behaviour in public places, among many other things. I also conducted group 
interviews on two occasions with the women from my conversation circle and with a 
separate language class.  
In addition to my interviews and the time I spent at organized activities, I 
explored the environment to document place names and areas of significance for locals 
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(through presence), and take note of daily interactions and happenings within the 
neighbourhood and Rotterdam on the whole. In order to explore how alternative uses and 
meanings of place are created, I asked certain participants to identify places of 
significance and explain why these places were more important than others.  
It is important to understand that while I spent my days in the field with so-called 
“allochthonous” individuals - mainly women in the local integration courses, language 
courses, providing homework lessons for “allochthonous” children (that were often a 
lesson in Dutch language for myself) or English lessons for a group of second-generation 
Turkish young women - the majority of my interviews occurred with those who would be 
considered “autochthonous”. Thus, while my participant observation was predominantly 
spent as an immigrant among other “foreigners”, the majority of my formal interviews, 
although not all by any means, were carried out with so-called “autochthonous” 
individuals. This follows up on calls for more “autochthonous” based research in the 
Netherlands (Sunier 2009a) and can also be partly explained by my position as a woman 
who, while a “foreigner”, was not seen to fit the “non-native” mold in the Netherlands. 
 
 
Organization of the Thesis 
 
In chapter 1, I provide a historical overview of Rotterdam which evolved into an 
important urban center largely focused on its harbor, and the subsequent urban renewal 
projects. Exploring urban planning projects and policies is important to understand how 
they change over time and shape the creation and understanding of neighbourhood 
spaces. In this historical overview, I also incorporate an outline of immigration and 
citizenship policies (both national and municipal) to trace the shift from diversity and 
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multicultural models towards “cultural citizenship.” The history of Rotterdam’s urban 
planning is interconnected to its past immigration policies, both of which shed light on 
the use and meaning of urban public space by various segments of the population, 
including those considered Dutch “autochthons” and those non-western “allochthons”.  
Chapter 2 looks at government initiated integration measures and citizenship 
requirements for “allochthonous” individuals. Using the examples of citizenship courses 
at the local neighbourhood centre, as well as integration programs on public streets in 
problematic neighbourhoods, this chapter examines how difference is created by 
programs that try to discipline students into appropriate public behaviours.  
Chapter 3 looks at how particular places in the neighbourhood are created, usually 
by facilitating the active participation of “autochthonous” individuals, while excluding 
“allochthons” from the process itself, due to the way programs have been designed and 
implemented. The chapter challenges the notion ‘active citizenship’ and participation, by 
closely examining how programs usually result in exclusion and not social cohesion. 
Chapter 4 explores how security and safety programs in Rotterdam map 
undesirable difference onto certain spaces (“allochthonous” neighbourhoods) and 
populations (“allochthonous” youth). It further investigates official initiatives to 
“civilize” these populations and territories.  
Chapter 5 continues to consider the reproduction of cultural difference in the 
Netherlands but approaches the subject through a consideration of stereotypical “Dutch” 
spatial practices, such as biking and the use of urban gardens in front of one’s house. This 
chapter investigates the role of these perceived “Dutch” traits in the creation of an 
understanding of cultural citizenship. This chapter also explores the ways in which 
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“autochthonous” individuals reproduce dominant understandings of “allochthonous” 
difference and design exclusive spaces for their own community. 
Chapter 6 situates the insights from the previous chapters into the context of the 
Dutch debate concerning the ‘culturalization of citizenship’. This chapter draws attention 
to the importance of spatial aspects in this debate. It also explores the uses of ‘spatial 
capital’ as a means to rearticulate the connection between “nation”, space, and identity 
toward a more inclusive understanding of ‘citizenship’ and belonging to imagined 
community of the Netherlands.  
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CHAPTER 1: BACKGROUND 
DESIGNING PLACES AND DESIGNER PEOPLE 
 
In Rotterdam, non-western immigrants constitute 37 percent of the population, and like 
Amsterdam, over 50 percent of Rotterdam’s population was born outside of the 
Netherlands (this includes non-western immigrants as well as western and other EU 
workers) (COS 2011a). As mentioned in the previous chapter, the category of non-
western immigrants refers mainly to those individuals of Moroccan and Turkish 
background and to a lesser extent, Antilleans. As such, Rotterdam is an important and 
appropriate site to conduct research on citizenship and national belonging, especially 
since the city has a conservative political history, where political parties and trends have 
used the presence of immigrants to mobilize around what they perceive to be an authentic 
Dutch national identity and culture. 
 This chapter provides background knowledge about Rotterdam’s physical and 
demographic changes since the Second World War (WWII). It argues that public spaces 
are designed to create and accommodate certain actions, behaviours and identities. As 
such, people who are seen as “different” and do not belong in these public places are 
taught, disciplined and/or pressed to conform to prevailing norms. Non-western 
immigrants in particular receive much attention from government and civil servants who 
attempt to shape their demeanour in public places. But first it is necessary to provide a 
brief overview of Rotterdam’s history of urban renewal projects since WWII, and to 
outline changes in immigration policies since the 1970s. The policies addressed here are 
those that influence and target non-western immigrants, to illuminate how certain identity 
categories and discourses emerged and developed over the last 60 years. 
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Designing Place: a history of Rotterdam’s built space 
Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Utrecht, and The Hague are the four largest cities in the 
Netherlands, and all are located in the western part of the country. Taken together, these 
four cities form an urban network known as ‘the Randstad’ and are often grouped 
together by policy makers, because most of the population live in them and experience 
similar urban problems. 
Rotterdam was established in the 13th century as a settlement built around the 
dam of the river Rotte. Between 1880 and 1914, Rotterdam developed its harbour to 
become the largest in all of Europe and throughout the world (van Ostaaijen 2010: 73). 
By the start of the 20th century, employment in Rotterdam’s port had attracted over 
300,000 residents to the city (ibid). Even prior to this dramatic population growth, the 
municipality struggled to meet the needs of its ever-growing population. Residents of the 
city-center often found themselves living in slum-style housing and in overcrowded, 
dilapidated houses with absentee or neglectful landlords (ibid). 
On May 14, 1940, during WWII, Rotterdam suffered huge structural damage (in 
addition to human losses) when German forces bombed the harbour and razed much of 
the city-centre to the ground. As a result of the bombardment, approximately one 
thousand residents were killed and 78 thousand were made homeless (van Ostaaijen 
2010: 73). In addition, roughly seven thousand commercial and industrial buildings were 
destroyed. Following liberation in 1945, Rotterdam’s leaders focused on rebuilding the 
economic infrastructure through the regeneration and industrialisation of its harbour 
(ibid). In addition, urban planners reconstructed Rotterdam’s city centre where retail 
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enterprises were built along a square grid and who designed wide roadways to 
accommodate the increasing number of cars in the city (van Ostaaijen 2010: 74).  
From 1945 until the 1970s, Rotterdam’s government addressed housing shortages 
produced first by the war, and later, by growing migration (both internal - rural to urban, 
and external - transnational movements); in addition to these shortages, maintenance and 
renovation of existing poor quality housing also became important (KEI 2011 a). Much 
of the housing built to fill these shortages were rental apartments in both low- and high-
rise buildings, controlled by housing corporations that were subsidized by the 
government. These housing blocks were composed of cheap and quick prefabricated 
materials that were similar in architectural design on the outside and inside (ibid). During 
this initial design stage, the architectural approach to building renewal saw these housing 
blocks erected around local facilities that further incorporated green and public places. 
Typically these homes would be rented by people with less financial means, such as 
immigrants and their families. 
Due to the recession in the 1970s and the mechanization and industrialization of 
the harbour operations and fishing industries in the early 1980s, 80 percent of employees 
associated with the harbour lost their jobs. This event raised the number of unemployed 
from 15,000 in 1970 to 50,000 people in the mid-1980s (van Ostaaijen 2010: 74). Guest 
labourers from Turkey and Morocco were among those hardest hit during the recession, 
and unemployment rates among non-western immigrants were higher than any other 
immigrant or native group (van Liempt and Veldboer 2009: 89). The Dutch actively 
recruited ‘guest workers’ (gastarbeiders) from Italy, Spain, Turkey, and Morocco who 
could immigrate to the Netherlands first and then apply for work permits after they had 
28 
 
landed (Doomernik 2004: 32). At this point in time, the Dutch attitude towards these 
guest workers was one of economic necessity and of temporality. These guest workers 
were expected to come in, work, and then return to their respective homelands once the 
employee shortages were over (Vink 2007: 339).  Despite worldwide events such as the 
1973 Oil crisis, which shook the Dutch economy and decreased employment 
opportunities, the Netherlands continued to accept workers and even began 
accommodating the unification of their families. Unemployment continued to be an 
endemic problem in Rotterdam throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. Thus, economic 
recovery and the revitalization of urban districts remained a priority for the Dutch 
government (as it had been since WWII).  
In 1995, the government introduced the Major Cities Policy (Grotestedenbelied) 
that focussed on improving the physical, economic, and social aspects of urban 
neighbourhoods. Changes were made to Rotterdam’s housing and public areas, while 
economic approaches sought to increase employment and entrepreneurship opportunities 
in the city (Burgers 2009: 133). With regard to the social aspect, social scientists 
measured and addressed perceived ‘social cohesion’ problems of areas with high 
concentrations of immigrants (ibid). As with earlier government initiatives, it was 
thought that physical and economic improvements in the neighbourhoods would not take 
hold in the community unless problematic social situations were also addressed. In this 
way, physical renewal was thought to be a step toward a better quality of life through the 
creation of a more defined physical infrastructure and with extra attention given to 
bolstering social cohesion in distressed areas (Burgers 2009: 134).   
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Dutch geographers Ronald van Kempen and Gideon Bolt have argued that the 
concept of social cohesion is rarely defined in Dutch policy literature despite its 
popularity among national policy makers10 (2009). These authors acknowledge the 
various uses and definitions associated with the term ‘social cohesion’ but define this 
concept as the “glue holding society together” as a result of bottom-up processes whereby 
residents make social contacts with other like-minded residents who come to feel as part 
of a communal group in a particular area (458). According to the authors, Dutch policy 
makers have used the term in relation to ‘social mixing’ among members of diverse 
groups (whether economic, social or cultural groupings) with the intent to solve problems 
associated with at risk neighbourhoods with homogeneous populations11.  
The quality of life in most post-war neighbourhoods, according to a the 
Knowledge Centre for Urban Planning (Kenniscentrum Stedelijke Vernieuwing or KEI12, 
was (and remains) “threatened by unpopular site design, (excess) pollution, social 
insecurity, the disappearance of neighbourhood (local) shops, (and an increase in) crime, 
vandalism, addiction to drugs or alcohol, and social tensions between different (ethnic) 
groups” (KEI 2011a). As a result, the demographic trend in neighbourhoods with high 
levels of subsidized housing was the out-migration of middle and upper income 
households to surrounding suburban areas, where one can find larger housing stock and 
                                                 
10
 They argue that the lack of clarity concerning this term makes achieving goals of increased sociability in 
the neighbourhood, very difficult (van Kempen and Bolt 2009). 
11
 According to Dutch policy makers, social mixing was thought to bolster positive social outcomes, such 
as: “social cohesion, social mobility opportunities, more social capital, better services, less crimes, an 
improved neighbourhood reputation, and more residential stability”(ibid: 460). More recent neighbourhood 
integration policies, however, have focused on the potential negative consequences of residential 
segregation on the integration of minority ethnic groups. These initiatives tend to advocate for the 
assimilation of minorities (van Kempen and Bolt 2009: 464, 471; see below). 
12
 Created in 2000, KEI is a non-profit organisation which seeks to collect and disseminate historical and 
contemporary information on Dutch urban renewal projects. This organisation is funded in part by the 
Ministry of Housing and Spatial Planning as well as by private institutions.  
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“liveability” in the neighbourhood (ibid). The government believed that if urban 
neighbourhoods were renewed to the satisfaction of these residents, then their out-
migration to the suburbs would slow down, and those upper and middle class residents 
who stayed behind could (better) take care of the area and increase the level of social 
cohesion in the neighbourhood (van der Graaf and Veldboer 2009: 61; see chapter 3).  
Following the implementation of the Major Cities Policy, the Ministry of 
Housing, Spatial Planning, and the Environment (VROM) turned its attention to former 
industrial sites (e.g. harbours) while continuing to work on post-war neighbourhoods 
(KEI 2011a). Officials at VROM continued their three-pronged efforts of improving the 
physical, economic, and social aspects of the city, with the release of the New Urban 
Renewal Policy document in 1997. The authors of this document concluded that to 
combat (middle and upper class) urban out-migration, planners needed to increase the 
number of the more expensive, owner-occupied residences through construction, 
renovation, or amalgamation of existing housing stock into larger dwellings (ibid). Thus, 
reconstruction efforts during the late 1990s identified households according to level of 
income in order to create economically-mixed neighbourhoods (ibid).  
In addition to these changes, the policy advocated using a neighbourhood 
approach (wijkaanpak), according to which the neighbourhood would be used as the unit 
by which to implement policies. This focus on the neighbourhood began in 1999 under 
the ‘Vision 2010’ document (van Ostaaijen 2010: 76). This approach divided up city-
wide projects into area-specific problems that allowed district managers and government 
officials to implement creative solutions to localized problems. According to a flyer 
outlining the neighbourhood approach, this program sought to “strengthen the economy 
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and social cohesion and (improve) ... neighbourhoods and (the) living environment” 
(ibid). Underpinning the official discourse concerning distressed areas was the 
assumption that physical (lack of care of one’s neighbourhood, for example) and 
economic problems were due to the absence of social cohesion. These areas typically had 
high turn-over rates of residents, low social mobility, low income levels, and ethnic 
segregation and social isolation from larger society.  
In 2000, VROM published a new policy document entitled: ‘What People Want, 
Where People Live’ (KEI 2011 a). This policy focused on providing ‘quality’ as opposed 
to ‘quantity’ accommodations, and consequently, the Ministry switched its approach to 
incorporate the entire ‘residential environment’ (ibid). Thus, renovation to a 
neighbourhood included improvements not only to housing stock, but also to public green 
spaces and local shops. It sought to increase employment opportunities, social 
participation programs, and various amenities such as sport facilities and neighbourhood 
centres (ibid).  
In 2002, VROM (which is a national-level ministry) established 56 ‘priority 
neighbourhoods’ that would receive accelerated support for urban renewal programs and 
which sought to stimulate social and economic welfare (KEI 2011b). This program was 
implemented nationwide and incorporated such tools as: ‘impulse teams’ in which 
experts were sent to areas deemed to be in need; a handbook of methods for determining 
renewal demands that outlined achievable projects and their implementation; and 
facilitation schemes to encourage partnerships among various stakeholders in the 
community (for networking purposes) (KEI 2011a). As it turned out, Rotterdam had the 
most priority neighbourhoods out of all other cities within the Netherlands. 
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Despite these efforts and throughout the early 2000s, policies directed at urban 
renewal were bogged down in bureaucracy and lacking in effective implementation. Even 
VROM Minister Kamp was only half-hearted about the success of the 56 neighbourhood 
program, as is evident in his words: “Tackling the run-down areas is a long-term process. 
One should not expect miracles in a year. People should feel a healthy anger and ask 
what they would like to change in their (own) neighbourhood. Then something will 
happen” (KEI 2011b). In order to combat growing discontent, Rotterdam’s government 
began focusing on quantifiable results such as building 3000 houses every year (van 
Ostaaijen 2010: 134, 142).  
In addition to inefficiency, the issue of safety became increasingly severe. From 
2002 and onward, urban planning began to focus on increasing the level of safety in 
urban neighbourhoods and upping the number of police in those spaces known for 
criminal activity (such as drug trafficking), or other problems, such as the (mis)use of 
public places (see Chapter 4). 
In 2007, the next VROM Minister, Vogelaar, established Krachtwijken or 
‘empowerment neighbourhoods’. Krachtwijken13 were a group of 40 neighbourhoods 
(some of which overlapped from the previous 56 problematic districts) that were set to 
receive additional funding from the government with the goal of increasing liveability 
and educational attainment levels, decreasing unemployment rates, cracking down on 
safety concerns, and monitoring how children were being raised through schools and 
integration programs (KEI 2011a). These neighbourhoods were also popularly known as 
Vogelaarwijken (after the Minister), or more disturbingly, achterstadswijken or 
‘backward neighbourhoods’. 
                                                 
13
 Krachtwijken denotes more than one problem neighbourhood, while Krachtwijk is just one. 
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In general, Krachtwijks were those neighbourhoods with an abundance of lower 
income residents and social housing; there were few ‘liveable spaces’ (such as green or 
child-friendly spaces); and typically, a sizeable immigrant population (van der Graaf and 
Veldboer 2009: 62). As such, Krachtwijk funds were used to address issues of integration 
of immigrant residents, whose lack of Dutch cultural knowledge and language skills was 
thought to be negatively influencing the level of social cohesion, and thus, the state of 
liveability (Bergpolder en Liskwartier 2011a).  
The area where I conducted the majority of my fieldwork, Bergpolder, is one such 
Krachtwijk. Bergpolder is a district in northern Rotterdam that received its name from the 
polder14 it was built upon during the early 1930s, polder ‘Berg’ (KEI 2011c). The 
neighbourhood is easily accessible to the city center and is in the immediate vicinity of 
one of Rotterdam’s busiest highways, the A20. Bergpolder is sandwiched between the 
neighbourhoods of Blijdorp and Liskwartier and is situated just north of the much larger 
Old North (Oude Noorden), which like Bergpolder, is a designated Krachtwijk.  
Bergpolder has three notable landmarks: the Bergpolderflat (designed by van 
Tijen in 1933) known for its unique ‘gallery apartment’ style design; the sport 
center/swimming pool that is in the style of ‘New Building’; and the Hofplein viaduct 
(KEI 2011c). The Hofplein viaduct is a 1.9 kilometre train line that was constructed in 
1908 and runs through the heart of Rotterdam North (ibid). Under the viaduct, there are 
archways (called bogen), which are used by artists and entrepreneurs as business spaces. 
The Hofplein viaduct used to transport passengers from Rotterdam to the North Sea in 
The Hague, and was one of the first electric railways in the Netherlands (Project Bureau 
Hofbogen). As of August 2010, the line and its stations were closed down, although there 
                                                 
14
 A polder is a piece of low-lying land reclaimed from the sea and protected by dikes 
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are plans to renovate both the top platform and the archways underneath the tracks. 
During my time in Rotterdam there were many groups and events dedicated to planning 
out the future of this large building and throughway into the city centre.  
In terms of housing, the majority of housing stock in Bergpolder is privately 
owned; there are, however, social housing apartments that are owned by Vestia (25 
percent of the 4700 available subsidized housing) (KEI 2011c). Vestia is a private 
housing corporation, which is a company that provides cheap, clean and well-made 
accommodation for individuals who could not otherwise afford such housing, called 
social housing (ibid). Housing corporations were once government-owned associations 
but are now privately-run businesses that must answer to government officials; despite 
this, their mandate remains the provision of affordable accommodation for those most in 
need in the Netherlands. Rotterdam has the highest number of social-housing 
accommodations in the Netherlands.  
The majority of this social housing was built during the construction boom of the 
1960s and 1970s in a ‘trap house’ design (KEI 2011c). Trap houses share one staircase 
with anywhere between two and four different apartments (on the second floor) and with 
an apartment on either side of the staircase on the ground floor. This type of housing was 
created for lower to middle class families, whereas more expensive single-family 
dwellings can be found in the next district to the east, Blijdorp. 
There are approximately 7600 residents who live in Bergpolder and since much of 
the housing stock is quite small, the area is largely populated by students, young single 
professionals or senior citizens. Demographic evidence shows that 49.2 percent of the 
population was between the ages of 20 and 34 in 2010 (COS 2011b). According to 
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Rotterdam’s Centre for Research and Statistics (COS), the largest demographic group in 
Bergpolder are the native Dutch at 58 percent, followed by other European and western 
immigrants at 15 percent (2011b). The Turkish and Moroccan populations comprise a 
total of ten percent of the neighbourhood’s population, while the Surinamese community 
comprises six percent (ibid). Despite its diversity, social integration among individuals is 
not thought to be a problem (KEI 2011c).  
With regard to other measures, such as safety, Bergpolder has rapidly shed its 
status as a ‘threatened neighbourhood’ and in 2003 (and ever since) became a ‘safe 
haven’ according to the yearly safety index (Rotterdam Safety 2009; also see Chapter 4). 
While the majority of Krachtwijken are designated as such due to issues of safety or 
social cohesion, Bergpolder was designated on account of its smaller housing stock, the 
state of disrepair to those privately-owned houses, and the fact that the neighbourhood 
borders a highway which brings noise and air pollution to the inhabitants. On the whole, 
satisfaction with living in the neighbourhood stands at 89 percent of residents, due largely 
to the decrease in instances of drug-related violence, destruction, and general nuisance 
(ibid).  
According to the latest City Vision 2030 (Stads Visie) plan released in 2010, 
politicians and city planners wish to see Bergpolder increase the gentrification of its 
privately owned housing (KEI 2011c). As with previous urban planning initiatives, the 
City Vision sought to encourage middleclass residents to settle in Bergpolder in order to 
diversify areas with a majority of low income households; it is thought that higher 
income residents will enhance the social and economic circumstances of those lower 
income residents. Despite research that showed such renewal schemes were not 
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necessarily successful, Dutch urban planners continue in this vein of urban gentrification 
projects (van der Graaf and Veldboer 2009; Musterd and Pinkster 2009).  
With Krachtwijk neighbourhoods, there is a certain amount of funding put aside 
for social programming in the neighbourhood, to boost income levels and broaden 
individuals’ social networks. The economic stability of residents and immigrants’ upward 
socioeconomic mobility are thought to generate social, economic and political capital 
(whether through having more time, more people to help, more knowledge, etc.). In turn, 
these programs are believed to create a more active and productive citizenry in Dutch 
society. In recent years, this programming has taken on an assimilative approach, 
especially in Rotterdam which has the most social interventionist programs of all Dutch 
cities (Duyvendak et al. 2009a: 17). As introduced in the previous chapter, non-western 
immigrant communities are seen to be the community that lags behind in economic, 
social and political life (Uitermark and Duyvendak 2008; Duyvendak et al. 2009b). Thus, 
much of the social programming in the area of Bergpolder sought to increase levels of 
social cohesion. To discuss Bergpolder’s social programs and their effects, it is necessary 
to contextualize these within the larger history of immigration policies, and the programs 
and methods that have the integration of immigrants as their ultimate aim.  
 
Overview of national and municipal policies for non-western immigration 
Rotterdam has a long history of labour immigration because of the employment 
opportunities provided by its harbour. The first group of immigrants to settle in 
Rotterdam in the 1960s came from Spain and, to a lesser extent, Italy. In the 1970s, a 
large group of Yugoslavian immigrants moved to Rotterdam to work in the harbour’s 
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metal industry. Although peaking during the mid-1970s, immigration from Morocco 
began in the early 1960s because of the political unrest in Morocco and after the Algerian 
border was closed due to the Algerian War of Independence (Kaya 2009: 126). As a 
result, immigrants turned to the Netherlands and other western European countries for 
seasonal labour opportunities (ibid). At the same time, the Dutch began actively 
recruiting unskilled labour from Turkey to fill manual labour positions in Rotterdam and 
throughout the Netherlands. Immigration from Turkey and Morocco, however, was 
meant to be ‘circular’ in which so-called guest labourers would return home after their 
employment opportunities were over. Yet, this circular immigration became ‘normal 
immigration’ as labourers brought their families to settle in the Netherlands (Kaya 2009: 
127).  
According to a report created by Rotterdam’s Department of Social and Cultural 
Affairs entitled, Changing Policies on Immigrants in Rotterdam, there are four 
identifiable immigration policy phases beginning in the 1970s and up until 2001 
(Veenman 2001). This report concerns policies that affect non-western immigrants 
because of their perceived sluggish social and economic integration. These phases 
include (but are not mutually exclusive as they are a synthesis of past and contemporary 
policies): (1) an accommodating policy until 1978, (2) an anti-deprivation policy from 
1978 until 1989, (3) a citizenship policy from 1989 until 1998, (4) a diversity policy from 
1998 until 2001 (Veenman 2001: 9). I address each one in turn.  
In order to prepare for the eventual return of the guest workers to Turkey and 
Morocco, the Dutch government encouraged non-western immigrants to maintain their 
unique cultural identities through the accommodation policy. This policy supported the 
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creation of social work agencies that used national funds to help facilitate inter-cultural 
networks (Veenman 2001:9). This act was in line with, although not officially included 
in, the Dutch pillarization (verzuiling) system.  
The pillarization system in the Netherlands was in place from 1917 until 1960s, in 
which the state funded various civic organizations run through religious institutions and 
ideological organizations (or pillars). During this time, people’s everyday lives were 
informed by their membership in a particular religious or political pillar through separate 
(state-funded) schools, hospitals, social support agencies, newspapers, trade unions, 
political parties, and media outlets. These pillars historically consisted of Catholics, 
Protestants, as well as socialists, liberals and humanists. During its height, leaders or 
representatives from each respective pillar worked together on communal issues; 
however, ordinary citizens would often work, socialize, and frequent businesses that were 
run by members of their own pillar community. This segregated lifestyle was best known 
through the Dutch maxims “living apart together” (Entzinger 2006: 124) and “good 
fences make good neighbours” (Kaya 2009: 118).  
Pillarization went out of fashion in the 1960s, due to its inherent paternalism and 
the growing tendency in Dutch society towards secularisation of the public sphere 
(Entzinger 2006: 124). Despite this, the government continued to fund immigrants’ 
organisations based on religious and ethno-cultural categories well into the 1980s. It was 
thought that like the Protestant and Catholic institutions in the past, Muslim organisations 
would eventually dissolve into liberal individualism (Kaya 2009: 120); however, 
immigration officials now argue that this form of accommodation reinforced 
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segmentation of the community as Islamic communities are having trouble integrating 
into the larger society.  
The government used other measures by which to facilitate integration for non-
western communities. This included asking employers to provide adequate housing for 
their employees, providing access to free healthcare, as well as education for the children 
in these communities in their ‘native tongue’ (Entzinger 2006:123-4). As mentioned 
above,  the economic recession following the oil crisis of 1973 resulted in a restructuring 
of low-skilled manual labourer into jobs requiring qualifications that the average ‘guest 
worker’ did not have. Many of the guest workers found themselves laid off, and 
unemployment in Rotterdam increased from eight percent in 1980 to 28 percent in 1995 
(Veenman 2001: 5). Despite the high unemployment rates, immigrants continued to settle 
in Rotterdam.  
Before the 1970s, the immigrant population in Rotterdam constituted 
approximately one to two percent of the entire population. However, the percentage of 
immigrants living in Rotterdam swiftly increased; in 1975, six percent of the population 
were identified as immigrants, which jumped to 20 percent in 1985, and 30 percent in 
1990 (Veenman 2001: 4). Tensions associated with these demographic changes mounted, 
and in 1972 certain neighbourhoods in Rotterdam experienced race riots directed at 
visible minorities (van Ostaaijen 2010: 80). With the rapid increase of immigrants 
settling in Rotterdam from the late 1970s onwards, immigration policy accordingly also 
changed.  
In response to growing immigration, Rotterdam authorities tried to limit the 
number of immigrants living in a particular area. This was based on the assumption that 
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high concentrations of “ethnic” groups increased anxiety in the larger society over a 
perceived threat that immigrants posed to the ‘Dutch way of life’ in low income zones. 
This attempt, however, was thwarted by the national government due to its discriminatory 
nature and because it violated the Dutch Constitution (Veenman 2001:10). At the time, 
Rotterdam officials were still working under a national immigration agenda and 
therefore, their only recourse was to request that national level officials adopt a more 
restrictive immigration policy (ibid). 
In 1978, Rotterdam’s municipal authorities released the Immigrants in Rotterdam 
policy, or what they called the anti-deprivation policy (Veenman 2001: 10). This policy 
continued to work toward solving socio-economic imbalances according to national 
standards.  Throughout this decade, however, Rotterdam sought to develop its own 
immigration policy and program independently from the national immigration agenda 
(Veenman 2001: 10-11). In the view of the municipal authorities, social solidarity in the 
city was diminishing, and it was therefore necessary to encourage immigrants to become 
socially and politically involved at the municipal level (Veenman 2001: 11). To this end, 
Rotterdam passed a law in 1979 allowing immigrants to campaign and vote in municipal 
elections as long as they had lived in Rotterdam for at least five years.  
In 1979, the Advisory Council for (national) Government Policy (WRR) released 
a report called Ethnic Minorities which it submitted to the national authorities. The 
Council confirmed that guest workers and their families were in fact not returning to their 
home country as originally intended. This report supported the creation of ‘social work’ 
policies that would facilitate the integration of those minorities who were perceived to be 
“anti-social”. Such socialising policies were used in the past on post-WWII immigrants 
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from Indonesia who were seen to be lacking Dutch morals and not contributing 
economically or politically to Dutch society (Kaya 2009:128). Examples of such policies 
included family education where men of “anti-social families” were trained how to be on 
time for work, show respect to their superiors, and recognize their place within the social 
hierarchy, while women were taught how to cook Dutch dishes, raise children, and keep 
house (ibid).  
  The national government acted upon the WRR’s report and in 1983, the Minister 
of the Interior released the Ethnic Minorities Policy. The overall purpose of this policy 
was to create “a society in which all members of minority groups in the Netherlands, 
individually and also as groups, are in a situation of equality and have full opportunities 
for their development” (Entzinger 2003: 63). Informally, this policy supported 
individuals’ identification with their cultural or “ethnic” identities while concurrently 
promoting their integration into society (ibid).  
It is important to note that the Ethnic Minorities Policy was the first time that the 
government labelled certain minority populations according to their perceived “ethnic” 
affiliations and as a state responsibility (Entzinger 2003: 62). Based on this directive, 
municipalities focused on socially deprived areas in the Randstad where large numbers of 
immigrants had settled (Veenman 2001:6). The overarching drive of this policy was to 
facilitate the inclusion of ethnic minorities, both western and non-western immigrants 
alike, into Dutch society, conceived as a multicultural society (Entzinger 2003:68).  
On the national level, immigrant communities were seen to be integrating well 
because they were taking advantage of the cultural support programs and thus supporting 
the multicultural agenda. Yet, despite municipal efforts for skill retraining and 
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employment within the city, the socioeconomic situation of immigrants remained largely 
the same throughout the early 1980s, due to the down-sizing of industries that provided 
manual job opportunities. In 1988, Rotterdam published The Memorandum on Policies 
toward Minorities in the 1990s that sought to influence the upcoming WRR report 
submitted to the national government in 1989. 
The WRR’s report stated that their original report had put too much emphasis on 
multicultural policies and not enough stress upon promoting participation and 
involvement of individual immigrants in civil society. The previous policy was seen to 
encourage immigrants’ dependence on public support programs, such as welfare, that 
perpetuated a cycle of marginality (Entzinger 2003: 70), as well as promoting 
conservative religious identities that were hindering immigrants from integrating (Kaya 
2009: 129). Instead, the Council recommended that more emphasis be put on education, 
employment policies, and Dutch language training courses so as to better facilitate ethnic 
minorities’ integration and participation in Dutch society (Entzinger 2003: 70). In this 
council package, culture was relegated to the private life and a stronger emphasis was put 
on “nationality", a discourse that had been submerged since World War II. According to 
Buruma (2006), nationalism was a taboo topic because it was linked to nationalistic 
(Nazi) projects of WWII and Dutch complicity in sending Dutch Jews to Nazi 
extermination camps (19). Therefore, comments that could be interpreted as being 
nationalistic or racist were not yet common in everyday language. 
During the 1990s on the national level, the report termed Allochtonenbeleid 
(Immigration Policy) introduced a new classification of ethnic minority groups. It was at 
this time that Statistics Netherlands (CBS) first made the distinction between “western” 
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and “non-western” migrants. The act of classifying certain immigrant groups as more 
problematic than others – since non-western immigrants were most often associated with 
being the least integrated or having the lowest socio-economic and educational standing – 
further contributed to the rising discontent associated with increased immigration and in 
particular the increased number of non-western immigrants who moved to the 
Netherlands through family reunification policies (Entzinger 2003:70).  
Politicians picked up on this thread of discontent and began to discuss the more 
controversial aspects of immigration in political rhetoric. Frits Bolkestein, at the time 
parliamentary leader of the neo-liberal conservative, centre-right People’s Party for 
Freedom and Democracy (VVD), argued that Islamic and “Dutch” (read: “Western”) 
values were innately incompatible (Moors 2009: 395 n.). He instead suggested that 
“[i]mmigrants should adapt to the dominant cultural pattern and observe the existing rules 
wherever these clash(ed) with their own cultural background” (Entzinger 2003:71). 
Muslims living in the Netherlands were becoming more and more visible due to the 
increasing number of Muslim immigrants and following events such as, the Iranian 
Revolution of 1979, the Rushdie Affair of 1989, and the Gulf War in 1990 (Kaya 2009: 
120-121).  
 When Bolkestein first voiced his suspicions about the threat of Islamic values to 
‘Dutch secular liberal values’, he was made out to be a fear-monger and a racist (Buruma 
2006: 29-30). Yet, much to the surprise of many left-wing politicians, Bolkestein’s views 
struck a chord with the Dutch populous. As it turned out, there was a silent majority who 
supported his views and this resulted in a change of political trends (Entzinger 2003:71-
2). His arguments triggered a public debate on the national level concerning the presumed 
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incompatibility of Islam and “Western values” (Entzinger 2006: 126). This undercurrent 
was made apparent in the 1994 parliamentary elections when for the first time in almost a 
century, the Christian Democrats, who were the largest supporters of multiculturalism in 
the Netherlands, were defeated. The incoming coalition of Labour (PvdA), Liberals 
(VVD), and Democrats (D66), were able to shift integration gears away from respecting 
cultural diversity toward promoting immigrants’ participation in society (that would bring 
non-western immigrants into contact with Dutch values) as was evident in the changing 
immigration policies that drew a more assimilative approach to integration (ibid).   
 One of the most significant changes to come from this change in the political 
climate was the institution of the Integration Policy in 1994 (Contourennota 
integratiebeleid etnische minderheden from now on referred to as the Contourennota), 
which replaced the 1983 Ethnic Minorities document. The Contourennota emphasised 
immigrants’ required civic participation rather than the importance of maintaining their 
cultural diversity (Entzinger 2006: 126). Until this point, discussions of integration were 
thought off-limits in Dutch politics (Entzinger 2003: 72). Yet, the Contourennota focused 
on integration as the key term for its immigration policies. Integration was defined as “[a] 
process of leading to the full and equal participation of individuals and groups in society, 
for which mutual respect for identity is seen as a necessary condition” (Entzinger 2003: 
72). In essence, this Integration Policy shifted the onus of integration away from the 
government onto ordinary citizens (ibid). Notably, this process emphasized the active 
involvement of the Dutch majority population as well as immigrants (ibid). Therefore, 
integration according to the Contourennota was not a one-sided affair but rather a two-
way process (Entzinger 2003: 73).  
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The Contourennota also initiated several new policies. According to the 
Citizenship of Newcomers Law (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers or WIN), introduced in 
1998, all non-European (non-western) immigrants had to report to local authorities on 
arrival in order to determine whether or not they had to attend language and civic 
education courses that were available free-of-charge (Entzinger 2003: 77). If new 
immigrants did not go for an interview they could be fined up to €2269 (ibid). These 
policies sought not only to teach immigrants Dutch, but also provide them with 
knowledge about ‘Dutch ways’ (Kaya 2009: 131). This law went a step further than other 
integration laws, as it made a ‘social contract’ between the local council and the 
immigrants themselves. While the local government had to provide settlement programs 
that facilitated workplace and educational opportunities, immigrants were obliged to 
follow the program in its entirety or risk losing their benefits, such as welfare (ibid). 
Thus, while the onus for integration was on immigrants, the state continued to play the 
role of enforcer in integration facilities. 
The emphasis of the citizenship policy phase was for individual citizens to build 
an independent existence. Ensuing policies included rewarding those who were thought 
to be sufficiently integrated (often finding a job was enough). Likewise, individuals were 
sanctioned if they displayed undesirable behaviours, for example, being anti-social, being 
unemployed, or if they were thought to engage in criminal activity (Veenman 2001: 13). 
Failure of the previous anti-deprivation policy was thought to be the fault of using a soft-
handed (multicultural) approach by the central government (ibid). To this end, integration 
and immigration officials in Rotterdam’s municipal government continued to lobby for 
decentralized agenda for social reform. 
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The fallout from these policies (on both national and municipal levels) was 
mixed. Statistically, the children of immigrants were doing better in school and had a 
lower drop-out rate than previous generations (Entzinger 2006: 126-7). As Phalet et al. 
notes, surveys conducted in Rotterdam at the end of the 1990s, however, found that 
Turkish and Moroccan youth did not identify with the Netherlands as a place where they 
‘belonged’ (Entzinger 2003: 75). Thus, policies to increase social cohesion among 
residents were not having their intended effect. This perceived distancing between 
“western” and “non-western” communities was evident in the phenomenon of ‘white 
flight’ from both residential areas and schools, that is, the out-migration of Dutch 
majority residents (the majority of whom had white skin colour) that was seen as an 
indication of decreasing inter-“ethnic” contact among Dutch communities living in urban 
areas (van Duin et al. 2011: 2). In the annual report on poverty released in 1996, 15 of 30 
Dutch neighbourhoods where most people were on welfare, and which also had the 
highest proportion of immigrants, were situated in Rotterdam (van Ostaaijen 2010: 81). 
In 1998 after the release of the Effective Immigrant Policy (Effectief 
Allochtonenebeleid), the final stage of policy was launched, that of diversity. The policy 
of diversity meant that social programs were now also seen as the responsibility of civil 
society; for example, government authorities asked businesses to hire immigrants in order 
to draw ‘ethnic’ clientele. This law was based on the assumption that following 
compulsory education, newcomers would find paid work, and social-cultural integration 
would then ensue (Kaya 2009: 132). In review, however, these integration policies were 
evaluated as unsuccessful by the government, which marked the second set of integration 
politics that failed (ibid). 
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In January of 2000, Paul Scheffer (a Labour Party ideologue) wrote an article 
entitled “The Multicultural Drama” (Het multiculturele drama) in the NRC Handelsblad, 
a popular and respected national newspaper (Moors 2009: 395 n.). In his article, Scheffer 
argued that Dutch politicians’ indifference toward increasing Muslim immigration would 
end in disaster, which he saw exemplified in the growing numbers of alienated Muslim 
communities who were living in ethnic enclaves (Buruma 2006: 126-128). This ‘drama’ 
concerned the creation of a disaffected ‘ethnic underclass’, as he described it, that did not 
feel connected to the Netherlands and were reluctant or incapable of integrating into 
Dutch society (Kaya 2009:133). Scheffer argued that the Islamic religion was not flexible 
enough to allow its faithful followers to integrate into a liberal Dutch society (Buruma 
2006: 30). He also believed that the previous governments were wrong to hand 
citizenship over to foreigners without considering whether or not they could actually 
achieve it (Buruma 2006: 53,125-128). He believed that this situation would eventually 
lead to the destabilization of the social cohesion in Dutch society. Scheffer lobbied for a 
more assimilative minority policy to ensure that immigrants had a keen sense of the 
Dutch culture and history (Entzinger 2006: 128). This pro-nationalist cultural approach 
later became the popular understanding of what was necessary for minorities’ integration 
(Kaya 2009: 133).  
Scheffer managed to center the integration debate on a choice between the rights 
of immigrants to hold onto their cultural identities or the rights of Dutch culture. As a 
result, the left wing political parties (who supported multicultural agendas) were made 
out to be traitors to the Dutch people as they championed the cultural rights of 
immigrants over their own. While Scheffer’s views were not universally accepted – he 
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was criticised for viewing Muslims and immigrants as homogeneous and unchanging 
groups – his views did start a public debate which later influenced integration and 
immigration policies (Entzinger 2006: 129). Therefore, what started as a reframing of 
liberal versus conservative values addressed in Bolkestein’s article in 1991, 
approximately ten years later became a matter of whose “culture” should take 
precedence. Over the last decade, however, public interest in issues of immigration, 
Islam, and social integration intensified due to the attention these topics received from 
politicians and due to deteriorating economic conditions of non-western Muslim 
immigrants in particular.  
In 2000, the percentage of non-western residents in Rotterdam reached 41 
percent; the largest growing populations were Turkish and Moroccans who were lumped 
together as one ‘Muslim population’. Although the overall percentage of unemployment 
declined in the 2000s, and in 2010 sat at approximately five percent in Rotterdam (CBS 
2011c), immigrants were disproportionally represented in welfare and unemployment 
statistics, constituting over 50 percent of all recipients (CBS 2011b). The September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States exacerbated feelings of hostility towards 
Muslims as a global “war on terror” began. This anti-terror discourse shifted the diverse 
array of media discourses about Islam worldwide toward a more homogenized stereotype 
of Muslim fanaticism (Brown 2006). It was in this darkening climate that Pim Fortuyn 
stepped forward into the political spotlight.  
A professor of sociology at the University of Groningen, Fortuyn was better 
known for his anti-Islamic columns in the weekly newspaper, Elsevier (Entzinger 2006: 
129). Fortuyn became the leader of Liveable Netherlands (Leefbaar Nederland), a 
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conservative party established in 1999, and was an influential member of Liveable 
Rotterdam (Leefbaar Rotterdam), a similar municipal-level party, established in 2001. 
Fortuyn’s political program was directed against bureaucracy or what he thought of as the 
leftist elite who looked after their own interests while ignoring the concerns of the 
“common Dutch people”, as well as against the institution of immigration, especially due 
to what he considered the failure of Muslim integration (Buruma 2006:39). Fortuyn 
believed that Islam was fundamentally opposed to Dutch liberal and sexual politics, 
against equality for women, and prejudiced against homosexuals (van de Veer 2006: 
115). Fortuyn used his flamboyant style, political savvy and magnetic charisma to shake 
up the humdrum of Dutch politics.  
Liveable Netherlands was set to run in the national elections in May 2002 and 
Liveable Rotterdam in the March 2002 municipal elections. Fortuyn’s views dominated 
both party agendas, which focused on: improved safety policies; stricter immigration and 
integration approaches (and open debate about such subjects); greater accountability of 
politicians and civil servants; and increased citizens’ input in policy making (van 
Ostaaijen 2010: 101). Fortuyn’s national and municipal platforms were much the same 
(ibid). Yet in February of 2002, Fortuyn was quoted in an interview saying that he 
“wanted to remove the ban on discrimination from the Constitution and close the border 
for Muslim immigration” (van Ostaaijen 2010: 107). For this, Liveable Netherlands fired 
him as party leader. Fortuyn went on to form his own party to run in the national 
elections called List Pim Fortuyn (Lijst Pim Fortuyn). He agreed to adhere to Liveable 
Rotterdam’s election program and thus, remained an influential party member for the 
fast-approaching March elections.   
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In the municipal election, Liveable Rotterdam won 35 percent of the votes, of 
which 97 percent were for Fortuyn himself (van Ostaaijen 2010: 147). The party won 17 
seats in the municipal council, and although other political parties formed a coalition to 
reach a majority coalition, the impressive showing of Fortuyn shocked Rotterdam 
politicians and Netherlanders alike (ibid). Despite their initial negative reaction to 
Fortuyn’s win, the major political parties decided that working with Liveable Rotterdam 
was the only democratic option as his and his party’s views represented a large 
proportion of residents’ wishes (van Ostaaijen 2010: 148).  
Leading up to the national elections (to be held in May of that year), Fortuyn’s 
party List Pim Fortuyn was projected to take 38 of the 150 seats in parliament (van 
Ostaaijen 2010: 161). Then, on May 6, 2002, just nine days before the election, an 
environmental and animal rights activist shot and killed Fortuyn as he left a Rotterdam 
radio studio. In the days following, temporary make-shift memorials sprang up at the 
murder site, around Rotterdam, and throughout the Netherlands as outpourings of 
sentiment both decrying the act and supporting Fortuyn’s politics (van Ostaaijen 2010: 
161, Stengs 2007). A condolence registry was set up at Rotterdam city hall that 
eventually collected approximately 65 thousand names. It was apparent that Fortuyn’s 
murder reverberated politically and socially throughout the entire country. It was at this 
point that Fortuyn became an icon for the ‘freedom of speech’ that soon became an 
important Dutch value in this politically unstable climate. 
Despite the loss of its leader, Fortuyn’s party (LPF) won 16 seats of 150 seats 
after receiving 17 percent of the votes. This made the LPF the second largest party in the 
government and marked the first time in over a century that a populist party had a 
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significant number of seats (the 2nd most seats) in the Dutch parliament (van de Veer 
2006: 115). Without Fortuyn, the party fell after only 87 days; however, the incorporation 
of Fortuyn’s parties in politics marked a change in public opinion towards Dutch national 
ideals and attitudes toward diversity. At a time when national identity was thought to be 
slowly eroding and being replaced by European, corporate, and global identities, Fortuyn 
provided an outlet for this sense of national belonging and confusion. As Buruma 
succinctly states:  
To a confused people, afraid of being swamped by immigrants and worried that 
pan-European or global institutions were rapidly taking over their lives, Fortuyn 
promised a way back to simpler times, when, to paraphrase the late Queen 
Wilhelmina, we were still ourselves, when everyone was white, and upstanding 
Dutchmen were in control of the nation’s destiny (Buruma 2006: 47). 
 
Fortuyn also provided a visible target for societal angst: Muslims and non-western 
immigrants. In a famous interview, he remarked that, “the Netherlands was full” (Buruma 
2006: 53). This same remark spoken earlier by a different Parliamentary Member had 
resulted in his dismissal from his party and from the Dutch parliament. By breaking the 
social taboo on speaking out against Muslims and Islam, Fortuyn was creating an outlet 
in which people were “allowed” to voice their frustrations with the growing migrant 
population (ibid).   
Fortuyn’s electoral win could also be attributed to the growing public frustration 
with Dutch politicians. Since 1994, elections had resulted in a left-right coalition, which 
in turn resulted in a stagnation of policymaking and a general distaste for public 
authorities. Fortuyn’s platform of attacking the elite and singling out Muslim immigrants 
made him a man of action, and a welcome change from the usual template of Dutch 
politicians. After the January 2003 elections, the newly elected government, led by Jan 
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Peter Balkenende of the Christian Democrats, remained true to Fortuyn’s agenda as 
Balkenende sought to curtail immigration and develop stricter integration strategies 
(Lechner 2008: 136). This government also paradoxically wanted the mutual respect for 
minorities to be based on fundamental Dutch norms and values (ibid). It is at this point 
that immigrants were officially portrayed as responsible for their lack of integration into 
Dutch society (Entzinger 2006: 131).  
Following these political upheavals, many of the integration policies became 
more restrictive. As noted by Smeets, the new minister of integration, Rita Verdonk, 
stated that Dutch citizenship involved speaking the Dutch language and observing basic 
Dutch norms (Lechner 2008:163). Therefore, the Dutch language was deemed an 
important factor in promoting social cohesion and national belonging. To this end, the 
government discontinued all minority language programs in Dutch schools. Recent non-
western immigrants were required to enrol and pay for civic integration courses and then 
pass a test in order to receive permanent residency permits. Although the citizenship 
courses (inburgering) were not new (see WIN courses above), under the new system they 
were no longer free and immigrants themselves had to bear some of the costs (Doomernik 
2010: 7). Measures such as having to take courses, longer wait periods before obtaining 
citizenship, making family reunification difficult, and generally increasing costs 
associated with obtaining legal status in the Netherlands (as is the case now in most other 
European countries), work to discourage immigration and asylum applications to the 
Netherlands and other European countries on the one hand, and limits immigration to 
those who can afford it, that is, upper classes, on the other. 
53 
 
In 2006, the government passed the Civic Integration Abroad Act (Wet 
Inburgering Buitenland). This act restricted immigration through family unification by 
making persons apply for a residency permit to take the civic integration exam from their 
home country. Furthermore, the exam, information package, and permit costs a 
significant amount of money, at least €1200, which must be paid before the person ever 
steps foot on Dutch soil (Vink 2007: 346). These measures disproportionally affected 
immigrants from Morocco, Turkey and the Antilles Islands. For example, as of 2007, 
new immigrants (newcomers), old immigrants (oldcomers), and imams have to attend 
citizenship courses (see Chapter 2).  
In addition to courses on civic integration, the government attempted to 
discontinue migration policies allowing for family reunification and/or obtaining 
citizenship through marriage. This was after a report was released, which found that 75 
percent of Turkish and Moroccan Muslims living in the Netherlands returned home to 
marry and then brought their spouses back with them to the Netherlands (van Selm 
2005). Therefore, policies were established that only allowed people above a certain 
income level to bring spouses from abroad. Furthermore, regulations were dissolved that 
required employers to report the number of minority employees working at their 
establishments (Lechner 2008:163-4).  
 The murder of Theo van Gogh by Mohammed Bouyeri in 2004 exacerbated the 
growing hostility toward immigrants and Muslims and fundamentally changed the 
relationships among Dutch natives and those Dutch of Arab or Turkish background and 
of the Islamic faith (see van de Veer 2006: 111; Buruma 2006: 7). The debate about the 
Muslim presence in the Netherlands has since maintained a high level of energy. 
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According to recent studies, the Dutch majority believe that some immigrants, but more 
specifically Muslims, have other loyalties than to the Dutch “nation” and regard this as 
the source of their incompatibility (van Bruinessen 2006: 21; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 
2007: 11). Officially, this was reflected in the parliamentary cabinet which distanced 
itself from multiculturalism and the so-called paternalistic approach to its minorities 
(Vink 2007: 346).  
After the murder of Van Gogh, certain policies were introduced that, according to 
the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), were in direct 
violation of human rights policies. The Municipality of Rotterdam gained permission 
from the Minister of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment to ban people from 
living in certain neighbourhoods within Rotterdam. This policy, called the Urban Areas 
(Special Measures) Act, allowed municipal authorities to ban persons who do not have an 
income from employment from residing in what are already seen as disadvantaged 
neighbourhoods. The Equal Treatment Commission (Commissie Gelijke Behandeling, 
CGB) found that although this policy is only used as a last resort and for a temporary 
period, it indirectly discriminates against residents of Turkish and Moroccan origin 
(ECRI 2008: 23).  
Furthermore, the ECRI stated that the nation-wide racial profiling has become one 
of the Netherlands’ most serious offences as evinced, for example, in their Reference 
Index for members of the Antillean population (Verwijsindex Antillianen, VIA). Set up 
under the auspices of tracking the Antillean population who were thought to be avoiding 
registration with the authorities and who are thought to have a tendency to be transient 
once in the Netherlands, this indexing system was set up to allow the educational, care 
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and support services, the courts, and the police, to identify Antillean youth (ECRI 
2008:25).  Officially, this index provides Dutch authorities with a clear link between the 
criminal justice system and the Antilleans; yet, according to the ECRI, this index is 
discriminatory (2008:25). There are many more securitization tactics utilized by the 
police that directly and disproportionally affect young Turkish, Moroccan and Antillean 
youth; I will discuss and analyse these in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
The ECRI also cited those laws that were lobbied for by politicians yet never 
actually passed, as exacerbating an already tense situation by creating unnecessary 
discrimination and stigmatisation towards Muslims and the Turkish and Moroccan 
communities (2008: 35). One example of these lobbied-for laws was Rita Verdonk’s 
attempt to ban the burqa, a piece of Muslim clothing for women, in public (BBC 2006)15. 
While this law did not initially come to fruition, the ideology behind it, the 
discrimination, and the singling out of Muslim minorities adds to the anti-Muslim and 
anti-migrant discourses in the Netherlands today.  
The lobbying to pass these bills is an example of a larger trend in Dutch politics in 
how politicians voice their opinions about controversial issues (Moors 2009: 395). Old 
liberal models, such as multiculturalism, have been dismissed as being too politically 
correct and relegated to the “old world” of politics (ECRI 2008:34). Racist and 
xenophobic expressions have become more commonplace in the political debate, which 
in turn has made an impact on public debates and opinion (ibid). Freedom of expression, 
which is now championed as a pillar of Dutch democratic society, has in effect brought 
about the right to deliberately offend others. The ECRI also stated that politicians and 
policy makers were complicit in their active use and passive acceptance of this general 
                                                 
15
 This ban has just been passed by the government (September 23, 2011). See more below. 
56 
 
trend. This can be seen in their use of such terms as “allochthon” as a catch-all expression 
for “the Other” in both political and public debate. The ECRI believes that this labelling 
will hinder the possibility of providing a constructive ground on which members of the 
Dutch majority, Muslims, and non-western immigrant communities, could begin 
meaningful dialogue (2008: 35). The ECRI concluded that the role of political discourse 
was crucial in determining the situation of Muslims living in the Netherlands today 
(2008: 37).  
Evidence of prejudice among the public can be seen in the upsurge in youth hate 
groups such as the Lonsdale group who were responsible for anti-Islamic activities, and 
the Hofstad group, a militant Islamic group to which Mohammed Bouyeri was claimed to 
belong. There has also been a dramatic increase in hate propaganda over the Internet 
from pro-Muslims and anti-Muslim groups and from pro-nationalist and anti-nationalist 
or anti-Dutch groups (ECRI 2008: 38). Xenophobic and racist discourses are also 
expressed in animosities and schisms among individuals and groups in the Netherlands. 
According to the Ethno-barometer project conducted in 2005, which sought to understand 
the relationship between the Dutch “majority” and the Muslim “minority” communities, 
there was already a perceived disconnect between members of these groups about what 
was expected with regard to integrating or tolerating cultural diversity (van Bruinessen 
2006: 19-21). While these racist and xenophobic discourses resonate variously across the 
Netherlands, debates concerning immigration trends and the integration of Muslim 
immigrants influence everyday relations among the general populace (Lechner 2008, 
Margry and Roodenburg 2007). 
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These events and trends raise questions as to why so much emphasis is directed 
against those of Muslim faith, and why an ‘Islamic way of life’ is often positioned as 
being antithetical to the ‘Dutch way of life’. In raising this question, however, one must 
not only look to the resulting Islamophobia but also, to the ensuing trend of a growing 
focus on nationalism and a Dutch identity. 
Following the death of Fortuyn, pro-nationalist parties have dominated the Dutch 
political sphere, such as Rita Verdonk’s (short-lived) Trots op Nederland (Proud of the 
Netherlands) and Geert Wilders’ (more successful) Partij voor de Vrijheid (Party for 
Freedom). This time was also marked by political volatility as Dutch voters were brought 
back to the polls in 2003, 2004, 2006, and most recently 2010, following the collapse of 
the government in all instances. The media and popular opinion of the time centered on 
discussions around democratic renewal, civic nationalism, economic liberalism and 
discussions that have led to restrictive measures against immigration, integration and 
criminal behaviour (Vossen 2010: 22). This nationalistic trend was even evident on the 
supra-national level when the Netherlanders voted against the European Constitution in 
2005 and against Romania and Bulgaria’s acceptance into the European Union (BBC 
2011). The situation of the Netherlands has since become more tense as it struggles, as 
with the rest of Europe, through an economic downturn that has spurred on ever-growing 
support for more conservative national level policies and political parties.  
The most notable, inflammatory, and nationalistic politician in Dutch politics 
today is Geert Wilders. Starting in the VVD party, Wilders left due to the Party’s position 
on allowing Turkey into the European Union. Wilders then began his own party, the 
Freedom Party (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), whose main political platforms were 
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stopping what he perceived as the Islamification of Dutch culture and the expansion of 
the European Union, and fighting what he identified as the ineffective and out-of-touch 
left-leaning progressive elite in Parliament. Wilders’ main issue with these progressive 
elite was their “cultural and moral relativism” that resulted in the weakening of “Western 
liberal ideals” and an ignorance of the threat of Islamification to the Netherlands, which 
he saw as a threat to all of “Western Civilization” (Vossen 2010: 27-28).  
Like Fortuyn, Wilders was thought to be a passing trend; however, his 
multiplatform party and constant media presence have helped him make great political 
gains in both municipal and national elections (Vossen 2010). In the latest election in 
2010, the PVV won 12 percent of the votes making it the fourth largest party. The 
coalition between the PVV and right-leaning parties led many left-leaning politicians and 
media commentators to question the future of tolerance in the Netherlands (Zimmerman 
2011).  Already there is evidence that immigration policies are becoming stricter. 
 In June 2011, Minister of the Interior Piet Hein Donner presented a Memorandum 
on Integration which stated that the government believed Dutch society, and the values 
that it was based upon, should be central to future integration policies (Government of the 
Netherlands 2011). The memorandum went on to state that people wishing to live in the 
Netherlands were expected to contribute to “social cohesion” and demonstrate their 
citizenship and their involvement in civil society. According to the Minister, this change 
in policy direction is justified because the same requirements are demanded of the 
Netherlands’ “own” citizens, thus providing a model for a hierarchy between “us” and 
“them” and where not all citizens are deemed equally ‘authentic’ or “autochthonous”. 
With this change of course, the government is distancing itself from the “relativism 
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embedded in the model of the multicultural society” (ibid). In so doing, the national 
government believed that integration policies needed to promote a mandatory, unified 
Dutch character in order to prevent the threat of “fragmentation and segregation in 
society” (ibid). The alternative, according to the Minister, is that “no-one would feel at 
home in the Netherlands” (ibid, emphasis added). This Memorandum implies many 
things, first, that “autochthonous” and “allochthonous” communities are indeed separate 
groups and second, that the Netherlands is a mono-cultural society where only 
“autochthonous” values and characteristics are acceptable and are something that should 
be restored and/or protected. Third, this Memorandum contends that the Netherlands is a 
place where increasing diversity creates a sense of non-belonging for the 
“autochthonous” majority community (as was implied in the statement that if 
fragmentation was not stopped, then no-one would feel at home), which is a phenomenon 
that the government intends to correct. The memorandum went on to state: 
[t]hat integration was officially “not the responsibility of the public authorities but 
rather of those who decided to settle in the Netherlands”. In so doing, every 
citizen was expected to ‘contribute’ to Dutch society by taking responsibility for 
their subsistence, for their living environment and for society as a whole. For 
instance, immigrants are expected to learn the language and learn about Dutch 
society (Government of the Netherlands 2011). 
  
There is no doubt then, that “allochthonous” individuals are expected to assimilate into 
Dutch society, not just as a means for belonging to the majority community, but as 
something expected of them in return for their being allowed to live in the Netherlands. 
In this way, assimilating “Dutch cultural values” is no longer a choice for 
“allochthonous” individuals. Such a project had never before been so obviously stated by 
the government. 
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This memorandum outlined future changes in the citizenship and integration 
policies which included: the Civic Integration Act will be amended and made more 
rigorous; grants and measures for the integration of specific groups will be terminated 
and incorporated in general integration policy; a bill dealing with the prevention of forced 
marriage will be made a priority; a bill will be introduced to ban face coverings in public; 
a common agenda for modern citizenship will be drawn up in cooperation with 
municipalities, civil society organisations, and citizens. 
Following in France’s footsteps, the first move to banning face coverings in all 
public places was recently made by the Dutch Council of Ministers on September 16, 
2011 (Moors 2011). This draft Bill still has to go through certain political and legal 
bodies, however, many believe that this Bill will pass. Slated to begin in January 2013, 
the bill will prohibit covering one’s face in public as a ‘matter of public order’. 
According to Minister Donner, “face-veiling is contrary to the character and customs of 
public life in the Netherland where we should be able to recognize each other’s faces”. 
Annelies Moors, an anthropologist at the University of Amsterdam, argues that Minister 
Donner’s understandings of face-covering and customs of public life in the Netherlands 
highlights the importance of being identifiable as well as one’s ability to participate in 
open communication. Minister Donner went on to cite that ‘veiling of the face’ was 
particularly problematic because it was “contrary to the principle of equity between men 
and women since women were only required to wear a face-veil” (Moors 2011). Minister 
Donner argued that this ban was not an infringement against freedom of religion because 
the government interprets the veil as a ‘regional style of dress’ rather than a religious 
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practice (as was the reasoning of French president Sarkozy when he banned the burqa in 
France in 2009). 
Moors convincingly argues that this ban raises questions concerning the supposed 
separation of state and religious institution, what legal grounds the state has to decide 
acceptable clothing for its citizens, and what this might mean for other inhabitants in 
future enactments of this Bill (2011). Although this ban is somewhat ambiguous in terms 
of its implementation, it is obvious that the target is Muslim women’s behaviour and 
bodily comportment in public places. Although these latest changes occurred after I left 
the field, the ethnographic data provided in this dissertation demonstrates a lead up to this 
direction in policy in the everyday lives of individuals in Rotterdam.  
As is evident from the aforementioned policies, there is a trend to regulate and 
assimilate those immigrants who are seen to oppose the ‘Dutch way of life’. By not 
dealing with underlying socioeconomic inequalities, which arguably result from larger 
global and capitalist disparities, the failure to integrate into Dutch society is blamed 
solely on immigrants’ inadequacies and renders them the scapegoats of a struggling 
economy and as failures of increasingly unbalanced integration policies. In this context, 
the Netherlands is not an exception as more and more European countries have begun to 
redefine their national identity, for example, the statement of a secular identity when 
France banned the wearing of the burqa in public or when Switzerland banned the 
presence of all minarets. Although the Netherlands has a specific history and trajectory, it 
follows the larger European trend in securitization, racialization, and criminalization of 
immigrants in general (cf. Silverstein 2005). In addition to the systematic differentiation 
of non-western Muslims, the redesign of physical spaces and developing understandings 
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of which behaviours are considered appropriate in particular spaces give evidence of a 
project that defines what it means to be “Dutch” today. Within this context, this 
dissertation explores the specific manifestations of this trend within the Netherlands. 
 In the following chapters, I demonstrate how a focus on assimilating those 
individuals who are perceived of as ‘different’ in Dutch society, serves to reconfirm who 
belongs to a “Dutch” community in the Netherlands today and how citizenship is 
increasingly defined according to cultural attributes.  
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CHAPTER 2: RESHAPING “ALLOCHTHON” BEHAVIOUR FOR “DUTCH” PUBLIC 
SPACES 
   
In this chapter, I will explore the educational methods used by municipal-level 
government officials to teach “allochthonous” individuals how to act in public places. 
The educational programs expose an underlying assumption that to be accepted into the 
national community, one must conduct oneself as the “Dutch” do. “Dutch”, a term, like 
“European” , is their loaded with cultural biases and interpretations to mean adopting 
another “culture” by speaking the Dutch language, wearing a particular style of clothing, 
expressing one’s beliefs in the private and not the public domain (mostly if one is 
Muslim), and generally showing signs that one has learned and accepted public conduct 
and demeanour that may be viewed as liberal. This is a sign of a shifting trend away from 
the ideas of civic citizenship in liberal democracies, where diversity in language, 
“cultural”, “ethnic”, or religious background and public expressions of these were 
considered a testimony of the principle of jus soli (law of the land) in contrast with jus 
sanguinis (right of blood) or ethnic nationalism. Cultural understandings of citizenship 
diverge from ethnic definitions nationalism, however, these understandings mirror their 
conservative trend to homogenise and purify the “nation” from other “cultures”.  
In the following, I explore integration courses, street-level behavioural programs, 
as well as a good-manners program for schools with a high number of “allochthonous” 
students. These instances are instructive as they show how individuals who are perceived 
to be “allochthonous” are taught to function in Dutch public places. This education 
underscores the idea that “allochthons” are a different and separate community and 
therefore have to be inducted into “Dutch” behaviours in order to belong, or at least 
publicly conform to the Dutch “nation”.  
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While in the field, I attended integration courses called Inburgering (literally: 
citizenship) courses, at the local neighbourhood centre, the Bergpolder Neighbourhood 
Centre (Bergpolder Buurt Centrum). On one occasion, the class was taken on an outing to 
an Inburgering theatrical performance. This production was created and put on 
specifically for inburgering groups all around the country and on the day we attended, 
there were other groups present from Rotterdam. Of all the students in my class, I was the 
first to arrive at the central library, which also houses a theatre. Within ten minutes, other 
classmates joined me and we waited together for our teacher, Hilde, to arrive. Hilde had 
asked the class to arrive at a certain time before the play so that everyone could practice 
ordering a coffee from the local cafe; however, we were not given the chance because we 
spent the minutes before the play outside waiting for the rest of our classmates who never 
showed up. Hilde was open in telling us how disappointed she was: “It’s part of the 
curriculum. They should be here”, she said. 
Despite their absence, we eventually filed into the lobby of the theatre and waited 
while the actors of the play began to hand out evaluation forms to all the teachers. Seeing 
both Hilde and myself among a group that was largely comprised of women wearing 
headscarves, I was mistaken for a teacher and was also given an evaluation form. I 
looked at Hilde who said: “Ah well, it will be useful for your research”. During the 
classes, Hilde treated me as any other student, yet outside of these classes she often took 
the time to discuss topics important to my research, such as integration. 
The play was comprised of a number of different scenes portraying ‘typical’ 
Dutch habits, and touched on current and heated debates surrounding integration and 
immigration in the Netherlands. The play began with a scene of a Dutch birthday party in 
65 
 
which attendees sat in a circle and waited for their hostess to provide them with coffee 
and cake, as they made awkward attempts at small talk16. Suddenly, a loud siren went off 
indicating that there was a breach in the dikes surrounding the city. Between other 
intermittent scenes where the actors rode bikes, had discussions about the equality 
between men and women, and vociferously cleaned their houses, the actors continued to 
come back to the birthday party scene that eventually ended in a mass evacuation to 
avoid a sinking Netherlands. Much to the chagrin of the students watching the play, the 
Dutch (who were now refugees) were turned away at every entry port and border. The 
reasons used for their rejection from other lands were the same reasons used in the past 
by Dutch politicians against the entrance of refugees and immigrants to the Netherlands. 
For instance, when they arrived at a bordering country, the immigration officer greeted 
them saying: "Oh you’d like to come in? No problem at all! Do you have your visa 
(blijfsvergunning) ready? Oh you don’t? Well, sorry chump you can’t come in!” When 
they arrive at the shores of the next country, they are asked: “Do you come from that land 
where that man said ‘Full is Full17?” “Yes!” responded all the refugees, happy to be 
recognised as Dutch citizens. “Sorry”, said the actor who was playing the immigration 
officer, “Full is Full!”  
When I spoke with one of the actors from this play, Evelien, at a later point in 
time, she described the thrust of the play that she and her company created:  
There are a lot of Dutch people who are not very nice and not very welcoming to 
newcomers. So in our plays, we always put one or two people in there who say 
strange things about the moustaches or the niqab. One of the images from the 70s 
                                                 
16
 This is a joke on the typical, yet old-fashioned “Dutch” manner to celebrate birthday parties, which is 
seen to be somewhat boring and largely centred on prescribed rules of etiquette. 
17
 The ‘Full is Full’ slogan came from the Central Democratic (CD) Party in the Netherlands, which is a 
right-leaning political party, in reference to their political platform based on decreasing immigration and 
putting an end to multicultural policies.  
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is that if you were an immigrant, then you had a moustache. But we also always 
have a person in the play who says something nice about them (immigrants) as 
well. For example, in the play that I did yesterday, I play a not very nice woman 
and so one of the things that I say is, ‘everything that they (allochthons) buy, you 
know the big cars, the nice houses, they do it from my tax money!’ and then Jan 
Willem (another actor) says ‘Yeah, but they pay taxes as well’. So we (the 
company) try to strike a balance between people who say not nice things and 
others who say nice things so that they (the visiting students) can see, well there 
are people who say mean things but also people who speak in favour of ‘us’ as 
well. 
 
What we’re trying to say is that ‘we’ (as Dutch people) don’t have all the answers, 
we don’t have this whole inburgering thing figured out, so it is just as difficult for 
us as it is for them (the students). The most important thing with this play was to 
create humour to make people laugh. We all (the actors involved in the play) 
believe that when you have a problem and it’s taken too seriously and made to be 
scary, then no one opens their mouth to talk about it.  
 
Evelien’s description concerning the point of this play and the theatrical enactments of 
“typical” Dutch scenes, reinforce an essentialist view of Dutch national “culture”, which 
to a large extent are informed by emphasizing a distinction between this group and the 
“allochthons”.  Although the playwrights acknowledge the everyday prejudice levelled 
against “allochthonous” individuals, they make no apologies, and only state that not 
everyone acts negatively toward “allochthons”. Evelien’s solution for “allochthons” to 
dialogue with “autochthons” presupposes their ability to have such a dialogue on an equal 
footing; this ignores the power imbalances among these individuals where “allochthons” 
have less resources and opportunities than “autochthons”. The residual sentiment from 
this play is that there is a divide between ‘native’ and ‘foreign’ populations. 
The theatrical production was one of a series of events that were planned in 
tandem with the inburgering lessons. The intention was to provide students with practical 
knowledge about their city, for example, learning where the library was, and to place 
students in situations that were thought to be atypical of “allochthonous” individuals, 
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such as watching a play in a theatre or ordering coffee in a Dutch café. These lessons 
belied a presumption about “allochthon” ignorance, and were meant to encourage 
students to adopt “Dutch culture and norms”, especially in how to act in public places, so 
that they might later participate socially and economically in society. Embedded in such 
integration-related activities is the idea that “allochthonous” individuals must become 
visibly active in Dutch society, which would signal that they have overcome language 
barriers and social or economic constraints. 
These programs that instruct and teach about the assumed typical “Dutch” cultural 
life are strictly directed at non-western immigrants who are thought to be inadequately 
integrating into Dutch society. Yet, inburgering courses are informative in other ways: 
they not only provide specific tutelage on appropriate public behaviours, but also insist 
that students come into public places, an act which has the intention of physically 
inserting them into Dutch society. The following are further examples related to the 
integration courses given in Bergpolder.  
 
Inburgering courses in Bergpolder 
 
According to Rotterdam’s What is Inburgering website produced in 2007, 
inburgering denotes ‘participation’ and thus necessitates the ability to read, write, and 
understand the Dutch language. The website also states that inburgering will teach 
students how to live together in Rotterdam and throughout the Netherlands. Students are 
selected to attend inburgering courses if their economic status is deemed a hindrance for 
participating in society, for example, if they are on unemployment for an extended period 
of time. This selection also depends on whether their cultural values are regarded as 
similar or adoptable to that of the Netherlands;  for example, Japanese immigrants are 
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counted as ‘western immigrants’ because they are assumed to be effective contributors to 
the economic life of the Netherlands (CBS 2011). In addition,  individuals are asked to 
attend courses if they are parents or educators of children and regarded as lacking the 
necessary knowledge to raise children in a way that will guarantee their integration into 
Dutch society (Schinkel and van Houdt 2010: 707).  
 Since January 1st 2007, integration policies oblige the aforementioned individuals 
who are living in the Netherlands to speak Dutch and understand how to live within the 
Netherlands. As part of the process for naturalization and integration in the Netherlands, 
immigrants and refugees must pass a test which requires that they have sufficient 
knowledge of the Dutch language, history, and culture. According to an affiliated city 
website entitled “It begins with language”, there are three groups of individuals who must 
undergo such training: ‘new comers’, ‘old comers’ and spiritual ministers 
(hetbegintmettaal.nl). Newcomers are defined as those who are immigrating from outside 
Europe, who do not have a Dutch passport and are between the ages of 16 and 65. Old-
comers are between the ages of 16 and 65, do not have a Dutch passport, have lived in the 
Netherlands for eight years or less, and do not have any Dutch education. Lastly, spiritual 
leaders such as imams, pastors, hospital chaplains, rabbis, or those working in religious 
education, humanistic counselling, pastoral or missionary work are all required to take 
inburgering courses in addition to the above guidelines. Such stipulations mark those 
students seen to be in need of instruction concerning Dutch cultural norms as being 
different from the rest of Dutch society. These courses, by their very existence, highlight 
the presence of an “autochthonous culture” which students must learn. 
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The tests for naturalization consist of two parts: a national exam and a practical 
exam. The national exam is standardised and consists of knowledge concerning Dutch 
society, being able to repeat Dutch phrases, and an electronic practical exam. The 
practical exams are conducted using role play techniques where students carry on a 
simulated interview or a short discussion, for example have a parent/teacher meeting 
concerning the progress of their child in school. These exams take approximately two 
hours for the price of € 399, according to Ooverburggen, one of the inburgering providers 
in Rotterdam. 
In addition to writing exams for the practical portion of inburgering, students 
must complete a portfolio that documents 20 different experiences (witnessed by 
appropriate signators) that highlight various inburgering proficiencies. The choices of 
portfolios include: citizenship, work, education, health and child welfare, social 
participation, and entrepreneurship. Proficiencies addressed in the work portfolio include, 
but are not limited to: acquiring personal insurances (e.g. asking questions from a 
provider); housing (e.g. paying one’s rent, acknowledging the need to conserve energy, 
cleaning up one’s property); education (e.g. signing up for further training); contact with 
neighbours in the area (e.g. introducing oneself, inviting a neighbour over, responding to 
an invitation, speaking with the neighbour concerning an issue and possible solutions, 
apologising to the neighbour for something that the student has done wrong); searching 
for work; specific work techniques (e.g. writing up a client complaint); work-customer 
service (e.g. discussing performance review); work-care and wellness (e.g. reading and 
understanding texts about health, hygiene and safe working practices). The final 
interview to assess one’s portfolio takes approximately 1 hour and costs € 169. 
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The integration courses that I attended were run three days a week out of the 
Bergpolder Neighbourhood Center (Bergpolder Buurt Centrum, the BNC). I joined these 
lessons in January and stayed until June, when these courses broke for summer holiday. 
As mentioned above, my instructor was Hilde, a 30-something, blonde haired, soft-
spoken woman who was well-liked by all her students. She led courses in Rotterdam and 
Dordrecht, in both day and evening programs, through a company called Ooverbruggen, 
which is one of the seven private companies allowed to provide inburgering services in 
Rotterdam. Hilde used various teaching techniques to cover the material in the textbook 
and was known for adhering to the strict rule of speaking Dutch at all times. 
While in class, students practiced writing exams and worked through the content 
of the Inburgering textbook. In my own classes we followed a textbook entitled Welcome 
in the Netherlands: knowledge for Dutch society for the inburgering exams (Gathier 
2008). This book covered material about situations one might encounter in everyday life 
and how students can and should react to them. On the whole, there was a lot of practical 
information in the book; for example, steps on how to open a bank account or how to set 
up a parent-teacher meeting at your child’s school. Important to this chapter’s themes, the 
book also included sections that outlined acceptable and desired behaviours in public 
places. Below is an excerpt from the section Living in the Netherlands in a sub-section 
entitled Keeping your house and garden beautiful: 
Most Dutch people think that it is important that their house and garden keep a 
good appearance. They care for the following things: There is a certain 
maintenance done on the house; for example, that the house is painted; that the 
outside of their house looks clean, for example, that their windows are clean. That 
the garbage is put in the trashcans; for example, that there is no garbage in front 
of the house or in the garden (Gathier 2008: 88). 
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Or, in the section Society in the Netherlands, there is a subsection on Bodily contact in 
public places: 
If two people are in love, they often have bodily contact with one another in 
public spaces. They walk, for example, hand in hand or with arms wrapped 
around each other on the street. Some people in love kiss one another in public. 
Also, you can see two men or two women holding hands in public in the 
Netherlands. Younger people have more bodily contact in public spaces than 
older people (Gathier 2008: 179). 
 
While these directions on how to keep one’s house or how lovers may behave in public 
may appear innocuous, they concurrently direct individuals on how to act in public 
places. In so doing, these directives identify contrary behaviour, for example, having an 
unkempt garden or negatively reacting to kissing in public, as conflicting or in 
disagreement with the prevailing cultural norms.  
Other examples in the book tackle social values and relationships, emphasizing 
that the family unit is not as important in the Netherlands as it is in Turkey or Africa, and 
teaching the participants how to relate to and behave with neighbours and friends. It also 
instructs them indirectly on how the Dutch spend their free time and with whom. For 
example, in the section The people in the Netherlands: 
The family is not as important in the Netherlands as it is, for example in Turkey 
or Africa. Many people do not see their brothers or sisters for months at a time. 
Sometimes, they see their brothers and sisters only on their birthdays. Friends are, 
for many Dutch people, just as important as family. They often do many nice 
things with their friends, for example, walking or eating together. Dutch people 
usually have good contact with their neighbours. Neighbours help each other with 
small things. They give for example, water the plants if you go away on vacation. 
Or they lend things to you, for example, coffee. Or they watch your children. If 
you’re new to a neighbourhood, you must make acquaintances (Gathier 2008: 43). 
Furthermore, in the section entitled, Development of your children, “allochthon” parents 
are educated on how to raise their own children according to the Dutch way:  
Children must learn many things. They do not learn everything at school but also 
at home and outside. At each life stage they must again learn new things. A 0-4 
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year old learns for example, to speak, a 4-6 year old learns to bicycle, and a 6-12 
year old learns to swim in the Netherlands. If your child learns new things, it is 
good for their development (Gathier 2008:132). 
The above excerpts are predominantly directed at Turks and Moroccans, or individuals of 
“Eastern cultures”, who supposedly spend too much time with family, and because they 
are Muslims, they are therefore assumed to be against homosexuality. It is also 
noteworthy that emphasis is placed upon taking part in one’s local community, for 
example when the text states that one should help their neighbour and make 
acquaintances in the neighbourhood; in so doing, this directive promotes active 
citizenship. In general, individuals are directed to use and spend time in public spaces, for 
example, to teach their children how to cycle and swim at a young age. These activities 
are understood and allocated to a list identifying typical “Dutch” ways, the knowledge of 
which must be imparted to those wishing to become legitimate citizens.  
Hilde, nevertheless could sense the content did not exactly fit her real experience, 
which was apparent when she said:  
That book is a disadvantage because it’s not all correct. In the lessons, there are 
certain standards presented as being commonplace, for example, informing the 
students when Queen’s Day is and that’s good. But for example, the book also 
discusses the ways in which Dutch people live, like ‘all Dutch people eat at 6 
o’clock’. Those sorts of things are so different from one individual to the next. 
For example, I do not eat at 6 o’clock like the book says but at 8 o’clock in the 
evening. Therefore people learn things that are simply not correct. 
 
Having said that though, I think the book teaches some important lessons, such as 
(self) dignity, acceptance of homosexuality, and the discussion over different 
aspects of culture.  
  
Although Hilde feels as though some lessons in the text are unrepresentative her 
comments do reflect the stereotypical view that “allochthons” lack the supposedly 
“Dutch” values such as tolerance and equality, and the ultimate purpose therefore was to 
integrate them by teaching them such values. Furthermore, the choices of where and how 
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these courses were provided were also significant in promoting this objective. According 
to Hilde:  
We originally operated these courses out of a small room in the local mosque (the 
mosque is a part of the Iskender Cultural Center and Mosque in Bergpolder South, 
near the BNC) three days a week. We had to move though because the room 
where we had these classes had no windows and because we were always 
interrupted by calls to prayer. We arrived for the lessons at 1 o’clock in the 
afternoon and by 2:20, the prayers started. We couldn’t do anything for the next 
half an hour because it was so loud and that went on every class! So I asked if we 
could take the loud speaker out of the room and they always said “yes” but it was 
never actually taken away. So I could not give good lessons. What I think is not 
nice about giving inburgering lessons in a mosque is that there was no Dutch 
being spoken in the place. Secondly, we were working in a women’s only space 
so no men were allowed to come in. So for the women, in my eyes, it is much 
harder to acculturate. Some women were in the courses for over 2 years (the 
regular timing is 3, 6, 12, or 18 months) because of how much harder being in the 
Mosque made it to learn. I thought, this is not good, they must learn how to 
participate, work, intern, speak Dutch, and what to do when they encounter men. 
If they don’t do these things then they haven’t really integrated.  
 
So, I asked my boss to move locations. What eventually happened is that I moved 
the group from the Mosque to join another smaller group already taking place in 
the BNC. The BNC was also ideal because they had computers there and some of 
the exams are on computers. In the Mosque there is nothing like this so I thought, 
I must let them see that. There were enough advantages to move there for sure. 
 
From the way in which these lessons were provided, it is apparent that one of the key 
intentions of inburgering lessons is to bring a particular type of individual ‘out’ into a 
public space that is not overtly religious, where they speak Dutch and interact with the 
opposite sex. Furthermore, Hilde’s reason for moving these courses signals that mosques 
are not a “Dutch” space as per the reasons stated above, and are therefore unsuitable for 
integration purposes.  
In my class, there were Turkish and Moroccan women who had come to the 
Netherlands with their husbands almost 30 years ago as well as some 20 year-olds who 
had come to the Netherlands within the last 5 years.  In addition to this group, there were 
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two women from the Cape Verde Islands, one in her 60s and the other in her 30s, both of 
whom immigrated to the Netherlands on economic visas and, due to length of residency, 
had become permanent citizens18. When I asked the women who attended the 
conversation circle19 at the local neighbourhood centre why it was they were choosing to 
learn Dutch after some had lived in the Netherlands for well over 10 years, Samira, a 
woman in her 30s, replied: “Well, I would have done it before but the system is so hard to 
understand.” Hasna, a woman in her 40s said: “The rules change all the time. I never 
know what I’m supposed to do.”  
The overall response to the lessons in Bergpolder was varied. For most of the 
students in my class, these lessons were just a means to an end, that is, acquiring a visa, 
or the first step toward other kinds of education. In general, students’ reactions toward the 
program were not negative but rather, of genuine interest and appreciation of time spent 
with the other students. I was present on two occasions when students who were already-
graduated visited the class ‘just to spend time’. Both visitors said that they found the 
courses cozy and friendly (gezellig). As mentioned above, these classes also proved 
useful to network and socialize with one another and obtain practical information. For 
example, the students were quite happy one day to learn from one of their classmates that 
there was a doctor in the area who would speak Turkish with you; a rare occurrence as 
there were few Turkish-speaking doctors in Rotterdam.  
In order to better understand how students perceived these lessons, I set up an 
interview with one of the previously graduated students, Virun, at her home. Virun had 
                                                 
18
 Rotterdam has a larger Cape Verdean population than all other major Dutch cities due to the availability 
of port and harbour jobs, which were filled by workers from these Islands. 
19
 Participating in this conversation circle is a means to gain participation credits that can be used toward 
one’s inburgering credit.  
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moved to Rotterdam from Pakistan with her husband over 20 years ago and had four 
children: two girls and two boys. Although she attended lessons in the BNC, she lived in 
Old North, the adjacent neighbourhood to Bergpolder where she and her family rented a 
house. The passage below is taken from my field notes because our session was not 
digitally recorded at her request. The field note entry states: 
Virun met me at the door and warmly invited me in. As we toured around her 
apartment, which housed her four children and the room of her estranged 
husband, she spoke about the accomplishments of her children and showed me 
their pictures and integration certificates. Following this, we sat on her balcony 
and were sipping tea and chatting. Then, Virun went and collected an expanding 
folder from the living room. In this folder were all the certificates that Virun had 
earned as an ‘old comer’ during her inburgering process. Virun went through all 
the various activities that she had been a part of since coming to the Netherlands 
in 1991. Starting at the BNC, she completed the inburgering and language 
courses. Following this, Virun did additional training as a homecare worker 
although she never ended up using this diploma. Between 2004 and 2005, Virun 
completed further examinations necessary for old comers because the integration 
regulations had changed since she first arrived. She proudly pulled out each 
document to show me in addition to her participation documents, which included 
thank you cards from her children’s schools for the time she spent volunteering as 
a lunchtime supervisor. (...) 
 
As we continued to speak about our experiences with the immigration bureau, 
Virun’s two youngest daughters came home from school. Surprised to find 
someone they did not recognise visiting their mother, they asked who I was. I told 
them that I was from Canada and how long I had been there for. They exclaimed 
that my Dutch was really good for someone who hadn’t been here for that long. 
‘Unlike my mother who still speaks as if she arrived here only a couple of months 
ago’ they joked. As they left to walk back into the city centre, Virun laughed and 
said to me, ‘I know they tease me but they also tell me how proud they are of me’.  
 
From the above experience, it is apparent that these courses became important for Virun 
for personal reasons and enabled her to engage with various organizations in Rotterdam. 
As the discussion continued, however, Virun spoke of an experience that demonstrated 
how citizenship programming influenced her experiences of the integration process. The 
field note entry states: 
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 In the folder, I also caught a glimpse of a mediation request addressed to Virun. 
Virun eventually moved onto this sheet and in an exasperated tone, discussed her 
experience with who she believed to be a racist social worker. According to 
Virun, this social worker thought that Virun could be doing more to find a job 
despite her efforts. This social worker took it upon herself to address Virun’s 
unemployment situation, which called for mediation between herself, the social 
worker, and a placement centre. The social worker requested that Virun be put on 
a different integration trajectory so that she could successfully find a job. Virun 
explained that despite repeated attempts at trying to enter the workforce, raising a 
family at that point interfered with her ability to find part-time employment. 
‘There was simply no time Jennifer!’ she exclaimed. Ultimately, Virun received 
other financial resources so that she did not have to find work while raising her 
young children. Virun was also unimpressed that the social worker and the 
placement service representative were badgering her to find a job when her 
husband, who had been unemployed for years, was left to do nothing at home.  
 
The point that can be drawn out from Virun’s experiences is that participants in the 
inburgering system can use these courses and experiences for their own means. Even if 
individual experiences do not align with official expectations regarding emancipation and 
social and economic integration into Dutch society, these courses are nonetheless found 
to be useful by participants. Despite the paternalistic approach20 of integration measures, 
as can be seen in Virun’s experiences with the social worker, these activities provided 
more than just integration for their students (cf. van den Berg 2011).  
Like Virun, Abida had four children and had lived in the Netherlands for over 20 
years. Abida had completed the course work of her integration and was at the time 
volunteering at the cycling lessons for a number of weeks to acquire participation credits 
for her portfolio. She spoke about how her role in these lessons made her feel: 
When at first I couldn’t cycle, my children were often embarrassed because their 
friends and their parents would often arrive at destinations using bicycles while 
we did not. However, during one of the national holidays, Abida’s daughters 
came with her to the bicycling lessons. They were still embarrassed until they saw 
                                                 
20
 Paternalism, according to Donald van de Veer, can be described as the “interference with the autonomy 
of another for that person’s good” (Martinéz Novo 2006: 150). Van de Veer describes projects of 
paternalism as being unjustified because they construct the other, in this case non-western Muslims and 
immigrants, as inferior, incompetent, and show a general lack of respect for them.  
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me on the bicycle and heard everybody there cheering me on saying ‘Oh, look at 
her go! Your mother is doing great!’ From then on I heard them telling their 
friends and other people what a good cyclist I was. I know they think that I do a 
good job and now with helping to teach these lessons, they are even prouder.  
 
Abida’s use for integration courses, like Virun’s, was not to become an active citizen but 
for her children’s recognition. It is also interesting to note that although these programs 
are meant to create a greater sense of belonging to society at large, in actual fact, it could 
be argued that there is a greater connection made with the other students. There is little to 
suggest that these classes, and their content, foster deeper senses of belonging to the 
majority population in the Netherlands. Instead, and as found by scholars such as Marnie 
Bjornson (2007) and Oskar Verkaaik (2010), integration courses work to reinforce a 
sense of difference for those students who take part, not only because they are singled out 
as lacking such knowledge and being in need of such education, but because such courses 
reinforce connections among a community that is already defined as ‘outsiders’.  
Upon completion, however, it is questionable as to whether or not participants in 
such lessons will be fully accepted as equal citizens, due to the biases found in the larger 
society and the meanings attached to an ‘active’ citizen. The fact that the integration 
process will never be complete for certain individuals is evident through the variety of 
integration measures available,  such as those culturalizing measures directed at 
“allochthonous” youth, who are thought to not to receive the “proper” Dutch upbringing 
that would foster a “Dutch” identity (see also, Chapter 4). 
 
 How to make a proper citizen? Step one: start young 
In April 2010, Welzijn Noord (Wellness North) a wellness association that worked 
with local schools to coordinate activities associated with Week van Goed Fatsoen or 
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Week of Good Morals. The primary directive of this organisation is “[t]he promotion of 
social cohesion between different communities and strengthening the social 
infrastructure” (Welzijnnoord Rotterdam 2008). This project was coordinated with the 
local school in Liskwartier21. Although this particular school has Catholic designation, it 
is generally identified as a black school22 (zwarte scholen) because the majority are 
“allochthons” and many of them Muslims. So-called black schools are provided extra 
funding and resources to combat the issues that are presumed to exist in a school that 
must spend extra time acclimatizing students to the Dutch culture and language (cf. 
Vedder 2006). The particular activity associated with Good Morals week consisted of a 
type of treasure hunt where children walked around to nine different spots within the 
neighbourhood in order to identify a violation of decent public behaviour (acted out by 
volunteers such as myself), which they had to politely correct. At each station, the 
children would collect a piece of a puzzle that would allow them to collect a prize at the 
end. The theme throughout the activity was ‘decency toward others in public spaces’ to 
teach children proper moral behaviours in public place. This activity is unique for its 
easily identifiable goal to socialise youth according to a specific moral order, and on how 
to address other individuals in public spaces. 
My job as a volunteer for this event was to sit on an open plane and speak loudly 
on a mobile phone. As I acted out my particular offence, the students got my attention 
and gave me advice on my behaviour. In general, I was told that I should be more 
                                                 
21
 Liskwartier is a neighbourhood in Rotterdam North and like Bergpolder, it has approximately 7500 
residents of which over 50 percent are identified as “autochthonous”, the majority of which are between the 
ages of 20 and 45 (COS 2011b). In general, Liskwartier is a quiet residential area and is popularly known 
as having more affluent residents than Bergpolder. These neighbourhoods border each other. See Appendix 
1 for map of Liskwartier and Bergpolder. 
22
 A black school (Zwarte School) is a school where over 50% of the students are “allochthons”, that is, 
where the majority of students have at least one parent who has emigrated from a non-western country to 
the Netherlands. 
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respectful of my public surroundings because I am not the only user of this particular 
public space. It so happened, although I was not directed to, that I placed myself in front 
of a large sign board which described “no shouting” as one of the playground rules. My 
placement under the board garnered comments from various students and their leaders, 
such as “Hey lady, can’t you see? Can’t you read what the board says?” 
It is interesting to see which manners were identified as being important enough 
to highlight by the organizers and supported by the local school as I was not privy to how 
the ‘offences’ were created. The children had to do the following when seeing other 
asocial behaviours in order to get a piece of the puzzle (that was the goal of the game): 
1. Tell someone that leaving his or her dog's poop in the middle of a walking 
bridge was unacceptable. 
2. Help someone who has dropped their groceries pick them up (without laughing 
at them - not laughing was a specific requirement). 
3. Stop someone from littering. 
4. Stop someone from crossing the street on a red light. 
5. Help someone cross the street who is unsure of how to navigate the traffic of 
bikes, cars, trams, etc. 
6. Stop someone from riding his or her bike on the sidewalk. 
7. Stop someone from vandalising the bus shelter. 
8. Help someone who cannot speak Dutch very well with a question. 
9. Ask nicely and act politely in order to receive a candy treat. 
 
 As is evident from the above list, the themes of the manners ranged from safety in public 
streets (crossing the street), to criminal acts (vandalism), to public nuisance (dog poop 
and speaking too loudly) in addition to helping those who cannot speak the Dutch 
language. They also included respecting one’s elders and helping those who were less 
fortunate. The activity worked to discipline and mold these children’s behaviour in Dutch 
public spaces.  
 What is important to note here is that activities such as these feed into the notion 
that “allochthonous” children are different and are not receiving the ‘proper education of 
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Dutch moral standards’ in the home (van Bruinessen 2006: 12). This phenomenon was a 
popular narrative recounted to me throughout my research, which stated that Moroccan 
and Turkish youth have a ‘lack of warmth’ at home, meaning that there was a lack of 
direction, parenting, or family atmosphere that could be seen as love or loving 
relationship (Müller 2002). It is also a paradoxical notion given that the stereotype is that 
these cultures spend too much time or focus on the family (as described in the textbook) 
at the expense of public participation. Policy makers believe that this lack of warmth 
contributes to young people’s misbehaviour and their inability to integrate into Dutch 
society effectively, which in turn disconnects them from the Dutch “nation”. Since 
parents are often blamed in this Dutch-centric view they have become targets of 
disciplinary action so that it can be assured that they will be able to raise children who 
become ‘active’ Dutch citizens. To reach this group, city officials have taken ‘Dutch 
cultural education’ to the streets.  
 
It’s your neighbourhood, so it’s your call!23 
 This idea of moral deficiencies as a specific immigrant problem is also supported 
by the ‘Mensen maken de stad’ program (MMdS or People making the city), a program 
that is described as “an assertive social policy: MMdS is a program in which residents are 
mobilized and encouraged to promote greater social cohesion in their street” (Uitermark 
and Duyvendak 2006: 3). The MMdS program involves a series of meetings between 
community workers (Opbouw workers) and residents of particular neighbourhoods and 
                                                 
23
 This is a slogan from the communication campaign for MMdS “Het is jouw wijk dus jij mag het 
zeggen!” which was used in many cities. This slogan is surrounded by pictures of people helping other 
people (for example, pushing a wheelchair, receiving a ball from a police officer, two men in Islamic dress 
talking, caring for the environment, among other things). 
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streets who agree to enact (by signing a contract) certain behaviours while on the street.  
The municipality selects streets that are to be involved according to their low standing on 
the Safety Index, which is an indicator of crime statistics, police reports and individuals’ 
feelings of safety. This is a particularly intensive project with respect to time and 
dedication on both the side of the community workers as well as participating residents.  
The creation of MMdS in 2002-2003 was Rotterdam’s next step in taking an 
active approach in its efforts to clean up the streets in both a physical and security 
respect. MMdS was based on a program called ‘Opzoomer Mee!24’ that sought to 
increase social integration and increase profits in the local economy. Opzoomer projects 
began in the 1980s and were designed to improve the quality of life in disadvantaged 
areas without direct government involvement 25.  
Dutch sociologists Justus Uitermark and Jan Willem Duyvendak (from the 
introduction) argue that the MMdS program operates as a “school for active citizenship” 
that informs “abstract ideals, such as citizenship, participation, diversity” (2006: 3). It 
was thought that Rotterdam faced an extraordinary challenge in regard to social 
integration of its citizens to which the ‘street approach’ was used to address these areas 
where citizens were not actively taking care of their environment. Areas typically 
identified as in need of social regeneration were located in neighbourhoods that had high 
turnover rates, social problems such as public nuisance, and where the collective care for 
the public spaces was absent, namely ‘achterstadswijken’ (literally: backwards 
neighbourhoods) that became Krachtwijken (2006: 4). The report’s authors note that: 
                                                 
24
 Opzoomer refers to neighbourhood initiatives initiated by residents of Opzoomer Street, in Rotterdam, 
who took it upon themselves to better the sociability and liveability of their street (see Chapter 5).  
25
 The exclusion of the governmental representative comes from the healthy distrust and scepticism of 
politicians in Dutch society (see Chapter 1 and 4 for further discussion of this popular distrust). 
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In such a situation, it is not worth it for individual residents (or even dangerous 
for them) to speak with others about indecent behaviour, cleaning up the 
environment, or organising a party for the neighbourhood. These areas are likely 
on the verge of sliding into a hot spot (area where more social and security 
intervention is necessary) that creates a feeling of collective distrust (2006: 4-5). 
  
In this way, this assertive social policy sought to provide services that would foster active 
citizenship where concern about the social and physical environment of the street became 
normalized and where neighbours automatically greeted each other and avoided creating 
any nuisance and littering in the streets (Uitermark and Duyvendak 2006: 5). As noted by 
the authors, “At its core, MMdS is about residents behaving as good citizens in the public 
domain and in this way, the government ensures that good citizenship is sanctioned and 
cultivated” (ibid). The immediate focus of the program, therefore, is restoring social 
cohesion and fostering ‘active citizenship’, especially in those neighbourhoods that have 
a problem with safety (cf. Litjens, Hammenga and Propper 2010).  
Uitermark and Duyvendak’s (2006) report is filled with phrases such as 
‘backward neighbourhoods’ (achterstadswijken), denoting inferiority, and in contrast to 
progressive, clean, and safe neighbourhoods; features of which presumably describe the 
neighbourhood’s inhabitants as well. Unsurprisingly, the residents in backwards 
neighbourhoods areas are, more often than not, predominantly “allochthonous” (CBS 
2010: 140). This report is also interesting because of the language it uses with respect to 
citizenship. The authors argue that citizenship debates in the Netherlands occur chiefly on 
the national level but that these debates should be brought down to what they call ‘street-
citizenship’ (straatburgerschap) and that it is difficult for ‘non-active citizens’ or what 
they term ‘citizens from backwards neighbourhoods’ to take part in national debates 
concerning Dutch identity and belonging because they are already too busy with their 
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‘everyday problems’ and have few skills by which to do so (8). Like Duyvendak’s later 
discussion of the culturalization of citizenship, local acts of active participation are 
thought to provide “allochthonous” residents with a sense of belonging to the “nation” 
and to provide their loyalty to the Dutch “nation” and to the “autochthonous” residents. 
Through this new street citizenship program, ordinary residents are encouraged to 
become active citizens; this, in turn will create bonds and social contacts among them 
(2006: 9). Thus, the street is seen as the place where individuals are able to show their 
allegiance and loyalty to the larger nation.  
The street approach also emphasizes the role of neighbours in helping non-
participants fully integrate into Dutch society, placing responsibility on the shoulders of 
ordinary individuals in reinforcing the conceptions of how to use a particular local space 
that is linked to a national-space in its bid to create active citizens. The following is a 
description from a local community worker concerning the everyday activities associated 
with this program. 
The local community worker, Karim, was one of the main MMdS facilitators in 
Liskwartier. Karim was one of three community workers (Opbouw workers) who worked 
in Rotterdam North (funded through the municipal government) and who has led 
numerous social cohesion and integration projects over the last 13 years. Karim was 
proud of his dual nationalities, Moroccan and Dutch26, and was well liked in the 
community because he was often around and could speak to most Moroccan residents 
who did not speak fluent Dutch. The following is a conversation we had concerning the 
MMdS project:   
                                                 
26
 It is unknown how long Dutch citizens will be able to keep dual passports as Geert Wilders seeks to put 
an end to it (see http://www.dutchnews.nl/news/archives/2010/10/new_government_to_face_its_fir.php).  
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Karim D.: the MMdS is a very intensive project. It is organised through the municipal 
government, those in ‘Opzoomer mee’ and Opbouwwerk (the organisation that 
employs him). A number of streets are chosen, for example in this 
neighbourhood, Liskwartier, we have two streets, Street A and Street B (…). You 
begin with interviewing people on the street by calling on them at their house and 
asking them if you can ask them a list of questions.  We ask questions such as: 
How long have you lived in your street? Is it nice in your street? Do you have 
contact with the other neighbours? Is the contact in your street just like a greeting, 
or do you have them over for coffee?  
 
Then you take all the information that you get from the street and try to figure out 
what the street ‘needs’. After this initial period, you hold a couple of meetings 
(straat afspraak) with the residents to which the neighbours must come. Before 
you start anything, you must have interviewed at least 50% of neighbours from 
the street. So if there are 100 inhabitants, you must have 50 interviews. You must 
also collect their signatures as well because this binds them to taking part in the 
program. So yeah, it is very intensive process and it takes a lot of time.  
 
We conduct interviews both during the day and at night. Luckily, there is always 
another worker with you. You both walk around in the midday and make plans 
with the residents about when they would be available to have a meeting with 
you. Then with your schedule, you go around and visit the residents one-by-one. 
You have to go in the evenings because, you know, people also work and you 
have to get to them as well. As you get the interviews and collect the signatures 
from the residents, then you extend an invitation to your contact at the municipal 
government (deelgemeente) and have a meeting with them to discuss the 
understanding of the residents and what you think should happen. Then you select 
point people (gangmakers) from the street, about 4, and they become the contact 
persons from the street (to both he and the neighbours) and with them you can 
initiate street activities. With these people you do activities in the street and give 
them the supporting funds for these activities. In the first year you give them 1000 
Euros and in the second year, they can get 500 Euros. The whole process lasts for 
about two years. And then one year after that, you continue to speak with the 
residents, with the municipal government and with the people from Opzoomer 
mee, about whether they are satisfied and they can continue receiving funding 
(from Opzoomer) for activities if necessary (…). It is a very good method, but 
also very intensive. 
 
Jennifer Long: Does it work? 
 
KD:  In some streets it works very well because the point people are enthusiastic and 
make good contact people in the street. Then you see that some residents become 
more active, for example, they become point persons who set up new activities on 
their own. They can write the letters themselves, call on other neighbours by 
themselves, etc. So yes, in some streets it works well.  
 
85 
 
On other streets, however, there are more troubles and in these streets and I have 
to work harder to find out what it takes to get people involved. (…) For example, 
in Street A, the residents have taken up all the organizing roles themselves. It 
helps that they have the same background and so it works well. However, in 
Street B, it is a very different street and so it is difficult. There is enough interest 
in the program but the residents are more individually-oriented and have little 
contact with one another. So this sort of street is in need of more attention and so I 
have to work harder to help that growth happen.  
 
Despite the heavy workload and demands on both his and the residents’ time, Karim went 
on to say that the MMdS program was a good method overall for reaching residents 
because it did not focus on one particular group, such as “allochthons”, but instead, 
approached each resident of a given area. In this way, Karim believed that neighbourhood 
problems were community problems and not just the cause of one particular group. 
According to Karim, this program had a contagious effect: “the idea with the 
neighbourhood approach is that it transforms not only the street, but the next street, and 
the next, and so on until the whole neighbourhood has changed”. Thus, despite the 
somewhat problematic rhetoric of the MMdS program, according to Karim’s experiences 
it was one of the more inclusive social integration programs. 
Karim’s conclusions were seconded by a resident of Old North, a neighbourhood 
bordering both Liskwartier and Bergpolder in Rotterdam North. This neighbourhood, like 
Bergpolder, is a Krachtwijk and has a mixed income population; however, it has a 
majority of non-western “allochthon” residents. This resident, Kurt, had lived in Old 
North for over 15 years and spent much of his time photographing local events and 
participating in projects in Rotterdam North. Kurt’s experiences with the MMdS program 
include his attendance at one of the preliminary meetings that he described in the 
following terms:  
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  There were 50 people of different ages (there). There were more immigrants than 
natives there, and many women who wore headscarves. It was such a mixed 
group and I think it was a good reflection of the residents who live here in the 
district because there are more immigrants than natives living in Old North. I 
thought that the presence of many foreigners was a success for the organization.  
 
We had to divide into groups of eight to ten people and sit around tables. We 
began to introduce ourselves. There were very different people: uneducated, 
educated, unmarried mothers, children, students, traditional Muslim men and 
seniors. Every table received a list of questions that we had to discuss as a group, 
and ours was: what is most dear for you in your life that you always want to keep? 
The second question on our sheet was: what did you dream that you wish to come 
true? When we spoke together there was a lot of respect and curiosity of the 
habits and customs of each other. Everyone was open to others opinion. (…) It's 
so wonderful that almost everyone went and spoke about very personal stories 
about their own lives and the changes they have experienced.  
 
I had never before experienced such an evening and found it very surprising. 
Normally you do not speak so openly and honestly with an unfamiliar person 
about your life but almost everyone expressed their views. Only the older 
traditional Muslim man had little to say. He did however speak about the fact that 
his family means everything to him and that he would find it terrible if he ever 
lost his photographs and papers of his family. Then a Muslim woman was again 
very open and talked about her diary how she now began to write columns and 
ambitions of starting to publish. She is studying social work now. We listened to 
each other and asked questions. It was fun and educational. You become a bit 
optimistic if people are so open and honest about their experiences! 
 
This event is pictured below in a photograph taken by Kurt himself: 
 
Photo of ‘Dag van Dialoog’ (with permission of the photographer) 
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Kurt, like Karim, found positive aspects to participating in these events despite their 
arguably paternalistic approach. In discussions that I had with other community workers, 
however, I was also told that the MMdS process was at times “forced upon certain 
residents because they are perceived to live in a disadvantaged area” and that these 
residents are targeted because “they do not want to take part in such social-bonding 
projects”. This feeling was also present in some of the adjectives that Karim used to 
describe the program, such as ‘intensive’, and when he described how he must involve at 
least 50 percent of the residents on the street, a standard which is set by the government 
and not by the voluntary participation of residents. Thus, it is apparent that there are a 
variety of responses and experiences of this program. Yet, the very existence of such 
intensive programming points to the fact that government authorities believe there to be 
insufficient cohesion among these mixed communities. Although the authorities hope to 
directly influence the behaviours of those who are involved in the meeting process, they 
have instituted other instruments used to influence individuals who did not participate in 
these meetings, that is, through public signage.   
 In addition to the meetings, when walking onto an MMdS street, one would 
encounter an MMdS board at the top and bottom of every street. The boards are located 
approximately 6 feet up the wall and are affixed to the end lot. An example of what is on 
this board can be seen in the photo below. Below is typical of MMdS boards: 
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Photo of MMdS board (from straatjutten.nl) 
 
Translated, this text reads: Neighbours of Aegidiusstraat (name of the street) 
1. We greet each other like good neighbours  
2. We heartily welcome new residents 
3. We find it nice to meet one another and therefore we organise two events per year 
4. The (open) plane is for everyone: we leave no mess behind and after 8pm is it quiet 
…and let’s speak to one another about this! 
 
MMdS boards include any rules of behaviour that the neighbours and community 
workers approve of, and are tailored to the perceived needs of the street. During my 
fieldwork, I saw signs that included such rules as: ‘we will clean up after ourselves’, ‘we 
will play football (soccer) with a plastic ball’, ‘we will look at one another while 
speaking with them’ ‘we will work toward making a greener street’ and ‘we will speak 
with one another in a nice manner’. 
According to the aforementioned report, the boards are the most concrete 
manifestation of the MMdS program (Uitermark and Duyvendak 2006:18). The point of 
having these boards, as emphasized by the authors, is the fact that it makes the residents 
responsible for others’ behaviours in their street (as well as their own), in addition to 
making the street a place where the residents feel responsible for overseeing behaviours. 
It is also the case that policy makers hope to create a space where inhabitants will belong, 
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“for example, visitors to the Square Joseph are told by the sign that it is ‘our square’. In 
streets and squares, there are signs with rules (that are meant to be) subtle reminders that 
nuisance or visiting criminals will not be tolerated and not go unnoticed” (ibid). The 
authors believe, however, that it is not the sign itself that produces more watchful and 
active citizens, but rather, the “process whereby a group of residents take responsibility 
and make others accountable for their (own) actions, and to be accountable to the police, 
the district, the corporation, and Roteb (the company that employs Rotterdam’s rubbish 
collectors and street cleaners)”, is what is of importance (Uitermark and Duyvendak 
2006:18). 
Despite the fact that these boards are made through a participatory process, it is 
remarkable to see such transparent direction outlining the ‘ideal behaviour’ to be enacted 
while in the public places of the street. As per Lefebvre’s understandings, these directions 
would reproduce the conceived ideas of space, that is, how the creators and maintainers 
of public spaces wish it to be used. Needless to say these rules are not always followed; 
for example, on a street in Liskwartier that had an MMdS sign, there was an issue with 
teenage boys hanging around on street benches after dark (in violation of the quiet 
atmosphere after 10 pm).  
In addition to these boards, there are also ‘greeting zones’ put in place in 2003 by 
one of the political parties (Green Left, Groen Links) in Rotterdam. These signs have a 
big waving hand on them with supporting text stating: ‘greeting is allowed’. The purpose 
of these boards is to encourage residents to say hello to one another. It was thought that 
the act of saying hello to a fellow neighbour in the street would create a more positive 
atmosphere and decrease anonymity between neighbours: “If the residents of a street get 
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to know each other, people will look after each other (in the right sense of the word) and 
take care of their neighbourhood” (Lelieveldt 2008: 327). Lelieveldt (2008) argues that 
these signs have worked to improve the overall situation on the street between 
neighbours; yet, he does not question the accompanying governmentality of designing 
behaviour in space. Although the residents on participating streets create their own 
unique boards to suit their specific street’s needs, the boards and the program itself still 
follow the larger understanding that residents should have social relationships with other 
residents on the street in order to increase active citizenship.  
Boards outlining proper behaviour seem to be a popular approach as a 
municipally funded community organization, Welzijn Noord (the organisation that 
facilitated ‘The Week of Good Morals’ in Liskwartier), also made boards outlining 
proper behaviour for children. Following their presentation to the local school, these 
boards were fastened to the wall across the street from the school. 
 
Photo of ‘Welcome in Liskwartier’ Board 
Below the pictures on these plaques are phrases that translate (from left to right): 
we greet each other; we care for our neighbourhood; a promise is a promise; we talk our 
arguments out; we listen to one another; and we speak to each other like we wish to be 
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spoken to. The emphasis on outlining behaviour in public places is evident. Like the 
MMdS signs, these boards were located in ‘backward’ areas, that is, areas with large 
“allochthonous” youth populations. The similarity between the content of these signs is 
also apparent as both focus inter-group cohesion; for example, in the top-left and bottom-
right pictures, one figure is wearing a headscarf while the other lacks notable 
denominational or cultural symbols. There is not much information concerning whether 
or not these signs achieve their respective goals (cf. Lelieveldt 2006; Stokkom and 
Toenders 2010) but as has been shown in this sub-section, there is a trend in social 
programming supported by the government to regulate behaviour in public place that is 
largely directed at “allochthonous” individuals. This can be seen to be in line with the 
integration program associated with the immigration of “allochthonous” individuals into 
Dutch society.  
Consequently, these signs also reinforce the understanding of difference among 
the residents of the neighbourhood through the focus upon particular set of appropriate 
“Dutch” behaviours that are to be followed by everyone. Furthermore, the fact that 
MMdS programs and programs such as the ‘Week of the Good Morals’ are featured 
largely in ‘backwards neighbourhoods’ reiterates the difference of residents within these 
area, the largest number of whom are “allochthonous” individuals.  
In this chapter, I have argued that integration courses and certain neighbourhood 
programs teach a set of “Dutch” cultural attributes that “allochthonous” individuals are 
expected to follow while in public space. These integration programs and educational 
avenues promote a cultural understanding of ‘active citizenship’ that strays from previous 
conceptions of citizenship in earlier decades (see Chapter 1). Furthermore, it is clear that 
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these programs and those individuals who are involved with them (whether they are 
officials or scholars who work to design such courses or the teachers who provide lessons 
at the neighbourhood level) place more responsibility on “allochthons” to prove their 
worth as citizens and their willingness to adopt “Dutch” cultural ways.  
The very existence of such courses and the peculiar selection of students highlight 
“allochthons” and “allochthonous” behaviour as unacceptable and identify “autochthons” 
and “Dutch” culture as (automatically) acceptable, regardless of the context. The 
trajectory of such education, and their underlying discourses, reflect a growing populist 
conservatism in the Netherlands that projects a need to protect the Dutch “culture” 
against the threat posed by outsiders and to diffuse one set of “Dutch” ideals to those who 
are marked as different, instead of living in a pluralistic society, for example. This 
direction indicates a narrowing of the vision of tolerance in the Netherlands where more 
essentialized and homogenized models for society are fanning the rhetoric that 
differentiates between “us” and “them”. 
 The experiences addressed in this chapter bring together two threads for future 
discussion in the coming chapters: first, there remains a disparity between how certain 
people use public places and how neighbourhood and district government (Rotterdam 
North) workers believe these places should be used. This is evident through the numerous 
programs that are directed at improving behaviour and social relationships in 
neighbourhood spaces. The second theme that resonates in future chapters is the 
connection between being an ‘active citizen’ and the act of participation. As we saw 
above, in order to be an active citizen in the rhetoric of integration education, one had to 
participate in Dutch society. It is thought that actively involving residents in the 
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neighbourhood will provide the opportunity to ‘bridge different cultures’ (Welzijnnoord 
Rotterdam 2008). What will come to the fore in the next chapter is that the participation 
process emphasizes the perception that “allochthonous” individuals do not participate 
enough and are not active citizens, and are thus different from “autochthons”; however, 
this status can be ameliorated by behaving like “autochthons” in public spaces. Therefore, 
the programs are designed for different populations along lines of “allochthon” and 
“autochthon”. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
“IT’S ALL ABOUT WHO YOU KNOW!” CREATING NEIGHBOURHOOD PUBLIC PLACES 
 
In this chapter, I will explore the process of creating public spaces through government-
led initiatives as well as through “autochthon”-led initiatives in order to demonstrate how 
understandings of “Dutch” culture and how being an ‘active citizen’ are accepted 
attributes of Dutch national identity. According to Lefebvre, it is urban planners and city 
officials who design and define the rules of how individuals should be using public places 
(1991 [1974]: 33). This was also the case in Dutch urban planning policy until the release 
of the Major Cities Policy in 1995, which not only sought to renew vast areas of 
Rotterdam’s post-WWII housing, but also incorporated social renewal programs through 
the active involvement of citizens, companies, and institutions in urban renewal projects 
(Priemus 2005: 6). This direction of incorporating ordinary citizens into urban renewal 
intensified following Pim Fortuyn’s popularity in the polls in 2001. Following up on one 
of Fortuyn’s most popular political contentions (that is, that something had to be done 
about the considerable gap that existed between the political elite and their citizenry), 
officials began to open up avenues for participation to gather residents’ ideas and critical 
views on government-led projects. This approach evidently worked as can be seen from 
the growing role of residents in the urban restructuring process. This “participatory” 
approach aimed at creating social ties among residents in the neighbourhood and was 
thought to be more successful with resident input than with those ventures that had been 
instituted ‘from above’ (cf. Priemus 2005; van Beckhoven et al. 2009b).  
During my fieldwork, I observed ordinary citizens taking part in renewal projects 
for the public places of their neighbourhood, for example, in the conservation of 
neighbourhood gardens, or in more large-scale development that sought to gentrify entire 
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neighbourhood areas. While there remained some scepticism as to the extent to which 
their opinions mattered, residents willingly participated in meetings, information nights, 
and focus groups in order to provide their input and feedback to the planning authorities. 
Yet, from the very beginning of my research, it was apparent that the majority of 
individuals who participated in the feedback process for neighbourhood projects (that I 
was involved with), were people who would be described as “autochthonous” residents.  
For example, at one of my very first meetings concerning the government-led 
renewal project of the southern blocks of Bergpolder, I mentioned to Albert, a man 
attending the meeting, that there did not seem to be many residents from the 
neighbourhood itself. This was evident because Bergpolder South (Bergpolder Zuid) has 
a demographically mixed population27, yet, aside from the representatives from Iskender, 
the local Turkish Cultural Centre and Mosque, there were few individuals from this 
community. The man with whom I was speaking, Albert, was in his early 20s and was 
finishing his studies at the Erasmus University in Rotterdam. He did not live in 
Rotterdam North but instead worked as an intern for the housing corporation Vestia28, 
which owns and is in charge of renovating not only the buildings in the area but also, the 
affected environment. He was knowledgeable about the project because the renewal 
project of Bergpolder South was his assignment while he was interning there. In response 
to my observation about the mix of attendees, or lack thereof, he said: “Now that is 
something you can do with your research. If you can figure out how to gather the 
                                                 
27
 There are no statistics outlining the exact numbers of “allochthonous” vs. “autochthonous” residents in 
Bergpolder South. Instead, I refer to Chapter 1’s demographic information that states that Bergpolder has 
an above national average of residents who are categorised as non-western “allochthonous” individuals that 
is 36 percent (as opposed to the national average of 11 percent) (Bergpolder en Liskwartier 2011b). From 
my own observations, the majority of “allochthonous” residents live in the Bergpolder South area. 
28
 Vestia is a housing corporation that provides cheap, clean, and well-made accommodation for individuals 
who could not otherwise afford such housing, see below.  
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opinions of the “allochthonous” residents, then everyone would be happy. That is what 
everyone wants to know!” According to Albert, the “allochthonous” residents of the area 
did not typically participate in the gatherings concerning the future construction of their 
own neighbourhood, and Albert felt that housing corporations had little recourse when he 
stated: 
What are you going to do about it? If we say to them (“autochthonous” residents), 
“Oh sorry, we appreciate you coming out but we’d rather have the opinions of the 
allochthonous residents”, then you’re not being fair to them because they are here 
and they want to participate. And truthfully, you’d have no one left to get 
feedback from (if you asked them to leave), because you don’t see a lot of 
allochthon at these meetings. So, you (speaking for the housing corporation) take 
what you can get. 
 
As argued by van de Wijdeven and Hendriks (2009), the Dutch meeting-room 
culture, as they call it, is “biased toward white, highly educated, male participants” (125). 
This organization style was apparent throughout the Bergpolder South. The participatory 
events, for example, were formal, beginning with a presentation about the project after 
which participants raised questions and made comments. These meetings were held at the 
district government office building and typically were scheduled after six o’clock in the 
evening. This style of participation platform arguably appeals to, and is only available to, 
a certain number of residents who are available at this time of day and who feel at ease in 
this setting. In line with van de Wijdeven and Hendriks (2009), I argue that the design 
and environment created for the feedback process influence which individuals were able 
to participate in neighbourhood projects. This is an important factor in the everyday 
politics of belonging; as my research argues, participating in one’s neighbourhood is a 
feature of active citizenry and a factor in belonging to the majority. This connection had 
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resounding effects for the “allochthon” population who were perceived as not 
participating enough in the community. 
 
Being a Good Neighbour: renewing Bergpolder South 
Bergpolder South is located in the borough of Rotterdam North and includes areas 
of both Bergpolder and Liskwartier. 
 
Map of Bergpolder South (available at: http://www.rotterdam.nl/bp3738) 
As outlined in Chapter 1, the Minister of Housing, Districts and Integration designated 
Bergpolder as a neighbourhood in need of attention known as a Krachtwijk in 2007. 
Bergpolder was added to the list of problematic neighbourhoods because it had a high 
turnover rate of inhabitants (thought to be a result of the small housing units found in this 
neighbourhood); moderate air quality (due to its location next to a major highway); small, 
cluttered streets that were thought to be dirty and often disturbed by nuisances such as car 
break-ins; as well as a limited supply of social facilities such as opportunities for sports, 
art, and culture. Due to these issues and the fact that the federal government stopped 
financing WWII renewal schemes for Rotterdam (for which Bergpolder received 
funding) around the same time, the municipal and district government with Vestia 
98 
 
decided to address the current state of Bergpolder South through urban renewal (Master 
Plan Bergpolder Zuid/South [MPBZ] 2011: 15).  
Vestia released the Master Plan for Bergpolder South (Masterplan Bergpolder 
Zuid, MPBZ) in May 2011 that provided an in-depth account of projects that were slated 
for completion in the year 2020. One example of these renovation projects involves 
converting many of the smaller two and three bedroom apartments, that comprised 80 
percent of the housing stock available in Bergpolder, into larger single-family dwellings 
(MPBZ 2011: 29, 39). Urban planners thought that by providing bigger houses, students, 
entrepreneurs, and young families would be able to stay in Bergpolder instead of moving 
out of the neighbourhood; this plan aimed to slow the high turnover rate of residents. 
Attention will also be given to public buildings and outdoor public parks and open 
spaces as the master plan proposed to tear down some housing blocks in order to make 
way for green spaces and small gardens for current residents (2011:21, 93-96). According 
to the planners, by creating a more ‘liveable’ environment, more residents would be 
willing to stay in the area and take care of their neighbourhood (2011: 17, 19). To date, 
housing and government officials in charge of the neighbourhood renovation have built 
an underground parking garage to address the issue of street congestion in the 
neighbourhood by lessening the number of cars on the street29. At the moment, financial 
aspects are being finalized before more renovations are scheduled.  
Additional controls that influenced the planning process included heritage 
services in Rotterdam, which declared protective status for certain buildings and 
architectural styles in the area, for example, renovation of the facade of certain houses 
                                                 
29
 This project was one of the preliminary developments leading up to larger regeneration plans, which was 
completed at the end of 2010. 
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must remain at the same height (MPBZ 2011). One such protected structure is the 
Hofplein Line (Hofplein Lijn). This 1.9 km long viaduct runs through the eastern border 
of this area. Closed in August of 2010, this defunct railway line (more specifically the 
archways under the raised viaduct) and its adjoining stations will be left intact and 
renovated in order to provide space for small shops, support services, and cultural centers 
for the community (MPBZ 2011: 31, 35, 53, 63, 65). Future building projects for this 
space include expanding the number of spaces found under the archways that have been 
converted into shops and transforming the track space into either a cycling path or a 
walking route to the city centre (for more information about the Hofplein Line see 
below). In this way, the planning committee hoped to boost local economic infrastructure 
and make Bergpolder an attractive area for ‘creative’ urban residents, such as artists 
(MPBZ 2011: 19).  
Diversifying the housing stock in post-WWII neighbourhoods is typical of 
contemporary urban renewal projects because the housing stock of this era was built in a 
period of housing shortage resulting in cheap and quick constructions made from 
prefabricated materials that produced a similar design on the outside and inside. 
According to van Kempen et al. (2009), homogeneity of the housing stock does not allow 
residents to remain within a single area because they are forced to move out to either 
expand or downsize (271). In areas with cheap and smaller housing, like Bergpolder 
South, there is generally a high turnover rate of individuals because those with the 
financial capacity to live in larger dwellings move out of the neighbourhood, leaving 
behind a more homogeneous population of those with less financial resources. This 
demographic is problematic according to Dutch city officials and urban planners because 
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it is believed that this population will have lower levels of civic engagement and little 
opportunity to better their social and economic circumstances due to decreased ‘bridging’ 
ties among residents.  
Using Granovetter’s (1973) and Putnam’s (2000) work on civic engagement and 
social connections among diverse urban communities, van Kempen et al. (2009) define 
bonding ties as relationships between people where not much ‘new information’ is 
exchanged and thought to be typical of ties between members of the same economic or 
social group; whereas bridging ties refer to relationships where much ‘world-wide 
information’ is exchanged between members of different economic and social groups, for 
example, employment opportunities or the dissemination of social norms (270). 
Kleinhans et al. (2007), who conducted their research in the Netherlands, found that 
individuals with higher incomes, higher education levels, and who lived in single-family 
dwellings had the highest level of social capital in the neighbourhood (1058). 
Furthermore, in this model, middle- and upper-class residents are thought to be good 
role-models for the lower-classes, increase social capital in the area, and improve the 
social contact and cohesion of the area (van Kempen et al. 2009: 271). Thus, having 
fewer higher classes of residents in any neighbourhood is thought to decrease the 
opportunities to create bridging connections for the lower classes. Fewer bridging ties are 
thought to lead to lower levels of sociability and liveability in a neighbourhood and 
decreasing opportunities for lower class residents to improve their levels of social, 
cultural, and economic capital (ibid).  
Concerning civic engagement, van Steden et al.’s research in the Netherlands 
showed that middle-class residents are more inclined to be civically engaged and to take 
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care of their neighbourhood (2011). According to such a view,  having a homogeneous 
population will lead to decreased civic engagement among the population, which in turn 
leads to more social and physical problems in the neighbourhood. This view is echoed by 
Putnam (1995), who noted that: 
For a variety of reasons, life is easier in a community blessed with a substantial 
stock of social capital. In the first place, networks of civic engagement foster 
sturdy norms of generalized reciprocity and encourage the emergence of social 
trust. Such networks facilitate coordination and communication, amplify 
reputations, and thus allow dilemmas of collective action to be resolved (67). 
 
Networks among various social and economic groups within the population are thought 
to garner a more collective outlook and provide a framework that supports future 
collaborations among residents (ibid).  
Recent research, however, has pointed out that the vast majority of middle-class 
residents living in mixed neighbourhoods tend to have closer relationships with those 
residents in the same economic class as themselves, regardless of other social or cultural 
attributes (Bolt et al. 2008; Musterd and Pinkster 2009; van der Graaf and Veldboer 
2009). Van Beckhoven and van Kempen (2003) sum up this phenomenon succinctly: 
“people in neighbourhoods seem to live alongside each other, not together” (871). 
Despite this, the Dutch authorities continue to operate and create urban planning schemes 
based on the assumption that urban renewal projects should work to bond middle and 
upper class residents to urban neighbourhoods so that they will introduce their lower-
class neighbours to larger social networks that will eventually improve the lower-class’ 
access to educational and employment opportunities and access to the “right kind of 
social capital” (van der Graaf and Veldboer 2009:63). Using Bourdieu’s theory of capital 
(1986), and in line with my own use of such terms in this dissertation, the authors defined 
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social capital as “resources that are accessible through social contacts, social networks, 
reciprocity, norms and trust” (1070; see introduction for my own definition). This model 
of creating mixed neighbourhoods assumes that marginalized individuals only need extra 
social and cultural capital in order to be successful in Dutch society. This approach 
camouflages structural inequalities between ‘native’ Dutch and immigrants, which the 
majority of those with the highest level of social, cultural, and economic capital are 
“autochthonous” residents30. To further explore this dimension, I will now provide an 
overview of Vestia’s participatory process for the Bergpolder South project. 
 
Participating in Bergpolder South 
Vestia and the district government, who are in charge of the Bergpolder South 
renovation project, determined that they had been successful in getting feedback from 
residents through an extensive feedback and participation process (MPBZ 2011: 117). 
According to the Master Plan, Vestia and the government ensured they had contact with 
local stakeholders who included: business owners, neighbourhood groups, and residents 
(MPBZ 2011:19). This participation process began with five ‘resident evenings’ 
(bewoners avonden) between February and April 2010, where planners laid out their 
                                                 
30
 According the Statistics Netherlands (CBS) 2010 report on integration, “non-western immigrants have 
substantially lower incomes than natives and western immigrants, which applies to non-western immigrants 
in both the first and second generation” (107; cf. Lautenbach and Otten 2007). According to this report, the 
average annual income in 2008 for ‘natives’ (“autochthonous” individuals) reached 25,000 Euros (108). 
The average income for those individuals identified as non-western “allochthon” was only 18,000 Euros, 
per household, per year (ibid). Furthermore, nearly half of non-western “allochthonous” families had an 
income in the lowest income bracket while only six percent of autochthonous families did (110). This 
report also found that Turkish and Moroccan incomes raised the least throughout their lives and that they 
were more likely not to advance throughout their careers (109). Overall, of the non-western 
“allochthonous” groups, Moroccan’s continued to be the lowest-earning group and the Surinamese the 
highest earning; both outcomes are said to depend on their employment status (110). 
103 
 
initial drawings and requested feedback from attendees as new versions of the plan were 
developed (2011: 113).  
 Overall, the Master Plan stated that respondents wished to see an increase in the 
number of green spaces in the area and renovation of degenerated buildings that had 
already been mostly empty for a number of years (MPBZ 2011:117). Further, residents 
wanted the character of the area to remain the same; more specifically, it was mentioned 
that residents wanted to maintain the “mixed character” of the neighbourhood (this was 
most often interpreted as the perceived social, cultural, and economic mix), in addition to 
building in line with the pre-war architecture that already dominated the area. Finally, 
residents agreed that the Hofplein Line should be developed into something that benefited 
the entire neighbourhood community (ibid). 
From my own experiences at these events, participants at these evenings were a 
diverse group, in terms of their age, occupation, and income. What follows is a brief 
profile of some of the more frequent attendees at these meetings. Hendrijk is a retired 
government employee who wrote municipal policies on immigration during the 1970s 
and 1980s and who lives on the Bergsingel (a street with upscale housing and water 
canal); he leads the Neighbourhood Organisation of Liskwartier (BOL). Josephine is a 
retired lecturer from the Technical University of Delft, who was active in city renewal 
projects in the Jordaan in Amsterdam. She lives on the Bergselaan, another street with 
owned housing and tall trees, and is the head of the Friends of the Hofbogen31 workgroup 
(Vrienden van de Hofbogen or VH). Josephine also substituted for Hendrijk, when he was 
away as the head of BOL. Caroline is a Bergpolder resident in her late forties who is also 
                                                 
31
 Hofbogen denotes the archways underneath the Hofplein Line and therefore, this group works in tandem 
with other groups dedicated to the planning of the Hofplein viaduct. 
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a member of the BOL, the VH workgroup, the multicultural choir group (Multikulticor), 
and the Bergpolder Theatrical Group. Reni is around 20 years of age, and a resident of 
Old North whose parents were born outside the Netherlands in South America. He 
completed a semester of his Master’s degree in Canada. He works at an indie cinema in 
Rotterdam and volunteered for the International Film Festival when it came to 
Rotterdam. Reni is interested in the Bergpolder South project because one of the plans for 
the defunct Bergweg station (located in Bergpolder) is to establish an independent film 
theatre, called Northern Cinema (Noorder Bioscoop). Willem, a mid-sixties photographic 
journalist, is active in his own neighbourhood of Old North (bordering Bergpolder and 
Liskwartier) in addition to volunteering for the VH and the Northern Cinema project. Piet 
is a new homeowner to Bergpolder, in his early 30s, who works as the editor for the 
neighbourhood newspaper (Het Bolwerk) and as a contract photographic journalist for 
other Rotterdam North newspapers. Lastly, Ertrugul is a 22 year-old whose parents 
immigrated to the Netherlands from Turkey. Ertrugul has recently become a member of 
the Neighbourhood Organisation of Bergpolder (that works out of the same office as the 
BOL in Liskwartier) and works as a volunteer for Willpower Works (Wilskrachtwerk), a 
volunteer placement agency that facilitates programming at the BNC, and other centers 
around Rotterdam. With the exception of Reni and Ertugrul, who would be considered 
well-integrated “allochthons”, the most active participants were “autochthons”. 
These evenings typically began with an introductory speech or presentation and 
broke off into smaller groups where workers explained the maps and charts that were laid 
out on tables. Participants were asked to make notes that were then attached to the 
documents themselves or written on a page of chart paper so that all attendees could see 
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them and comment on each other’s feedback as well as the plan itself. Within a couple of 
weeks, summaries of the participants’ feedback were sent out (via email) in preparation 
for the next event or meeting. These evenings were held in a couple of different locations, 
for example in the local government building, the defunct railway station of the Hofplein 
Line (MPBZ 2011: 115). In order to advertise these nights, letters, information papers, 
and fliers were distributed to the addresses in the affected area and advertisements were 
sent out around the district and distributed on the public squares on the week leading up 
to the meetings.  
In addition to these resident evenings, Vestia and the district government invited 
residents to join a consulting group (klankbord groep), which began in June 2010. This 
group was created to provide more in-depth feedback about the process of the master plan 
with representatives of the government and housing corporation (MPBZ 2011: 113). I 
myself was able to attend some of the meetings of the consulting group in June and July. 
Planners also held debate weeks where residents could come by and discuss the current 
plan (first in June and then in October 2010). The stakeholders also held a ‘Mirror 
Evening’ in September where residents could answer the question: “have we heard you 
correctly?” This meeting was held in response to certain negative feelings concerning the 
direction of the planning process felt within the community. Finally, there was a closing 
debate where residents were presented with the latest draft of the Master Plan before it 
was finalised (MPBZ 2011: 117). 
The decision was made to host an additional meeting to encourage 
“allochthonous” participation. Representatives from the local Turkish, Iskender Cultural 
Center and Mosque, located in Bergpolder South, had requested that the meetings take 
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place outside the time of Ramadan and a meeting was held at the centre in late 2010. In 
hosting a meeting at the local cultural center and mosque, it was thought that a more 
diverse crowd would attend. Jacco, Bergpolder’s government director, was quoted in a 
local publication as saying,  
It is too bad that the people who are participating in the meetings do not really 
reflect the residents (who live in the area). To involve everyone, we have had one 
of the meetings in the building where the mosque is located. At this event, more 
attendees had diverse backgrounds (Via Vestia, Winter 2010: 4). 
 
The extra effort on behalf of the organizers to collect more representative feedback 
concerning neighbourhood renovations is notable and speaks to the importance of 
diversity for district government employees; however, this approach also highlights 
“allochthonous” difference at the same time that it seeks to incorporate ‘their’ feedback. 
Jacco’s comments are also interesting because he connects the space of the meeting as a 
method to reach residents from the area who are largely perceived as “allochthonous” 
individuals. As stated in previous chapters, there is a strong perception that 
“allochthonous” individuals are also identified as Muslims. These individuals are also the 
group that are often described as not participating in neighbourhood events and in Dutch 
society in general, as was the perceived outcome of the meeting held in the mosque. 
Importantly, despite what appears to be an enormous effort at collecting residents’ 
opinions, residents critiqued the planners because it was thought that the plans for the 
neighbourhood were already completed and that the advice from these participation 
platforms was not actually used by any of the planners. The authors of the final Master 
Plan document stated that “residents were always clearly informed of the particular 
purpose of the evening or the conversation” and that throughout the entire process, it was 
always clear to the participants that while their participation was appreciated, “the 
107 
 
decision (of the future project) rests with the parties who are planning it, namely Vestia 
Rotterdam Noord (the Rotterdam North section of Vestia) and the district government of 
Rotterdam North” (MPBZ 2011:117).  
To better understand the process whereby the views of the residents were 
supposedly incorporated into the plans for Bergpolder South, I spoke with Anton who 
worked in the district government offices and was the liaison between the district 
government and Vestia. I asked Anton, who almost always attended the planning 
meetings, why it was so important for the housing corporation and the government to 
collect input from residents to which he said, “If you renovate a street, it’s a good idea if 
you get the cooperation of those who live there! Of course!” and continued: 
The government is becoming more aware that residents have knowledge about 
what is going on here in the neighbourhood. In my other work, for example, we 
were renovating around another light-rail train line that runs from Gouda to the 
coast (Noord Wijk) via Leiden. One evening, I had a meeting with local people 
about this project as I was hired to facilitate that meeting. There was a woman 
there and at one point, she pointed to the maps that we had open on the table and 
said “What you have drawn here (pointing to the plan) is not possible”. “No”, we 
said, “look here, it is possible” and they measured the distances and concluded 
that their calculations were right. She said, “No, you see I walk here every 
morning with my dog and there is a shop there. Every morning, a truck comes by 
and does a turnaround in this area. Trucks use this space in this way all the time 
so what you have planned here will make that impossible”. This bit of knowledge 
is something that we wouldn’t have known otherwise because we don’t live there. 
Residents give you insight into how exactly people behave and react in that space.  
 
It is obvious that Anton finds residents’ knowledge both useful and insightful. Thus, 
allowing residents to participate from Anton’s point of view is not just a political ‘trick’ 
to appease the voters but is something that makes the process of renovating a 
neighbourhood easier. I then asked him to speak about residents’ feedback in response to 
the Bergpolder South project.  
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Anton: In the Bergpolder project, we have the sounding board group and we ask the 
people their opinions on everything. (...) This is important because it is not only 
on the final revision of the plan that they’re asked about but they are asked about 
the process itself. It doesn’t mean that what they say, we’ll do, but what they say, 
will indeed contribute to the planning process. But in order to do this, you have to 
be very clear at the beginning about what the participants are able to give 
feedback to you about, because there are simply some things that you cannot ask 
the people about. 
 
 JL:    What sort of things can you not ask them about? 
 
A: Well, for example, there will be some buildings that will be torn down because 
they are so old and it would be far more expensive to renovate than to just tear 
them down. You cannot ask the tenants of that building “Well, what do you think 
about that?” (i.e. Can we do this?) because the tenants will of course say “No!” In 
the end, the cost of the renovations are paid by the owners of the buildings, so 
sometimes you have to decide with the owners, in this case, Vestia. But, the 
important thing is that you are clear from the beginning in terms of what role 
people can play in participating.  
 
It is important to note the caveat that Anton makes in regard to the final decision when he 
states that at times ‘one must defer to those who are paying for the renovations or own 
the buildings’, and his allusion to asking residents certain questions that may ignore some 
of their deepest issues with a particular plan. Residents’ participation is also at the behest 
of the government and stakeholders, that is, these parties decide to what extent and at 
what times residents can be involved in the planning process (van Beckhoven et al. 2009 
a: 220). It appears that, in line with de Certeau’s understanding of how public spaces are 
designed, and rules for usage conceived, the ultimate power (the final say) still lies within 
the hands of the urban planners and government officials of this project, or “the strong”.  
 Regarding this specific regeneration project, I spoke to a few individuals who 
were extremely unhappy with the projected plans due to the unclear or condemned state 
of their own houses. One such woman, Sylvie, lives in an apartment in a building that is 
currently waiting for a plan to be assigned to it; however, as she states below, she 
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believes that her building will eventually be torn down. At the time of this discussion, in 
early February 2010, residents had just received the initial ‘Ambition Document’ that 
discussed proposed plans for the area. Sylvie, a woman in her early 40s, would be 
identified as an “autochthonous” individual having parents who were both born and 
raised in the Netherlands; however, her husband, who was born in Africa and who 
immigrated to the Netherlands, would be identified as “allochthonous” and therefore, any 
children that they might have would also be categorised as “allochthonous”.  The 
following are Sylvie’s experiences with the Bergpolder South gentrification project: 
In this building here (where she lives), some apartments are privately owned, like 
mine, while others are owned by Vestia. (…) So, I went to Vestia and asked if we 
could work together to maintain the building and keep it in the right shape. You 
see, when I moved here, I saw a lot of things that could be fixed up and I thought 
that if all the owners would work together on projects, at the same time, then 
things would look better and happen more easily. For example, if the frames 
around the windows need painting then they could all be painted at the same time 
because it’s cheaper to buy all the materials and the building will look well taken 
care of, if all the frames are renewed at the same time. (...) 
 
But Vestia does not want to maintain its apartments in this building. Instead, 
Vestia plans to tear down this building and put up newer, larger houses. They are 
doing this in order to get new people in the area; by new people, I mean rich 
people because this area is filled with the singles, elderly, or couples with only 
one child and if that family wants to expand then they have to move out of the 
neighbourhood to find a bigger house. On the whole, the residents living here 
have lower incomes because they’re working only part-time and studying, or are 
working at their first job, or whatever and so the overall income of the 
neighbourhood is low. So, that is what it’s all about. Vestia and maybe even the 
government, or at least some of the politicians, want more rich people in the area 
so that they can come here and spend their money. This of course is good for the 
shop owners here because they will get clients but for the rest of us...I don’t 
know. 
 
Sylvie, who self-identifies as an individual who has low income, believes that she will be 
one of the individuals sent out of the neighbourhood to make way for middle and upper 
class residents, if she, and others like her, are unable to afford the cost of the newer larger 
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housing. This move will influence residents with lower incomes more because this group 
is more often dependent on social housing due to their financial situation (van der Waal 
and Burgers 2009: 31).  
Sylvie believes that Vestia is letting the state of the surrounding apartments  in her 
building deteriorate, so that in the future the private owners will have no choice but to 
sell and move away. Sylvie described her past dealings with Vestia to me:  
I have two reports right now and both reports state that the building is in good 
condition, the roof is new and it is okay. The building is not new, it was built in 
1938, but it is still in good condition. So now, three year later (it is now 2010), 
Vestia cannot tell me that the condition of the building is so bad that they have to 
tear it down. You know?  
 
I tried to make contact with the Vestia to go and work together. I even spoke with 
the minister when she came in 2008. At that time, we had started the Krachtwijk 
and as residents we were allowed to bring them our ideas about the area. I brought 
forth the idea that the housing corporations and the owners of the private houses 
should work together to regenerate the area. I said this to them, the minister and 
the director of Vestia, who were both in front of my house when I was speaking 
with them. Both said, “What a great idea!” and it was a nice talk. And after that, I 
tried to get contact with them again, many times, so that we could work together 
but I only got negative responses.  
 
So instead, I asked Vestia to get a copy of the upcoming maintenance jobs 
planned for the apartments in my building. But they said: “Yeah, but working 
together is difficult because the house owners have their own schedules for 
maintenance and so it’s difficult to co-operate” but in the meantime, I’ve already 
spoken to the other owners and they have already agreed to participate in the 
whole plan! So I wondered, what is going on? 
 
In the above quote, Sylvie describes her lack of trust in the housing corporation which 
evolved from her attempt to have the building maintained as a whole. Despite her 
misgivings, Sylvie continued to work with Vestia to create, with other selected volunteers 
and residents, the ambition document. She said: 
After that, I received an invitation to consult on the ambition document with 
Vestia and some other residents and stakeholders of the area. So we all had 
interviews and they created a document with all of our ideas for the 
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neighbourhood. When I finally read the ambition document, there was one plan 
(at the time there were various planned options for the area) to tear down the 
whole area and replace it with new larger houses in order to attract new, richer, 
people in the area! In one of the plans, the spot where my house used to be was 
instead a green field! (…) 
 
When a woman from Vestia called a little while later to fill me in on the progress 
of the Master Document, I asked her, “Do you know what the plans are for my 
part of the street (my building)?” and she said, “Yes, Vestia is going to tear it 
down”. I said, “Excuse me, but Vestia cannot just tear down my house without 
my permission!” To which she said, “Oh no, no, they haven’t bought all the units 
yet, but they’re working on it.” And I said to myself, I don’t believe this, how can 
this be? (...) 
 
So I thought then that I have to send the minster a letter about what is going on 
here because it was only last year that the minister and the director of Vestia 
North were in front of my house, agreeing that it was a good idea to renovate and 
not tear down my building. Then, not one year later, the same organisation is 
planning to tear my house down. That is not right! That is not cooperation! 
Instead, I got chased away! And that is the strange thing. If you’re a citizen who is 
trying to make the area better, you take your time to attend meetings, talk with 
people, organise things, etc. And then you learn that these plans are not about you 
and the people who are living there, but about the people who have money. 
Money is the issue because the housing corporation and the government want to 
have more money in the area. So I am currently in this situation and I don’t know 
what’s going to happen. 
 
Sylvie went on to contact the Minister who sent a letter to Vestia and who promised to 
keep an eye on the situation should Sylvie feel the need to contact him again. She then 
received a call from a Vestia representative who stated that Vestia was in fact not going 
to tear down her housing block. Despite this assurance, Sylvie remains sceptical of 
Vestia’s plans as she has heard other rumours in the neighbourhood of her block being 
torn down to make way for larger houses. In the meantime, Sylvie started her own 
campaign to save her building and created a short document outlining what repairs she 
has done to her own apartment since the beginning stages of the redevelopment project in 
the area. This document also outlines what Vestia has not done to upkeep their 
apartments in the building. Her booklet convincingly portrays the lack of upkeep of the 
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Vestia apartments including the fact that Vestia-owned apartments are no longer being 
rented out, but are instead allowed to remain empty. Without tenants, Sylvie believes 
these apartments will fall further into disrepair and weaken her chances of keeping her 
apartment in a deteriorating building.  
Sylvie feels as though she can no longer work with Vestia but continued to work 
through the Minister who was in charge of the housing portfolio for Rotterdam. 
According to the Master Plan, the plans for Sylvie’s building remained unclear and she 
was dissatisfied with the participation process surrounding this regeneration project. 
“What is the point?” she said to me when I asked why she no longer came to the 
information or debate evenings, “they don’t listen to me anyways.” 
It is evident from Sylvie’s experiences that those stakeholders who were 
financially supporting the venture have the most power when it came to having the final 
say. Conversely, in a recent (Winter 2010) renter’s magazine distributed by Vestia, there 
was an article about the Bergpolder South renovation project. In it, Rien Tuk of the 
Vestia Corporation, who worked with the focus group (klankbord groep), said that he 
“regret(s) the fact that residents (of Bergpolder South) are left out of participating in 
some of the (resident input) meetings” and comments further: 
Many people shrug their shoulders when they hear about future plans for the area, 
but later when they read that there is a possibility that their houses will be 
demolished, they protest. We make efforts to bring everyone out. I even call 
people because having local residents involved makes a difference (Via Vestia, 
Winter 2010: 4) 
 
Sylvie would most likely not agree with Mr. Tuk’s comments as she took part (in the 
beginning stages and up until approximately July 2010) in these focus group sessions and 
other resident participation events and platforms. Her position as an individual residing in 
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this district, although supposedly of importance to official stakeholders, was not seen by 
her to be a position of power. Yet, not everyone was as dissatisfied as Sylvie with the 
participation process.  
As outlined in the Master Plan of Bergpolder Zuid, stakeholders created a 
Sounding Board Group (Klankbord Groep) that met with officials from the government 
and from Vestia in order to give feedback on the various versions of the plan leading up 
to the Master document, as well as on the participation and planning process as they 
experienced it. During the group’s second meeting in June 2010, the majority of the 
attendees, who happened to live outside the neighbourhood and who would be 
categorised as “autochthonous”, discussed the fact that the majority of participants who 
were present that evening were not actually from the affected area and debated whether 
or not this was an issue. Individuals’ responses included “Well, we’re here, why don’t 
our opinions count?” as well as “individuals who do not have higher levels of education 
will not come to these meetings because they have other, more pressing problems to work 
on, like maybe they’re working right now or making sure that their children are doing 
their homework!” Another attendee, Maureen said, “Look, if they’re not going to show 
up to these meetings, then why do we have to accommodate them?” Despite their 
hesitations, attendees were open to trying new tactics to get more participants from the 
affected area involved, but agreed that the opinions of those present, who had made the 
choice to participate and who felt that they too would be affected by these renovations 
because of their proximity to Bergpolder South (all participants lived in Rotterdam 
North), would also count toward the decision making process. Residents agreed that 
despite the potentially negative effects that these renovations could have on certain 
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residents of the area (for example, if they had to move out of the neighbourhood), 
Bergpolder South was indeed in desperate need of renovation. This need for change in 
the area was confirmed by one of the attendees when he said,  
Regardless, there is a need for some changes to happen in the area. Although it 
may affect some people negatively (as in forcing some to move away) overall 
these renovations can be a good thing because really, it can get quite dirty around 
those stair-houses32! 
 
After this meeting, I set up an interview with Maureen who lived in Bergpolder but 
outside of the proposed renovation area. Maureen said that she participated in the 
sounding board group because one of her close neighbours was also taking part and 
because “it’s rather fun to be a part of the whole process”. She participated in the 
planning process despite feeling suspicious of the inner-workings of Vestia and the 
district government. Her apprehensions were a result of working with officials from both 
of these sectors over the last 15 years in order to lobby for the upkeep of her own 
building. Although she only owns one of the apartments in the housing block, the 
building itself was plagued by an unsound foundation that created a 50 cm difference in 
elevation from one side to the other. She lobbied for its renovation to be paid for by the 
local government and eventually won. During our interview, I asked her to elaborate on 
her comments at the meeting earlier in the week:  
I’m not a racist but I think that there are often autochthons who want to do 
everything for the allochthon. The original allochthon came as guest workers and 
they needed to be taken care of. But now you have the second and third 
generations who have their own children, who can speak Dutch, who go to school 
here, and who can do things for themselves and for their parents. But here in the 
Netherlands, there is a bit too much care taken for the allochthon at least in these 
second and third generations. We all have the same possibilities; they are 
autochthon but they are called (treated as) allochthon. (...) 
 
                                                 
32
 Stair houses or trap huizen are colloquially known as social housing that is cheap to rent and 
overcrowded. These three-to-four storey buildings have one single stairway, hence, their name.  
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You see this also with the sounding board group. The man from the Iskender 
Mosque came to the first meeting but then he didn’t come again. It is a fact that 
everyone can come to these meetings because everyone is welcome, but that is not 
what happens. In my opinion, there is more done for the allochthon now than the 
autochthon, and by this I mean the older people. That frustrates me! I do not see 
them (allochthonous community) as a subordinated/disadvantaged group 
(achtergestelde groep), seriously not. (...) 
 
In this sort of area (Bergpolder), there are probably more allochthon than 
autochthon residents and maybe that’s why there is such a focus on including 
them in the planning process; but this (hand-holding) approach is taken 
throughout all the Netherlands - to provide and do a lot for these allochthon. 
 
Maureen’s usage of the terms “autochthon” and “allochthon” indicates that she saw these 
groups as being separate and distinct communities, and that she herself belonged to the 
“autochthonous” community. According to Maureen, such programs and attitudes to help 
“allochthons” are paternalistic and unnecessary because second and third generations 
have integrated and therefore, she assumes, they should be able to function in Dutch 
society without government assistance. Furthermore, in her opinion, this paternalism is 
not serving “allochthons” but in fact, disadvantages the “autochthonous” population who 
are, according to Maureen, in need of more support. Finally, Maureen believed that 
despite having the opportunity and the ability to take part in the participation platforms, 
“allochthonous” chose not to take part. 
It is important to examine the underlying causes that hinder “allochthons” from 
participating in programs and having worked and interviewed women living in the 
neighbourhood, I found that the neighbourhood meetings and information sessions were, 
more often than not, scheduled in the evening, which made attending these events 
possible for only a certain group of people. When I asked participants in the Bergpolder 
Neighbourhood Center (BNC) conversation group why they had not attended the Debate 
Week about Bergpolder South, Amaa, a mother with three young boys (one older and two 
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younger twin boys) who had a good grasp of the Dutch language responded, “Okay, I 
could go. But then who would take care of my children?” Similarly, Zefra, who had just 
started as a volunteer for Willpower Works and who provided the coffee and tea during 
visiting hours, but whose Dutch was still at an intermediate stage, said, “They speak 
Dutch so quickly. I can’t follow their conversations.” Zefra often participates in 
neighbourhood activities, however, only those activities that take place in the daytime. As 
a widowed, single mother of one son, whose husband died suddenly after she and her 
baby arrived in the Netherlands, Zefra attends integration courses twice a week and 
programs held at the neighbourhood centre two other days of the week (in addition to 
Arabic courses at her mosque). Despite being active during the day in both private and 
neighbourhood events, I did not see her at any evening events or information sessions for 
the Bergpolder South renewal project or other events at that time.  
It became apparent that the majority of individuals who attended events scheduled 
in the evening were residents who would be considered “autochthonous” and that the 
majority of individuals who participated in daytime activities run-out of the BNC, would 
be categorised as “allochthonous”. These latter activities  included integration programs 
(see Chapter 2 for more details). Thus, the idea that some individuals do not participate is 
not entirely correct, because participation varies according to the particular day, time, 
place, or event. Consequently, those who did not work were able to attend daytime 
events, whereas those who worked during the day were limited in their daytime 
availability. These findings are supported by Bolt et al. (2008) and Musterd and 
Pinkster’s (2009) research that saw neighbourhood interaction occurring among members 
of the same social community and economic class. 
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The “allochthonous” residents, who were the majority population in this area, 
were not as involved in the renovation planning process as “autochthonous” residents 
were, even though they participated in other activities and events. The general non-
participation of “allochthonous” residents lead to the creation of a physical environment 
and its intended uses by those living outside the environment and in so doing, excluded 
these residents from the creation process of that space and the conception of its uses. 
Despite all the events and discourses surrounding participation, the extent to which these 
processes in fact influence the Master Plan is questionable. Importantly, however, it was 
the act of participating itself that became a significant factor when describing and 
aligning oneself to particular communities or groups in the neighbourhood (for example, 
Sylvie as a low-income resident) or in the Dutch “nation” (for example, Maureen as an 
“autochthon”). 
It is also important to investigate civic engagement in resident-led or bottom-up 
initiatives that seek to influence the physical and conceived spaces of the neighbourhood, 
in order to understand how such participatory acts influence understandings of “us” and 
“them” and understandings of civic engagement.  
 
‘Working it’ in the Community  
The Hofplein Line has been introduced in this chapter as a 1.9 km long defunct 
light-rail train line that is protected as a heritage site (as of January 2010). The track runs 
above the street through Bergpolder and Liskwartier, making spaces available underneath 
the archways to house small businesses and community centers like the BNC. Although 
plans are in the development stage, the most popular plans (as learned through the 
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participation process) aim to turn the top of the railway track into either a green park or a 
cycling pathway to the city center and to rent out all the archways to small business 
owners. Before anything happens, however, financial hurdles must be overcome for any 
large scale development to take place. As it stands, four different housing corporations 
own various parts of the Hofplein line; Vestia owns the part in Bergpolder.  
The outcome of the Hofplein Line is of interest to my research because of its 
potential to redesign the public spaces in the neighbourhood. If a green pathway is 
realised on the top of the rail line, then this will produce a different space – one that 
perceivably prioritises nature and the environment – than if it is renewed into a cycling 
route for cyclists – a space that would prioritise transportation. If the structure and its 
adjoining buildings are torn down, however, the structures or spaces built in its place 
would also greatly influence the neighbourhood. 
Vestia has created a group to work on the future plans for the Hofplein Line and 
station, called the Hofbogen BV. However, there is another group, ‘The Friends of the 
Hofbogen’ (Vrienden van de Hofbogen, or VH) that is a residents’ initiative. The VH 
seeks to participate in the planning process of the Hofplein archway spaces, train line, 
and station by vocalising the wishes of the Rotterdam North residents for this structure. 
The VH holds monthly and at times bi-monthly meetings at the neighbourhood center of 
Liskwartier concerning the plans for this structure. Attendees at these meetings are often 
residents who are already busy with other projects in the neighbourhood and who often 
volunteer to participate. As was found in many of my other ethnographic experiences, the 
majority of attendees at these meetings were “autochthonous” individuals. Josephine, a 
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resident of Liskwartier, is the leader of this initiative and who was also one of the 
frequent attendees of the Bergpolder South project. 
Josephine is a retired architecture professor from the Delft University of 
Technology who now spends much of her time coordinating events and rallying for the 
redevelopment of the Hofbogen. In addition to this, Josephine is part-time chairperson of 
the Neighbourhood Organisation of Liskwartier (Bewonersorganisatie Liskwartier or 
BOL) and could often be found at the local neighbourhood office. While in the field, I 
attended many VH meetings, a roundtable discussion, and a lecture that were all 
organised by Josephine and the VH committee.  
Josephine’s connections in the community (and beyond) were evident through the 
location of these events, the number and prestige of attendees, and amount of media 
coverage from local and district press houses. For example, the roundtable in January 
2010 was held in the newly renovated Hofplein Station which solely discussed the future 
plans of the Hofplein Line33. With the help of the VH, Josephine published a ‘Chronicle 
of the Hofplein Line’ that outlined the history and potential future plans for the train line, 
which she presented to Rotterdam’s Minister of Finance at this meeting. Furthermore, the 
second meeting held in June 2010 was a presentation of architectural plans for the 
Hofplein Station from students at The Hague University (de Haagse Hogeschool); these 
students have a working budget to design a film house and a cafe in the empty station 
(Vrienden van de Hofpleinlijn 2010). This second lecture was also held in the Station and 
Rotterdam’s Minister of Finance and various planning authorities from the Hofbogen BV, 
the development bureau, and Vestia, were in attendance. Most recently, in October 2010, 
                                                 
33
 I attended few other “bottom-up” initiatives that received such attention from the politicians and 
neighbourhood authorities. 
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the VH held a lecture with cultural historian Wijnand Galema (owner of Wijnand Galema 
Architectural History) and Hugo Priemus (Emeritus Professor from the Delft University 
of Technology) concerning the renewal process and in particular, what steps should be 
taken to incorporate all parties’ input in the planning process.  
I had numerous conversations and interviews with Josephine and was a part of 
both committees that she led or had a significant role in. During our first interview, I 
asked Josephine why it was that she became involved with the development process of 
the Hofplein Line, to which she answered: 
I wanted to do something for the neighbourhood and for the poorer people. For 
those who cannot do everything by themselves. A good way to do this is by 
forming a group. There is a book called, “Samen Staan We Sterk” which means 
‘together we stand strong’. That is what I wanted to do. This group (HV) then is 
not only about achieving concrete goals but bringing people together during the 
process of sorting things out. That’s one of my passions.  
 
I focussed on the Hofbogen specifically because before I retired, I took a trip to 
Paris to look at a similar construction, the park, in Paris. I hadn’t been there 
before and I was amazed by it. I thought we should have it here with the 
Hofbogen! That was 2001 and since that time I have been interested in the 
Hofbogen. For a long time we tried to make contact with the project management 
bureau. Their response was, “Well, why do you want to participate? If things 
don’t turn out then everyone will be disappointed afterwards. So what is it that 
you want from us?” “Well”, I said, “I would like to have contact and coordinate 
events together”, to which they did not respond very enthusiastically.  
 
For many years we tried to have more involvement from the community and we 
had some activities but it was really when Laurent (the social community worker 
for Liskwartier) had the idea to have a party in the neighbourhood that introduced 
and focussed on the Hofbogen, that everyone from the neighbourhood and from 
the district government became very interested. All at once, it was a success! It 
went very well and now I am happy.  
 
There is so much to do now and with the development of Bergpolder South, for 
example, certain parts of the Hofplein Line might be boarded up and torn down 
by the housing corporation. Although the district government has said that we 
should conserve what is beautiful and what has unique qualities. And so that 
neighbourhood, which is next door to the Hofbogen, has a lot to do with it. And 
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so I feel as though we also have to have a voice in those proceedings and so we 
have a lot to do.  
 
Vestia also wants to tear things down and make something new. Every time they 
want to plan something new, it is always for the more affluent people despite the 
fact that they say that the neighbourhood should become more mixed. Planning 
schemes are usually only made for the middle to upper class people and so I have 
a lot of work to do! (She emphasized her point by slamming her fist on the table) 
 
Josephine believes she is working ‘for the people’ in order to bring beauty and a more 
liveable atmosphere to Bergpolder and Liskwartier. The fact that she states that these 
development projects are often steered toward the middle and upper classes, of which she 
is a member, is important as she sees herself as an advocate for the lower classes. The 
above quote, however, does not convey how much work Josephine put into getting the 
Hofplein Lijn to be a part of the local political agenda.  
As mentioned above, Josephine and members of this group were present at almost 
every debate and information session that Vestia and the local government held 
concerning the Bergpolder South project. Their presence was felt by all who attended 
these meetings as the Hofbogen was a topic addressed at every event. Josephine, and at 
times her colleague Caroline, gave presentations at other neighbourhood events, such as 
the political cafes34 (in both 2010 and 2011) and the New Years’ party. Josephine was 
also present and set up information stalls during numerous community events, including: 
Queen’s Day celebration (April 30), Independence Day (May 5), and any events held at 
the Hofplein Station throughout the year, for example, the Northern Cinema weekend 
event and the March break children’s camp. Furthermore, the BOL had the Hofbogen as 
one of their agenda points and the Bergpolder neighbourhood organisation is also 
working together with the VH. These two neighbourhood organisations are by far the two 
                                                 
34
 Political Cafe (Politiek Café) were evenings organised by various neighbourhood organisations where 
politicians from the district government office weighed in on local issues and projects. 
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most active neighbourhood organisations in the region of Rotterdam North and as such, 
this project influenced everyone in the region. 
It was apparent that other Bergpolder residents found the Hofplein project 
important as they voluntarily mentioned it when speaking about impending plans for the 
neighbourhood, saying such things as “The Hofbogen is the heart of Rotterdam North” 
and “It is a structure that has many possibilities, all of which will really liven up the area. 
There is nothing to do here at the moment.” It got to the point, however, that members 
outside the organisation became somewhat tired of hearing about the Hofplein line since 
actual developments of the Line and Stations were still years away due to the unclear 
financial situation. Other interviewees mentioned, “What is the point of taking up our 
time to discuss this now because there is no money available? It’s all talk and nothing is 
actually done!” and “That’s all we hear about now - the Hofplein! I agree it’s important 
but it’s not the only thing that is important in this area.” Importantly, however, this 
particular project receives the attention it does due to the work of Josephine and the VH, 
and possibly Josephine’s willingness to take things to the next level, for example by 
taking legal action.  
At another point in time, Josephine became worried about the direction of the 
Bergpolder South renewal project when some initial drawings of the Master Plan came 
out that depicted certain parts of the Line as demolished. To this end, Josephine tried to 
acquire the newest and yet-to-be released version of the Master Plan but was stymied by 
individuals at the corporation who would not make the plan available to any resident 
ahead of the scheduled date. In response, Josephine hired a lawyer who drafted a letter 
that was then sent to Vestia’s Bergpolder South planners stating that she would take legal 
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action if they did not immediately produce the latest version of the plan to her (and her 
group). At the time Josephine thought that the plans were already ready, but that maybe 
they did not support keeping the Hofplein Line as one intact structure, which was her 
preference. The result of this legal action was that Josephine was allowed to view the 
plans at the local district government office that Vestia shares, where she learned that 
there were no plans to demolish the Hofplein at that time.  
When I interviewed the neighbourhood director of Rotterdam North, he 
mentioned that individuals like Josephine were the neighbourhood’s “provocateurs” and 
that these individuals were “absolutely necessary for the participation process, as they 
kept bureaucratic officials ‘on their toes’ and the cogs of large corporations and the 
government churning”. Thus, while Josephine’s methods were at times unique (as I did 
not experience any other similar case during my fieldwork), they were still within the 
lines of ‘acceptable behaviour’ with regard to civic engagement in the participation 
process.  
The case of Josephine’s position in society and her ability to facilitate her own 
vision of the future for the neighbourhood can be illuminated by Talja Blokland’s (2008) 
discussion of a community gardening project in a neighbourhood in New Haven, 
Connecticut. Blokland’s ethnographic study looked at how middle-class residents living 
outside a neighbourhood (with higher levels of social capital than the residents living 
within the neighbourhood), facilitated gardening projects in ghettoized neighbourhoods 
according to their own understandings of what the community needed (2008). These 
gardening projects were facilitated using the contacts and resources (social and economic 
capital) of the middle-class project leaders; however, they ended up having little input 
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from the local residents35. Blokland concludes that instead of challenging understandings 
of differences within the neighbourhood, boundaries were reproduced between the two 
communities (2008: 167).  
Like Blokland’s work, Josephine’s Hofplein Line project reinforced the idea of 
difference along the “allochthon/autochthon” divide. This was evident when looking at 
the usual participants in Josephine’s events and her VH group who were largely 
“autochthonous” residents living outside of Bergpolder South. Josephine’s participation 
structure exacerbated this phenomenon because it followed the format of the Bergpolder 
South renewal process, which arguably appeals to only a partial group of the affected 
community, that is, government bureaucrats, urban designers from Vestia and largely 
white, upper and middle class residents. In so doing, Josephine and the members of her 
group had more input and control over the future plans of the neighbourhood than the 
neighbourhood’s residents themselves.  
A similar phenomenon of privileging those with resources (capital) can be seen in 
the activities of a neighbourhood group in Liskwartier, called ‘Neighbourhood Kids’36 
which facilitated children’s activities. This group hosts festivities for residents of the 
neighbourhood throughout the year, for example, their celebration of the national holiday 
of Queen’s Day.  
The Queen’s Day celebration held during my research took place on April 30 
2010 in Liskwartier. This event was planned for the entire community and was a popular 
event with high attendance. Before the event, members of the Neighbourhood Kids’ 
                                                 
35
 Lower-income residents joined the project in the hope of taking advantage of the middle-class resident’s 
resources (for example, her social networks). Blokland found that the lower income residents stopped their 
involvement with the project once it became apparent that the interest of the middle-class facilitator only 
went as far as provision of gardening space. 
36
 pseudonym 
125 
 
board distributed flyers around Liskwartier and hung up posters in day care centers, 
schools, and community centers weeks in advance. The following is a brief excerpt from 
my field diary on Queen’s Day concerning my impression of the festivities as led by the 
Neighbourhood Kids group. The field notes state: 
We arrived at around 12.30pm at the Bergselaan around Lisplein (a low-traffic set 
of streets with larger sidewalks located in an affluent area of Liskwartier) and 
went to look at the ‘queen’ who was already out, addressing the crowd from a 
fourth floor balcony. This balcony looked onto the Bergselaan, at a corner where 
the stage and the flea market met. The Queen thanked the crowd for celebrating 
her day and wished everyone a joyous Queen’s Day celebration. The attendance 
was surely affected by the rain because there were only about 50 people there in 
the morning. By the afternoon, however, as I was biking off to my next 
appointment, there must have been over 400 hundred people spilling out into the 
more busy streets! (...) The majority of attendees were family groups with 
children, and white. There was a different sort of atmosphere here compared to 
the flea markets in the centre of town (where I had just come from) because 
people were greeting one another and saying hello. It was friendlier and more 
personal although I didn’t know too many of the people there. The stalls, where 
people were selling their wares, were also quite different. Along the Bergselaan, 
there were local businesses that set up small stalls in addition to residents who 
were just selling second-hand stuff. There was even a wine maker with samples 
who was dressed in an apron and starched shirt! Overall, I got a sense that this 
area, bedecked with flags and all things orange and the colours of the Dutch flag, 
was more ‘high-class’. There was also a sense of imbibing from the local bar, 
which is located kitty-corner to the festivities, although their music was drowned 
out by the music on the stage. Although I have been told that this event is quite a 
‘white’ event, as attended by “autochthonous” individuals, I did see some 
“allochthonous” people, but they were definitely the minority of attendees. 
 
Neighbourhood Kids was started by a group of mothers who lived in Liskwartier. 
I met with one of them, Valerie, who had settled in Liskwartier with her husband and 
three children. Their family takes part in Opzoomer activities (see chapter 5) and those 
events hosted by Neighbourhood Kids. I asked her to describe her involvement with this 
group, and she said,  
We started two years ago with a group of friends who lived close together in the 
neighbourhood (...). We were moms that thought that the neighbourhood was 
missing things for kids to do. We would get these flyers from the other activities 
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(that are funded and organised by the district government and their associated 
groups) and they’re always kind of ... feeble ... you know, like the opening of the 
football field (across from the BNC), there was hardly anything happening there. 
What was happening started late and there was nothing clearly marked for what to 
do or what was going to happen. We thought, “We can do better than that”. (...) 
 
When we started our group, we got some money with the Krachtwijk funding (to 
publicly celebrate holidays, two-to-three times a year) and now we’re funded 
through the kid-friendly neighbourhood project (kiwi)37. There are twelve 
neighbourhoods in that initiative, I believe, and there is money available. A group 
can get 2,500 Euros for one event from the kiwi pot. It was hard at first (to get the 
funds) but after the first successful event, they gave it again willingly from then 
on. (...) [T]here are little pots of money everywhere. You just have to know how 
to work the system. (...)  
 
This year, I also asked Rabobank (a bank in the Netherlands) to sponsor our local 
initiatives as well because they do that. I filled in a form and within a week we got 
called to come and talk to them. I brought in my portfolio with all my pictures and 
things that we’d done and we were chosen. We received 1,500 Euros from them 
and apparently we won out of a big group of people who wanted the money. They 
were only going to give us 1,000 but after speaking to me, they gave us the whole 
1,500. So yeah it was great! And there are other funds as well, for example the 
Orange funds (Oranje Fonds) and other national programs but you have to be a 
foundation in order to get those; hence, why we’re going to become a foundation 
this year. So yeah, once my job becomes a little less hectic, maybe after the 
summertime I’m going to start applying for those things too. So we’ll get more 
money. 
 
In this excerpt, Valerie’s ease with the bureaucracy of funding and community support is 
evident through her social connections and network and her knowledge of how the 
system works; the latter of which is apparent through the selection of her group’s 
application by the funding committee and her ability to persuade funders to provide her 
with the total amount of her requested funding.  
                                                 
37
 Liskwartier has an initiative to make itself a more child-friendly neighbourhood by the year 2014. 
Projects in this program concern curbing traffic around grade schools and improving the behaviour of 
parents and children. This project is made available through the Kid-friendly Neighbourhoods 
(Kindvriendelijke wijk) and the municipal action plan for Traffic and Transport (Verkeer en Vervoer).  
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I then asked Valerie how she was able to learn all of this, as she works in a 
different sector and originally did not have much experience in fund raising, to which she 
replied: 
A family friend of mine owns his own foundation and does the same sort of 
neighbourhood stuff as we do. He also lives in Liskwartier. He has turned his own 
fundraising into his actual job, like an advice bureau, and he says that he would 
like to work with us. So, we’re starting to know which players can give us money, 
or help us, or not.  
 
Valerie’s knowledge of the system and her social network are vital factors to her success 
as the Neighbourhood Kids fundraiser. In addition to the family friend who is a 
fundraising specialist, she told me how Neighbourhood Kids hired a graphic artist to 
create the fliers for all of their events. These fliers have a distinctive design and are 
attractive because they are colourful, interesting (there is always a gimmick on each flier, 
for example, cutting out a snowflake to hang on one’s Christmas tree for their Christmas 
lights tour), and made of good quality cardboard. It is important to point this out because 
Valerie believed that these advertisements influenced the success of their events and 
attracted a particular kind of attendee. 
When I asked her about the attendees to her events, she said, 
We happen to cater to the highly-educated, autochthones that live in close-by 
urban neighbourhoods. That wasn’t our intention but yeah, that’s who we’re 
typically reaching out to with these events. Like, ask yourself how many 
hoofddoekjes (head scarves, meaning women perceived to be Muslims) did you 
see at our event (the Queen’s Day celebration)? One? Maybe two? 
  
Valerie went on to explain a specific instance when she collected money for the 
Neighbourhood Kids’ Queen’s Day celebration by integrating certain ideals important to 
the district government’s social planning agenda, that is, the incorporation of 
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“allochthonous” residents for the sake of building tolerance (for diversity) in the 
community,   
 One of the things that we did with the Queen’s Day celebration, because our 
funding was getting cut off (from the Krachtwijk funding), was we invited a 
theatre group called Siberia to come for part of the day and do a work shop. This 
activity fell into the category of ‘help the poor allochthon’ at the district 
government (gemeente) and they ended up paying 2000 Euros (for the theatre 
group to come) and then they gave us another 1000 that filled our budget 
(downfall). (...) The workshop itself was not very successful, that is, not many 
children went to it. But we did it to get the money because at this point, we know 
how to work the system. The government will put on events and spend 5000 
Euros but they are not very well attended! I mean look at the Independence Day 
celebration (which she identifies as a multicultural celebration). It doesn’t do well 
because it’s only a holiday (a day off work) every five years! I mean, I work, so 
why would you think that people would actually turn out?  
 
There is this idea that the government can only support the “allochthon”, and that 
they only make the events for them. For example, there was a swimming event 
every year, at the local swimming pool. We get this flier and the advertisement 
says “the goal of this event is to promote swimming for, and in quotes 
“allochthonous” kids. And I think “Why do you have to mention allochthon? 
Why are you shutting (the rest of) us out? Why can’t it just be for all kids?”  
 
It is evident that Valerie knew how to ‘work the system’ to achieve her funding 
goal by aligning her project within a fundable government framework, which highlighted 
integration. Despite catering to such themes, however, the Neighbourhood Kids’ event 
did not foster interaction among “allochthonous” and “autochthonous” individuals, as 
Valerie makes note of above. While these events did not involve or cater to 
“allochthonous” individuals, it is important to note that in principle, they were open to all 
residents and as I myself experienced, these events had an air of enjoyment and welcome. 
From her above discussion and from her (mis)use of such funding, however, the 
Neighbourhood Kids’ events are intended to for an “autochthonous” audience. 
In addition to rather exclusive attendance, the Neighbourhood Kids’ use of 
neighbourhood public places as a means to celebrate the Dutch Monarch invokes a 
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history and tradition associated with “Dutchness”. Decorating the street with the colour 
orange and Dutch flags, and seeing a sizeable group of white “autochthonous” 
individuals only emphasizes the meaning of this event and reinforces the boundaries 
between those who belong to their heritage and who remain on its fringes. 
Valerie’s frustration at what she perceives to be the favouring of “allochthonous” 
individuals in the neighbourhood is evident. She later commented on the district 
government’s push for integration and why it might not work, when she said, 
 There is no point to try and make communities integrate together, really. In this 
neighbourhood the biggest barrier (for bringing individuals from perceived 
different communities together) is educational level and economic factors. I mean 
if they (“allochthonous” community) were white, we still wouldn’t integrate with 
them. Don’t get me wrong, integration is a really great thing and I really want the 
allochthonous community to come to Neighbourhood Kids’ events, especially to 
Queen’s Day, but it just doesn’t happen. We’ve (the board) decided that it’s okay 
because integration is not actually our goal. Our goal is to have a nice event that 
people like, and we’ve reached that goal.  
 
 It is important to note that Valerie defines “allochthons” as non-western 
immigrants and Muslims (the latter, according to her reference concerning headscarves) 
which aligns with the popular understanding of “allochthon”. Although she uses this term 
to distinguish a particular group of people (of which she is not a part), Valerie 
problematizes the government’s approach to integration when she said, 
I really think that since Pim Fortuyn and Theo van Gogh, I’ve noticed a big 
change. There is more segregation between allochthons and autochthons. I think 
part of it is a protest against the stamp (the allochthonous stamp) that is put on 
these people. For example, people hear that we’re raising our children bilingually, 
and for English ‘that’s fine.’ But if we were teaching them Turkish, then it would 
not be okay. They think ‘it’s horrible, you’re not integrated, and you’re not doing 
the right thing’.  
 
The NRC every week has a magazine and there was this Dutch researcher, he 
looked at the ‘problem of integration’. He found that the problem has a lot to do 
with the education level because the white people in the city are generally really 
highly educated and the allochthon are not - and that’s the problem. If you look at 
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Dutch emigrants, when they move away to France or Germany, they live with 
each other in Dutch-colonies and they have their own shops and speak Dutch to 
each other. So for the Dutch, it is okay not to integrate, but for others not to 
integrate here, is not okay. I don’t understand that. It’s extremely hypocritical.  
 
I think that because the (allochthonous) children are getting their Dutch lessons at 
school that the situation is getting better. But then you get these parties like PVV 
and VVD who want to send the allochthonous children to school earlier than the 
other students. That’s great but these parties want the families to pay for the extra 
education. Well, where are they going to get the money for that? It’s so crazy that 
the government has the money for things like street parties, but they don’t have 
money for things like that? That is really strange.  
 
Maureen and Valerie’s comments are a few of the many that I heard throughout my 
research concerning integration. While Maureen critiqued what she perceived to be the 
biased support of immigrants over “autochthonous” individuals, Valerie was critical of 
the ways in which local government officials imposed such programs on the local 
communities that highlighted what she saw as the divide along “allochthonous” and 
“autochthonous” lines. Notably, both practices were seen to ostracize the 
“autochthonous” community. From my experiences in general, there was a sense that the 
integration approach by the government was flawed, expensive, inefficient, and to a 
point, unnecessary. While I found that many of the people I met would often differentiate 
between “us” and “them” (categories that are applied differently by every individual as 
was evident from Maureen’s understanding of “allochthonous” that only included the 
first generation of guest workers) in everyday conversations, this differentiation was 
more often used to identify and categorise a community, rather than speak in an outright 
racist or prejudiced manner; for example, when people spoke about their ‘one Turkish 
neighbour who spoke good Dutch and looked after their yard when they were away’. In 
other cases, the category “allochthon” was used negatively, usually drawing on 
stereotypes or criticizing practices associated with “allochthons”, such as Dutch Turkish 
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and Moroccans marrying and bringing spouses back from ‘the home country’ (that is, 
Turkey or Morocco38). Thus, it was the perceived reluctance to integrate or lack of 
participation in Dutch society that most often prompted individuals’ need to differentiate 
between “us” and “them”. 
 In this chapter, I discussed how residents of neighbourhoods, government 
officials, urban planners, and other individuals and institutions engaged in community-
based projects, influenced the creation, allocation, and use of public places in Bergpolder 
and Liskwartier. Throughout this chapter, it became apparent that the process of creating 
and using public places in the neighbourhood contributed to the exclusion of 
“allochthonous” individuals because the participation process responded best to 
“autochthonous” residents, who were members of the middle and upper classes. This is 
important because the opinions of lower class individuals who lived in diverse 
neighbourhoods, such as Bergpolder and Liskwartier, were not represented in these 
processes and therefore, were also not represented in the conception of space, itself.  
Although diversity of participants remained an important theme within 
government-led neighbourhood projects, participation from “allochthonous” residents 
was not achieved. Furthermore, while the integration of residents was an important 
rhetoric for government officials, it was not always a priority in neighbour-led initiatives. 
This unequal participation contributes to the view that “allochthonous” individuals do not 
participate enough in the community, that is, they are “inactive citizens”. Such initiatives 
show how being an ‘active citizen’ is an accepted attributes of “Dutch” culture. This 
                                                 
38
 This practice is seen as problematic because the spouses, mainly women, do not speak Dutch and are 
thought to be unfit to raise the next generation of children in the Netherlands, in ways that facilitate their 
integration (see Putting ‘import brides’ to the Dutchness Test. Available at: 
http://vorige.nrc.nl/article2270070.ece). 
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narrative of the importance of participation is complicated by the larger question 
concerning the influence of participants on the gentrification process, however, it is 
significant that this narrative designated particular groups as participating more often 
than others. 
 I will continue to explore the underlying causes of the government’s focus on the 
“allochthonous” community by examining policing tactics in public places on the part of 
government authorities. Research for this next chapter was conducted in a different 
neighbourhood that had a majority of “allochthonous” residents and was known for high 
crime rates.  
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CHAPTER 4:  
EXPERIENCING SAFETY AND SECURITY PROGRAMS IN ROTTERDAM’S HIGH RISK 
NEIGHBOURHOODS  
 
The following is an exploration into the public safety and security measures that 
influence what are considered Rotterdam’s high risk (unsafe) areas. It has already been 
argued by social scientists (van Swaaningen 2005, 2007, 2008; van Ostaaijen 2010: 118; 
cf. Uitermark and Duyvendak 2006; Eijkman 2010) and a European commission (ECRI 
2008) that certain public safety policies in Rotterdam create stigma against targeted 
communities. In this chapter, I focus on how this stigmatization is inscribed into physical 
space and expressed through individuals’ interactions with one another and use of 
specific public spaces.  
What becomes apparent through this investigation of public safety measures is 
that there are certain individuals, in certain neighbourhoods, who are more policed than 
others. Those who are most often policed are “allochthonous” individuals. 
Neighbourhoods with high concentrations of “allochthonous” populations are under more 
scrutiny by authorities and have more programs aimed at generating civility among 
inhabitants. Some of this attention is due to the fact that the majority of “allochthonous” 
individuals have lower than average incomes. Areas with inhabitants of lower income in 
general are afflicted by higher levels of crime and thus extra policing measures or social 
programming in such areas are not uncommon. As I will show below, however, the types 
of policing and social programming in these areas enforce a particular kind of moralistic 
law that promotes some behaviour and discourages others. Specifically, the types of 
behaviours favoured in public spaces reinforce “Dutch” norms and reject behaviours 
associated with “allochthonous” individuals and in particular “allochthonous” youth. In 
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Rotterdam, “allochthonous” male youths are typically identified as misbehaving or 
misappropriating public spaces. For example, young Moroccan and Antillean youths are 
identified as the most problematic individuals toward other Dutch citizens and the Dutch 
way of life (Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007, Stengs 2007, and Mepschen et al. 2010: 
970, van Swaaningen 2007). There is much done by Dutch authorities to control these 
and other “allochthonous” youths in order to provide them with the appropriate tools to 
cope within a society where many of them have been born and/or raised, but are not 
thought to belong to the Dutch majority. The following is an account of individuals’ 
experiences with some of these extraordinary security measures. I first provide a brief 
description of the community where I conducted this particular research, followed by an 
overview of some of Rotterdam’s more extraordinary policing tactics in the public 
domain. I use preventative searches (preventief fouilleren) in Delfshaven as a case study 
for exploring individuals’ experiences of security and safety in Rotterdam39. 
 
Neighbourhood: Nieuwe Westen - Delfshaven 
Nieuwe Westen (New West) is a neighbourhood located closer to the city centre, 
in the borough of Delfshaven. As of 201040, there were approximately 18,962 inhabitants 
living in Nieuwe Westen, 72 percent of which were identified as “allochthonous”. 
Twenty-three percent of housing in this neighbourhood was social housing (subsidized 
housing) and the percentage of inhabitants with lower income was approximately 60 
percent and the number of unemployed was ten percent (well above the city average). 
                                                 
39
 As briefly mentioned above, Rotterdam is a useful site in which to conduct research on policing and 
security tactics because it has become famous around the country for its tough-on-crime approach; these 
aggressive tactics have earned the moniker ‘the Rotterdam Approach’ (Rotterdamse Aanpak), which is used 
to describe when a city gets tough on crime. 
40
 The following statistical information is found at: http://www.cos.nl/stadsgetallen/cijfers.php?bn=24 
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According to the Safety Index of 2010 (which measures the level of safety from the 
previous year, 2009), Nieuwe Westen scored a 5.3, landing it in the ‘threatened’ category. 
It remains one of the six problem neighbourhoods that will receive special attention in the 
2010- 2014 safety action plan (for more information on the safety index, read below).   
Although I conducted the majority of my work in the neighbourhoods of 
Bergpolder and Liskwartier, their status as ‘safe’ neighbourhoods left few avenues by 
which to explore some of the more controversial policies of policing individuals in the 
public domain. For this reason, I also conducted research in the threatened 
neighbourhood(s) of ‘Delfshaven41 where I was able to speak with policing authorities 
(including police as well as other public and private security forces) in addition to those 
individuals who experience measures of security, their friends, and families.  
Before moving on, it is important to define what I mean by the terms safety and 
security, as these terms are not self-evident in the Dutch context. While in the field, I 
came to understand that the terms safety and security translate into one word in Dutch, 
veiligheid, but that this term had different meanings. To understand this difference, I 
spoke with Wilco a mid-40s man who was the neighbourhood Director of Safety for the 
municipal government of Rotterdam North. Wilco worked for ten years as a Rotterdam-
Rijmond police officer. He was once a resident of Rotterdam but recently decided to 
move into Rotterdam’s suburban area due to the constant noise and troubles of the city. 
According to Wilco, security can be defined as: 
Something that is supposed to measure (criminal) actions and combat these 
actions with programs of prevention, repression, and pro-action; that is, stopping 
things before they become a problem by doing such things as: having more police 
                                                 
41
 In the borough of Delfshaven, there are approximately 70, 000 inhabitants in eight different 
neighbourhoods: Delfshaven, Schiemond/Lloydkwartier, Oud-Mathenesse/Witte Dorp, Bospolder, 
Tussendijken, Nieuwe Westen, Spangen, and Middelland. 
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on the streets, having burglar prevention systems in stores and in houses, having 
cameras available for shop keepers.  
 
Security, by Wilco’s definition, is the measure of levels of threat and threatening 
acts and the response to them by authorities who are given the ability to respond to 
criminal acts or perceived threats. As will be discussed in more detail below, security 
threats to Rotterdammers have changed over time. 
Julien van Ostaaijen (2010), a lecturer in politics and public administration in the 
Netherlands, whose book Aversion and Accommodation looks at the changing politics of 
safety and security in Rotterdam between 1998 and 2008, describes two kinds of safety: 
physical and social safety (77). Van Ostaaijen’s discussion of the types of safety is useful 
because he breaks down safety not only into physical and social safety, but also into 
categories of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ social safety. According to van Ostaaijen, 
physical safety refers to protecting oneself from fire, starvation, sickness, traffic, or 
terrorist attacks. Social safety, on the other hand, refers to threats from technology, or 
from criminal elements, other than terrorist attacks, residing in the Netherlands at the 
time. Van Ostaaijen goes on to describe ‘objective’ social safety as those acts and facts 
that are determined by reports from police based on the number of crimes reported, cases 
solved, criminals arrested, and related data. Subjective safety, alternatively, refers to 
residents’ experience of discomfort or threat at what they perceive as impoliteness, 
rudeness or racism in public places, or at the sight of garbage on the streets or areas of 
darkness as a result of non-working street lamps. According to van Ostaaijen, social 
safety has become important in the last decades of the 20th century and first decade of the 
21st century (2010: 77-78).  
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Ostaaijen’s safety categories resonate with my interest in how individuals create 
and experience space and how the design or physicality of space can influence 
individuals’ perceptions of that space. From this point on in the chapter, when referring to 
safety, I will be referring to social safety in both the objective and subjective senses 
described. 
 
History of Rotterdam’s Security and Safety Policies 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s there were few public safety policies in Rotterdam that 
diverged from other Dutch cities or other large European cities in general. On the whole, 
crime did not feature largely in politics until the mid-nineties when drug-related crime, 
prostitution and related nuisance became an issue in the neighbourhoods around the city 
centre. Crime prevention and public safety policies during this period were a mixture of 
prevention and action issued on a case-by-case basis, in addition to increasing forms of 
surveillance being placed around the city. According to Dutch criminologist Rene van 
Swaaningen (2007), Rotterdam’s officials followed an ‘integral’ (or integrative) approach 
to safety that deals with crime through a multi-agency approach that addresses specific 
urban problems as they come along through whatever means are deemed most viable 
(245). This approach not only incorporates repressive measures by the police, for 
example, but also seeks to provide preventative methods that can be delivered through 
other stakeholders in civil society, such as government officials, local businesses, or 
neighbourhood groups (van Ostaaijen 2010: 75-77, 211-214). This integrative approach 
to public safety policy further incorporates fighting the fears of crime and feelings of 
insecurity experienced by crime victims and other Rotterdam inhabitants, as a means to 
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encourage community support for urban and social renewal programs in Rotterdam (van 
Swaaningen 2005: 291).  
Despite policing efforts, Rotterdam became an increasingly unsafe city 
throughout the late 1990s. A survey was conducted in 1994 which found that 73 percent 
of citizens felt that safety was still one of the biggest issues in Rotterdam (van Ostaaijen 
2010:76, 213). In 1998, safety was one of the twelve top programs for which the mayor, 
the police and the district attorney were said to be accountable. In 1999, the mayor Ivo 
Opstelten (from the neo-liberal, conservative party VVD) declared that the previous 
safety approaches in Rotterdam failed to achieve results and that regaining safety of 
Rotterdam was his number-one priority (van Ostaaijen 2010: 213; van Swaaningen 2007: 
244). This approach was also supported by the national government in 2001, when it 
asked municipal governments to develop local safety policies in addition to the national 
safety programming. This change in approach was most likely in response to increasing 
public distress regarding safety and security following the terrorist attacks of September 
11th, 2001 in New York, and two national events: an exploding fireworks factory in 2000 
and a deadly bar fire in the small city of Volendaam near Amsterdam in 2001 (van 
Ostaaijen 2010: 78).  
As pointed out by van Swaaningen (2007), the objectives for public safety 
policies of the 2000s did not diverge greatly from the previous two decades; however, the 
manner in which safety and security goals were set and ‘measurable outputs’ achieved 
was indeed different (245). The security measures of the 2000s took a more ‘social 
reconquest’ (sociale herovering) approach, which emphasized the political importance of 
taking a stand against civil disobedience. According to Engbersen and Snel (2006), 
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Rotterdam’s approach to safety over the last decade was aimed at increasing ‘liveability’ 
and safety in the public domain, balancing community structures, and formulating rules 
of civic conduct among inhabitants (van Swaaningen 2007: 244). In general, this new 
approach to community safety is based on the ‘rediscovery’ of more aggressive security 
tactics that have a moralistic tenor and are less likely to respect people’s personal 
privacy. 
Following an increase in street crime and theft in the central districts of 
Rotterdam, in March 2001, residents banded together (through neighbourhood groups) to 
approach the municipality and spoke with the mayor about their safety concerns 
(Barendregt and van de Mheen 2009; van Ostaaijen 2010: 78). This resulted in the 
creation of a Five Year Safety Action Plan (FYSAP) at the end of 2001, which contained 
eighteen concrete safety objectives to be realised by 2006. One important development 
was the introduction of a ‘safety index’, which in 2001 identified eight (out of 63) of the 
most problematic districts in Rotterdam.  
This safety index is determined by ‘objective factors’ (police-figures on registered 
crime), ‘subjective factors’ (statistics concerning feelings of victimisation), as well as 
‘context-figures’ (ethnic composition, welfare dependency, value of houses, frequency of 
moving, et cetera) (hetccv.nl 2010). In general, the index considers the frequency of theft, 
drug nuisance, violence, burglaries, public nuisance, vandalism, traffic and cleanliness of 
a borough’s public spaces. The index assigns a number to each district from 1 to 10 that 
is then divided into five categories: unsafe area (receiving a grade below 3.9), 
problematic area (from 3.9 to 5.0), threatened area (from 5.0 to 6.0), in need of minor 
attention (from 6.0 - 7.1) and a safe area (above 7.1). The safety index is used to measure 
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and locate security situations throughout the city, analyse and track the progress of 
neighbourhoods over time, and influence past and future policy directions. In the last 
safety index released in 2010, relating 2009 statistics, Rotterdam’s overall score was 7.3. 
Since its creation, Rotterdam’s safety rating has increased from a 6.9 rating to 7.3 rating 
and the number of ‘safe’ districts has increased from 30 to 36. Rotterdam’s index has 
worked well enough to initiate similar indexes in cities such as Amsterdam.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Fortuyn’s political platform prioritized safety in the 
city in the 2002 Municipal elections. Following his party’s substantial win in municipal 
politics, the theme of safety was picked up by the then governing coalition (which did not 
happen to include Fortuyn’s party but two center-right parties). Following his murder, the 
topic of public safety grew more popular in the public discourse and Rotterdam’s 
coalition announced a new, tougher approach to public safety. The municipality’s 
approach was to boost surveillance, lower tolerances for crimes and add more police 
presence on the streets of Rotterdam (van Ostaaijen 2010: 115). To this end, the board in 
charge of implementing the Five Year Safety Action Plan (FYSAP) set goals for certain 
territories, for example closing down areas known for prostitution and clearing disruptive 
drug addicts and homeless people from all transit lines and stations (ibid: 116). The 
municipality also designated five “city marines” who would be paid well to work on the 
street and solve implementation problems at the ground level. These marines worked 
with large budgets and had direct access to the Mayor in order to solve the perceived 
problems with bureaucratic red-tape that was thought to slow down the justice process. 
These marines were either assigned to work in specific areas or with a perceived 
threatened group, such as youth (ibid: 117).  
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In addition to these measures that sought to speed up the implementation of the 
FYSAP, the board implemented a ‘zero tolerance’ approach to violations of existing laws 
and regulations. This was done despite the fact that some of the existing laws and 
regulations were still under debate or only approved at a municipal rather than national 
level (van Ostaaijen 2010: 117). 
As a result, between 2002 and 2006, the police were given the authority to have a 
heavier hand on the streets to control such nuisances as alcohol abuse and loitering. One 
such controversial policy was the institution of preventative searches (preventief 
fouilleren) of individuals or automobiles for concealed weapons. These searches however 
can only be conducted in neighbourhoods or ‘hot spots’ that were designated by the 
Mayor and only for a limited length of time (van Swaaningen 2007: 242). By the end of 
2005, more than 40,000 people had been preventatively frisked and 10,000 cars had been 
searched (van Ostaaijen 2010: 118).  
In addition to these policing projects, the physical spaces of perceived 
problematic residential areas were also affected by ‘hard-nosed politics’. The government 
focused on areas with dirt and deterioration in an attempt to literally clean the streets, 
using the slogan ‘sweeping the streets’ (van Swaaningen 2007: 245-246). In the gateways 
of multiple dwelling residences, entrances were sealed with steel doors to prevent 
entering, loitering, or drug trafficking. In one of the most problematic areas of Rotterdam, 
Charlois, 147 steel doorways were outfitted by the end of 2005 (van Ostaaijen 2010: 
118).  This approach followed the so-called ‘broken windows’ theory which supposes 
that a clean and well-maintained physical area will produce less social nuisances and 
criminality than an area with broken windows and garbage (ibid).  
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Although the majority of these actions were directed at the public sphere, 
municipal authorities did not stop there, going beyond the public domain into the private 
sphere of people’s houses. Intervention teams consisting of police and civil servants were 
sent out to the homes of individuals who were thought to be engaging in criminal 
behaviour or causing public nuisances. After gaining permission from homeowners to 
enter, the team checked the dwelling and its residents for unlawful activities such as 
illegal occupation or residency permits. The team was also supposed to provide 
assistance that could help the residents improve their current situation or make them 
aware of the support facilities in the area (van Ostaaijen 2010: 119). By 2005, over 4000 
homes were searched, 88 percent of which were thought to have problems that needed 
attention (ibid). These interventions were criticised because the teams targeted low 
income, high risk neighbourhoods and showed up with uniformed officers who were 
thought to intimidate residents, the majority of whom could not speak Dutch, into 
allowing the teams into their homes (ibid). 
In the midst of these events, attention began to focus more on Rotterdam’s 
“allochthonous” populations following a public debate concerning the results of a report 
released by the Statistics Netherlands (CBS). This report stated that those problematic 
neighbourhoods within Rotterdam would have majority populations of “allochthonous” 
residents by 2017 (KEI 2006). The issue with this projection was that this group had a 
higher presence in crime statistics, were more likely on average to be on welfare than 
their “autochthonous” peers, and in general thought to be poorly integrated into Dutch 
society. The outcome of this debate was the idea that the city had reached its tipping 
point (in certain neighbourhoods), which led to the release of the report Rotterdam 
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Presses On: the way to a balanced city in 2003 (van Ostaaijen 2010: 122). This report 
contained some controversial policies such as requiring “allochthonous” immigrants to 
earn 120 percent of the minimum wage in order to settle in certain neighbourhoods that 
already had a high concentration of “allochthonous” inhabitants. In 2006, the law 
colloquially known as the ‘Rotterdam Law’ was enacted which made possible some of 
the measures of the Rotterdam Presses On, such as lowering taxes for businesses, closing 
buildings with frequent disturbances, and demanding that certain newcomers (if it was 
deemed appropriate) have an income from work in order to settle in certain areas (ibid). 
Targeting particular communities who were seen as problematic remained an 
important theme with the initiation of a series of youth programs that focus on addressing 
the problem of hangjongeren, which translates to ‘hanging-about male youths’ (van 
Lieshout and Aarts 2008). Youth tend to hang around in city parks or on street corners 
and their behaviour is seen by the police and municipal authorities as creating social 
nuisance for other inhabitants (Rotterdam.nl 2009 b). The associated loitering spaces are 
seen as gateways for drug trafficking and hotbeds for criminality in general (Baillergeau 
and Hoijtink 2010, Lindo 2010). Hanging around is also seen as the pastime of those who 
do not contribute to a working and effective society. To address those youth identified as 
the typical perpetrators of such activities, an action programme called the Antillean 
Approach was developed that involved hiring a city marine to deal exclusively with 
Antillean youth. All youths in this program were required to be either employed, in 
school or in a judiciary program (van Ostaaijen 2010: 123). A Moroccan Approach was 
later developed in 2008, to slow the rate of habitual criminal behaviour by providing 
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family coaches, homework assistants and case managers who would help Moroccan 
youth find work, internships, or housing (van Ostaaijen 2010: 172).   
Since the initial FYSAP was released, two additional Five Year Safety Action 
Program (FYSAP II) have been released (one for 2006 – 2010, and one for 2010 to 
2014). Most measures that were developed in the initial safety action plan were carried 
through, such as the Safety Steering group (consisting of the mayor – as the most 
important member, the police, and the district attorney), taking on territorial (e.g. security 
risk areas) and personal (e.g. Antillean or Moroccan) approaches, the safety index, 
neighbourhood city action programs, the city marines, and the hot spot approach (van 
Ostaaijen 2010: 166). The second FYSAP had targets such as: making 85 percent of shop 
owners feel safe all the time in their businesses, and raising the social safety index rating 
on public transport to 7.5 and at train stations to a 7.3 (ibid). Controversial policies that 
specifically affected public spaces (or the use thereof) during this time included 
establishing a 9 pm curfew for disruptive youths in one neighbourhood in Rotterdam and 
installing ‘mosquitoes’ in areas that were used as ‘hangout spots’ for youths, such as the 
shopping centre in Rotterdam south (ibid). Mosquitoes are machines that emit a high-
pitch frequency that only youth can hear thereby making it uncomfortable to stay in a 
particular space for a long period of time.  
The third FYSAP entitled “Trust in safety, participating in the city” (Vertrouwen 
in veiligheid, meedoen in de stad’) focused more on the participation of citizens in 
increasing the level of safety in their city (Rotterdam.nl 2010). This follows up on a 
report released in 2007 entitled “City Citizenship: the motto is participation” 
(Stadsburgerschap: het motto is meedoen) in which a prior emphasis on integration (that 
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was seen to single out a specific part of the population, i.e. the “allochthonous” 
population) was replaced by the idea of participation (that was directed more generally at 
the overall population). This approach emphasizes the importance of participation in 
society. It stresses that every inhabitant has rights as well as duties, including using Dutch 
as the common language and upholding Western values which recognize equal rights for 
women and homosexuals, respect for religious difference, and reject honour killing and 
female circumcision (van Ostaaijen 2010: 172). What is readily identifiable in the above 
report is an increasing moralistic approach taken toward participation which presumes the 
superiority of “Western” values and practices over “Eastern” (read “allochthonous”) 
ones.  
The 2007 report was based on the 2006 Rotterdam Code (Rotterdam Code), 
which listed seven guiding principles that every Rotterdam citizen should follow. 
Although largely the same, the Code explicitly highlighted using Dutch as the common 
language, rejecting radicalisation and extremism, and raising one’s children as genuine 
citizens (van Ostaaijen 2010: 172). It is apparent from the above lists that these rules of 
behaviour are based on a subjective interpretation of “Dutch”  traits that distinguish 
“genuine” citizens from immigrants in general (hence the Dutch language requirement) 
and from Muslim inhabitants in particular who are presumed to be extremists who do not 
recognize the equal rights of women, homosexuals, etc. The focus on the ‘proper raising 
of children’ in creating ‘genuine citizens’ also alludes to the belief that “allochthonous” 
mothers do not raise children in a Dutch manner by not speaking Dutch at home or, for 
example, not teaching children how to ride bicycles, or look after their neighbourhoods 
physical appearance.  
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In addition to highlighting the importance of participation, the FYSAP III had the 
following security goals: remedying the safety situation of Oude Westen, Tarwewijk, 
Hillesluis and Nieuwe Westen that were designated ‘hot spots’ from 2010 – 2014; putting 
an end to all unsafe neighbourhoods in Rotterdam by 2020 (a target of FYSAP II that was 
not achieved); and increasing Rotterdam’s overall safety index score to 7.1 (Rotterdam.nl 
2010). Although there has been some discussion concerning the potential effects of some 
of Rotterdam’s more extraordinary security measures, there is less research conducted on 
the perceptions and experiences of such measures (notable exceptions include van der 
Torre and V. Dijk 2007; Martineau 2006; Baillergeau and Hoijtink 2010).  
In what follows, I explore residents’ experiences of preventative searches (other 
than car searches) in designated hotspot of Nieuwe Westen in Delfshaven.  
 
Case Study: Preventative Searches (Preventief Fouilleren)  
Preventative searches were originally introduced in 2002 due to the perceived rise in 
violent crimes with a weapon, under section 151b of the Municipal Legislation 
(Rotterdam.nl 2009a). As mentioned, the mayor of Rotterdam is allowed to designate 
certain neighbourhoods as security risk areas (veiligheidsrisicogebieden) for as long as 
they are perceived to be “at risk”. To make this decision, the mayor uses data and 
experiences from the police that point to perceived risk. The office of justice can 
designate certain periods of time when security officials (police or other designated 
groups) are able to open packages, search vehicles and conduct bodily searches in order 
to look for the presence of weapons or ammunition. In order to inform the residents of the 
impending search area, there are announcements in the local newspapers and in the 
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neighbourhood, stating that the neighbourhood has been selected for preventative 
searches that week.  
There are three objectives of these searches: (1) securing firearms and initiating 
criminal prosecution against illegal handling of such weapons; (2) increasing the safety 
and security feelings of citizens and their trust in the police and government; (3) making 
illegal gun ownership less attractive (Rotterdam.nl 2009a). In 2010, the year in which I 
conducted research on these searches, there were four main designated security risk 
areas: Delfshaven, the city-centre (Centrum), Vloemhof/Hillesluis, and Rotterdam-Zuid 
(ibid). There were seven search periods that began in 2009 and ended in 2011 and 105 
control operations (ibid). Since 2004, there has been a 33 percent decrease in the recovery 
of fire arms and 2,700 weapons were seized (ibid).  
According to the official website, preventative searches are “fully accepted” by 
the majority of the population and there is “a lot” of willingness to participate in such 
actions (Rotterdam.nl 2009a). According to the report, 88 percent of the population feels 
that preventative searches improve feelings of safety and 76 percent of those searched are 
satisfied with their treatment by the police during these proceedings (ibid). These positive 
experiences are said to be the result of the precise and professional manner in which 
searches are carried out (ibid).  
Not everyone, however, has such a positive assessment of preventative searches. 
My friend Carmen, a researcher from Germany who was living with her “allochthon” 
partner in a security risk area in Rotterdam, told me, for example, that she did not feel 
unsafe in her daily life until she experienced a preventative search. Carmen recounted her 
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experience in a blog that she and I began in order to find out more about people’s 
experiences with these searches:  
[O]ne early spring evening in 2009 (…) I strolled with a small group home from a 
snack bar along Vierambachtstraat (in the neighbourhood of Nieuwe Westen). All 
of a sudden, three police buses stopped and sealed off one (end) of the street. The 
police, in full attire and hands on their weapons, pushed me aside and quickly 
aligned a row of around 15 men along the wall of the houses on the sidewalk. 
This happened fast and there were hardly any words spoken except for orders. All 
of the men standing with hands up, legs spread and face to the wall looked, as the 
Dutch say, allochthon. Women and blond men were ignored and they walked on, 
most of them did not even lift their heads. The police searched, and having found 
nothing, left. Those who had just been searched resumed their activities.  
 
I was stunned: First of all, because my friend (who was identified as “allochthon”) 
was searched and I (who was identified as “autochthon”) was not. I did not have a 
chance to help him or to know what was going on. The police man I asked only 
told me: Dat mogen we doen (we are allowed to do this) and did not seem to be 
inclined to tell me more. Secondly, it seemed to be normal, a known and fixed 
part of everyday life in this area. No resistance, no questioning… nothing. That 
was the first time I witnessed preventief fouilleren (preventive searches). 
 
Carmen goes on to talk about how she was angered by such an event and that 
“they invaded my neighbourhood”. As colleagues and friends, Carmen and I spent one 
night a week over a period of five months walking around the safety risk 
neighbourhoods. Our purpose was to try and learn individuals’ opinions of how, if at all, 
these searches influenced them or whether or not these searches changed the way they 
used public places. What follows is a discussion of how members of the community 
experienced a search and arrest we both witnessed in the high-risk neighbourhood of 
Nieuwe Westen (in Delfshaven). The field note entry states: 
Carmen and I walked down Vierambachtstraat and turned right to reach 
Tidemanplein. There, we hung out around the playground making a lap while 
looking for somewhere to sit and for individuals we could introduce ourselves to. 
We walked to the far end where women were sitting and sat on a bench in 
between some women and younger children. As a rambunctious group of young 
boys were running, kicking, yelling around us, we contemplated how best to 
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approach people when our attention (like everyone else’s) was drawn to a street 
corner, kitty-corner from where we were sitting on the playground.  
 
Two policemen on bikes had stopped and were searching the bags and pockets of 
two youths. It was apparent that the police had found something on the youths as 
they began radioing to arrest the young men. At this point, other youths from the 
area became interested in the situation and a group of about ten youths began 
approaching the scene. As one police agent stayed with the two offenders, the 
other police agent barred the approaching group of teenagers from coming closer 
to the scene. One of the approaching youths tried to get even closer; however, the 
police officer (a man) appeared angry, and while saying something to the youth, 
put a hand against the youth’s chest to stop his advancement. Another 
approaching youth stepped out onto the street and started filming the scene with a 
mobile phone. He walked at enough distance that he wasn’t intruding on the scene 
and shook his head and sort of sauntered around, acting defiant, as if to say “I’m 
going to tell on you and get you in trouble”.  
 
At this time, the two youths were handcuffed and the officers decided to make the 
youths kneel down on the ground (while they waited for police agents with cars to 
arrive and collect the youth). The two young girls sitting next to us did not like 
this, saying “Why do the police do that? It is not necessary. They are already 
handcuffed! You do not have to have them kneel down.” An unmarked car arrived 
at the scene and three men (one with a badge around his neck) got out and stepped 
aggressively between the two police and the surrounding group of young men on 
the sidewalk. At this point the two youths were kneeling on the sidewalk with the 
two arresting officers in front of them, the three security men stood between this 
foursome, and the growing group of youths on the street corner; all parties were 
about a meter apart from one another. These security men were not wearing 
uniforms. Carmen asked the girls who these men were but they did not know, 
“maybe the secret police?” one of them guessed. At that moment, two police 
buses arrived and the original two police (on the bicycles) placed the two youths 
in one of the buses which then drove them away. The youths in the back of the 
bus smiled and waved to the group of teenagers at the corner. At this point, many 
individuals on this side of the plane (an open plane intended for general, public 
use) had come to the corner to watch what was happening. While the group of 
young men walked around the street corner where the event took place, most of 
the women and young girls remained on the plane which was slightly raised from 
the sidewalk and enclosed by a waist-high fence. This vantage point, as Carmen 
and I were also on the plane, allowed for a clear view of the events unfolding 
below.  
 
After the arrest, there was a general sense of tension in the air. After the police 
bus with the two arrested youths had left, Carmen approached the three 
“undercover” police men in order to ask whether they were from the police. It was 
not clear since they did not wear any uniforms or badges. One of them answered 
her rudely, “Yes of course, don’t you see? Is that not the symbol of the police?” 
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showing her something with the police symbol that was hanging around his neck. 
She answered, “No, I did not see it (as it was not readily visible from a distance), 
and your friends are not wearing it” pointing to the other officers who were not 
wearing any identification. At this point in time, however, the three men stepped 
back into the car and drove away. The two police officers on bicycles stayed for 
about five more minutes talking to the group of young males who had now taken 
over the street corner but eventually cycled away. After all the police figures had 
left, the youth from the area ‘played gangsters’ yelling to one another, calling the 
police names and making violent movements as if to say ‘this is what I’d do to 
them if they ever tried that on me...or just try and come back here!’. Shortly 
thereafter the police on bikes reappeared in the plane to try to disperse the 
growing group of young men who had gathered as a result of the event. These 
groups slowly dissipated and the children who were using the playground 
resumed their playing.  
 
We took the opportunity to speak to some of the other women on the playground 
area, who would be considered “allochthon” because they were speaking Arabic and 
Berber amongst themselves, and the majority of whom were wearing headscarves except 
for one or two young girls. I asked the women “Does that happen often?” One woman 
answered “No, not all the time but often enough.” I introduced Carmen and myself, and 
asked the ladies whether it was safe in the area. “No”, the women said collectively. Then 
one of the women took the lead and answered the rest of our questions while the others 
followed our conversation42:  
Woman: There is not enough police presence here to combat the youth problem. The 
youth do not have any upbringing. It is not just their fault, but also the parents’ 
fault. The parents don’t take care of them. There is drug dealing among older 
youth and another big problem is burglary. They even come when you are inside 
the apartment! (The problem is that) young people do not have anything to do 
here. They are bored, have nothing to do and that is why they go outside and 
irritate people. After 16 years of age when they do not do well at school, they 
have finished their education and do not have any (available) work. They stay at 
home or hang out outside.  
 
Carmen: Do they conduct preventative searches here? 
 
                                                 
42
 It is important to note that the following two conversations were not digitally recorded but that they were 
recalled later that night to the best of our recollection and transferred from our field notes to this 
dissertation. See next footnote for further details on methods of writing. 
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Woman: Yes, the police do preventative searches. They stand on either side of the 
sidewalk of one of the streets and stop everybody that wants to walk through, 
including women and older people. It never happened to me. When I see them I 
take a different street. When we meet here on the plane, we often talk about 
safety. (...)  
 
Before, everything (in the neighbourhood) was safer. (But now) more police 
presence is needed in order to improve the situation. It is not safe for women to 
walk outside here at night. It is not possible. We just stay inside.  
 
This group of “allochthonous” women reiterate the idea of “allochthonous” youths as a 
threat to neighbourhood safety. According to our respondents, problematic youth 
behaviour can be attributed to insufficient police presence, poor socioeconomic 
opportunities for youths, and inadequate parenting. It also seems that these women 
approve police searching tactics in order to combat ‘the youth problem’, despite the fact 
that preventative measures, such as searches, affect them as well. Lastly, it is important to 
note that the idea that “allochthonous” youths are criminals is not something that is 
propagated by policing or government officials alone but also by residents within the 
neighbourhood.  
After speaking with the women, we thanked them and walked across the plane to 
the other side. There, another group of women (who were speaking Turkish and were all 
from one family) and two men were sitting in a circle on their own folding chairs. As we 
walked closer, members of the group looked up. We approached them, introduced 
ourselves and explained what it was that we were doing on the plane and what we were 
interested in learning. The woman closest to us, Jemen, answered the majority of our 
questions while the others listened in and commented on her answers. I began by asking 
if it was safe in this neighbourhood, to which she responded, 
Jemen: Yes, except for a few problems: teenage boys hanging out, smoking cigarettes, 
smoking weed, showing their attitude to others and then intimidating the younger 
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boys. I have told that already to the police who were coming around asking the 
same questions but I feel comfortable living here. It is a nice region to live in. It is 
safe for women. But the problem is that the parents do not take care of the kids. 
There is actually a lot to do here with all kinds of activities for the kids through 
the school, the municipal government and the local neighbourhood center. For 
example, every Wednesday there is an activity here for the kids. The 
neighbourhood center has a social office where you can come for coffee and ask 
questions. (...) 
 
Carmen: Have you ever witnessed a preventative search? 
 
Jemen: No, I have never seen preventative searches. There should be more presence from 
policing authorities (toezicht van de gemeente). The problem is that they 
(motioning to the group of women that we had just come from who would 
typically be identified as Muslims due to their wearing headscarves and/or as 
Moroccans as their clothing would be popularly associated with someone who 
had immigrated from rural Morocco, i.e. long dresses and lengthy over coats) 
have 14 kids and then abandon them on street without watching over them. I don’t 
want to point at certain people, but they have too many kids to keep them all at 
home. We have all lived here for a long time. He (the uncle) has lived here for 38 
years now. But it’s a nice place. When we come home from work and it is too hot 
inside, you can just fetch your chair and sit and have a chat outside. We have 
asked for benches to sit on (from the municipal government), hopefully they will 
come soon.  
 
It is interesting to note that certain points concerning safety were brought up by both 
groups. Both groups agreed that the threats to security came from a lack of police 
presence and youths’ behaviour of hanging about (while smoking, yelling, making 
messes and loitering) on street corners. As with the previous group, these issues were 
attributed to inadequate parenting of the youth. It is noteworthy that the views of this 
second group are again in line with the official discourses. Yet, despite the reservations of 
each group concerning youths’ behaviour, both groups were enjoying an evening outside 
in the same area as the problematic youth43. 
                                                 
43
 The level of safety in Rotterdam is actually often made out to be more problematic in the media than is 
actually perceived to be the case in the everyday lives of individuals. It is important to make note of the fact 
that regardless of perceptions of lack of safety, people continued to use public spaces. 
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These groups however disagreed on certain points when discussing the night’s 
events and the general level of safety of the area. First, with respect to the safety of 
women in the neighbourhood, there seems to be a disagreement as to whether it is a safe 
place or not. These groups also disagreed on whether or not there were enough things for 
youths to do and what sorts of services were available for them. When the second group 
mentioned that there were activities in the neighbourhood after mentioning the problem 
of the youth, the speaker gave the impression that criminal or bad behaviour was a choice 
of the youth because, according to her, there were ample activities in the neighbourhood. 
Furthermore, while one group was more general concerning which kind of parents were 
at fault for their sons’ behaviour, the second group pointed to Moroccan women, or 
possibly those perceived as Muslim women, when assigning blame for children’s 
upbringing. This last discourse too aligns with the official narratives of the ‘kinds’ of 
mothers and sons who are in need of social and civic support (see van den Berg 2009: 
173; Martineau 2006: 71, Chapter 7). Finally, on the matter of preventative searches, 
there was also a disagreement on their frequency, with the second group denying having 
witnessed them. This is somewhat baffling since a preventative search, which led to an 
arrest, was conducted not thirty minutes earlier on the north side of the plane (this group, 
however, was seated on the southern side).  
These divergences of opinion are notable because they illustrate how lived 
experiences of safety and security on the plane are as unique as the individuals who 
experience them. Thus, the perception of the plane as a relatively ‘safe’ space by the 
residents (with the caveat that young “allochthonous” males were the typical source that 
threatened this safety) is notable because it both questions and aligns with the official 
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discourse regarding the plane. Experiences of the neighbourhood diverged from the 
official understanding of the plane in that some residents believed it to be a relatively safe 
space as opposed to a “threatened” one, as per the safety index. The opinions of these 
groups aligned with official discourses, however, in stating that those who threatened 
neighbourhood safety were “allochthonous” youths. The association of offending youths 
with “allochthonous” identity was made overt in the second discussion when Jemen 
explained problematic youth behaviour as the fault of Moroccan caregivers.  
The above discussion is enlightening as to the experiences of security measures in 
one of Rotterdam’s security ‘hot spots’. However, this perspective, while important, lacks 
the personal experiences of those who appear to be the greatest nuisance to public safety; 
that is, the opinions of the youth themselves. 
On another night, Carmen and I had the chance to speak with a larger group of 
male youths who would be identified as Moroccans and as “allochthonous” individuals. 
The following is an excerpt taken from our diary of that encounter44. 
Carmen and I were standing on the far end of the plane. With us was a group of 
approximately six male teenagers. As the conversation continued, more and more 
youths joined us. One youth in a white shirt answered the majority of the 
questions we asked and the others followed along and chimed in when they 
wanted to. I asked whether they felt safe on the plane and they all replied, “Yes”. 
One youth laughed and said, “Why should we not feel safe? We’re the ones that 
are supposed to be the problem!” The white-shirt youth then said “it was only 
people like them (motioning to the rest of the group) who are policed” and then 
hesitantly he added allochthon. “We are Moroccans”, another youth said. Carmen 
replied: “But also Dutch, right?” The teenager with the big smile responded by 
saying that he “was born in Rotterdam and he should not be seen as an 
allochthon”. They all nodded and one youth spoke up: “(We) are actually Dutch 
but they (that is, “autochthones”) don't see us as Dutch. They don't treat us that 
                                                 
44
 A note on writing: The following excerpts are again from our field notes as digitally recording our 
conversations with youth was not an option. Before each and every conversation that Carmen and I had on 
the street we explained who we were and what questions we were trying to have answered. The 
conversations below were written down to the best of our knowledge always after our walk-about. Both 
Carmen and I worked together to provide the most representative account of the situations. 
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way." The youth in the white shirt continued: “We have autochthon friends at 
school but (those friends) do not come here to the plane to hang out”. At this point 
in the conversation, it was made apparent that there were no other blondes/whites 
on the plane besides the two of us.  
 
Carmen then asked them if they had any encounters with the police and if so, why 
this happened. The problem, the youth in the white shirt said, seemed to be (the 
act of) hanging out in public areas. They all nodded their heads in agreement. 
“We are not doing anything other than hanging out and being bored but this (act) 
is a problem for others”. Carmen asked about the frequency of preventative 
searches in the area. The white-shirt youth answered that he had been searched 
once about a year ago on this plane. “But”, he said, “It doesn’t happen very often 
here”. Other youths did not agree with his statement, and responded that, in fact, 
this plane is searched often. They also indicated that they are searched more often 
on Mathenesserplein (a larger, busier intersection that has a sitting area) and on 
the bigger streets. Then everyone agreed that a preventative search did indeed 
happen on this particular plane, approximately one year ago.  
 
When they were asked to describe it, they used words like inval which means 
invasion or intrusion. “The police came at them from all sides, blocking the ways 
out and cordoning off the plane. When the plane was secured, the police began an 
extensive body search of all the young males there.” They went on to explain that 
there was a new beat cop in the area and he wanted to show them how tough he 
was. The teenagers laughed at this. The white-shirt youth then told us that his 
mother saw the whole thing and was convinced that he had done something 
criminal. It took him some time afterwards to convince her that everything was 
okay and that he had done nothing to provoke such a search. 
 
The youths went on to say that the police do identity checks more often (than the 
searches) and that they drive by the plane in their cars, taking pictures out the 
window of those who are hanging around. The youth also spoke about being fined 
90 Euros for hanging out in groups of more than three people in places where they 
were not supposed to hang out. According to them, the fine has been introduced a 
few months ago and was rather new. We asked them how they felt about these 
security controls. “They (i.e. the police) should not do any of it”, they answered. 
“They make things worse and make us feel unwelcome.”  
 
We asked them what they would like to change in the area, if they could. As 
we’ve experienced before, at first everyone answered “nothing”. But after a few 
seconds they mentioned how bored they are: “there is nothing to do, no work (or 
training) to be found”. Although most of them were still in school, after school 
they just hang out outside, most often on this particular plane. “We would love to 
have more activities. At one time, representatives from the government came to us 
and asked us what we wanted. They promised us soccer events and other things, 
but nothing ever happened”. At this point, one youth pointed toward a container 
behind us. He then explained that the local government had put games and stuff in 
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the container for the younger children to play with. These games were locked up 
until the lock oxidized. Once the lock was broken, somebody stole all the stuff 
inside. They (the group of youths) were taken ‘in’ for it by the police as they were 
the ones associated with crime in the area. The container program was shut down 
after that and no new games or toys were supplied. The youths found it ridiculous 
that they were taken in for the crime because “we would not have taken the stuff!” 
This event showed them that the police are unable to help and do not have a clue 
as to what is actually going on the plane.  
 
The youths we spoke with were conscious of the fact that they were being singled out and 
marginalized by police measures as well as by the reactions of others toward them as a 
group (or as individuals) when in public spaces. It is evident from their statements cited 
above that these youths recognized that they were not believed to belong to the majority 
community, as per their self-identification as ‘the problematic group’ who are often 
checked by the police. It was important to note, however, that these youth felt 
comfortable identifying with Rotterdam as "their" city rather than with the country of the 
Netherlands. Throughout my research, this narrative ran through many of my 
conversations with “allochthonous” youth when asked about belonging to the Dutch 
majority (national) community.  
Through the above experiences and other perceptions that I encountered during 
my research, it is notable that Tidemanplein was interpreted as an “allochthonous” space 
by both the users (when, for example, they described it as a space that their 
“autochthonous” friends from school would not come to) and by the authorities (who 
controlled certain behaviours in this particular public place). Furthermore, it was 
surprising to learn that the police would take the time to control and monitor an area that 
did not have a high volume of human traffic, as this plane is situated off one of the side 
streets of Vierambachtstraat and not along the larger streets with telephone shops or 
coffee shops that are seen as havens for illicit behaviour in high risk zones. According to 
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the youth, the innocent act of hanging around in public places was the biggest reason why 
they were policed. For these youths, it was a matter of having nothing else to do. 
Individuals’ negative experiences concerning preventative searches and 
interaction with police were reiterated to Carmen and I on more than one occasion. The 
following is an exchange that took place another night on a larger plane, 
Mathenesserplein off of Mathenesserlaan, which is also located in Nieuwe Westen (in the 
borough of Delfshaven). On this night, the plane itself was quite busy with a group of 
older gentlemen occupying the benches in the seating area and another group of people 
waiting for the bus. On the same plane, there was a pair of Dutch police agents on 
bicycles speaking with a couple of “allochthonous” youths outside the row of shops. We 
approached two young men who were off to one side and introduced ourselves as 
researchers who would like to know more about people’s experiences of preventative 
searches. Carmen began by asking if the youth felt unsafe in this area to which the youth 
replied, “No”. Then Carmen pointed out the police, who were chatting on the other side 
of the sidewalk, and asked if the police visit this area often. The youth, Herron, became 
agitated and said, “Look at them. They’re doing nothing but wasting tax-payers’ money! 
They should go back to their offices and do some real work. The only thing that they do 
is provoke (uitlokken) people. They provoke people and create problems”. Carmen then 
asked him if he felt as though he can ask the police for help when he needs it and if he 
trusts them. He decisively said, “No.” Carmen then went on to ask him about 
preventative searches. He answered “preventative searches happen quite often, I don’t 
like them but there is nothing that I can do about them. This is how things are.” Herron 
went on to tell us that the police also disperse groups regardless if there are three 
158 
 
individuals or less. He told us a story about one of his friends who received a €60 fine 
because he was just hanging around in a public space.  
The potential of some of Rotterdam’s security approach, including preventative 
searches, for creating bias, is supported by Herron’s comments above and provides 
insight into the negative reception of some policing tactics by the local population. As a 
person who had experienced preventative searches first hand, Herron disliked these 
searches, however, he felt powerless to stop them as is evident from his comment “but 
there is nothing I can do about them”. Other security measures that Herron experienced, 
such as fining groups who are congregating in public spaces, were also perceived as 
negative. Herron’s comments are supported by the experiences of the first group of 
youths who had also been fined for “just hanging out”. Although the first group of youths 
did not seem as outwardly negative toward police officers as Herron did, both cases 
suggest that these youths feel that certain policing measures are unjustly performed. 
Although none of my informants specifically called these policing practices ‘racial 
profiling’, there is evidence of police profiling Muslims, minorities and lower-income 
youths, the majority of whom in Rotterdam are categorised as “allochthonous”, during 
security enforcement (ECRI 2008; Eijkman 2010). 
According to the municipal government’s website, by hanging around, these 
youths are denying others access to certain areas and creating (what the government 
believes to be) nuisance in these public spaces (Rotterdam.nl 2009b). The unwanted 
behaviour outlined on this website includes aimlessly stopping in doorways of homes or 
store fronts, obstructing free passage, or shouting in public, which in effect outlaws 
public gatherings among “allochthonous” youths. This website specifically states that 
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nuisance from the misuse of public spaces affects all inhabitants of Rotterdam by making 
them feel unsafe and it is a priority of various stakeholders in the community to address 
this issue.  
Although a recent study by Erin Martineau (2006) suggests that hanging around in 
public places - whether done by white Dutch youths or “allochthonous” youths - is 
identified as an anti-social behaviour and thus negatively reacted upon by the 
authorities45, this same research confirms that hanging around and being a nuisance is 
generally linked to ethnic diversity and is frequently perceived as an “allochthonous” 
behaviour. Martineau explains: 
When I told people that I was studying the problems with hangjongeren, many, if 
not most, first assumed that I was studying ethnic minority youth, partly because 
problems with those youth are so much the object of academics, journalists, 
policy makers, and the various organs of the social welfare state (276). 
 
Martineau goes on to write that “[t]he common linkage between ‘problem’ and 
‘youth’ and ‘ethnic minority’ suggested to me that the abstract image of hangjongeren is 
often an image of non-white youth” and that the presences of these youths in public 
places have come to represent larger problems in integration and lax immigration policies 
since the 1960s (2006: 276). Although Martineau states that “[a]t the neighborhood level, 
most people expressed much more nuanced ideas about ethnic difference” (2006: 31), she 
                                                 
45
 It should be noted that Martineau’s dissertation focuses on the problematic of hanging-around in public 
places as a perceived result of “too much tolerance” a theme typically associated with the insufficient 
integration of “allochthonous” immigrants. Yet, she concludes that this stereotypical idea of the 
Netherlands’ exaggerated societal tolerance incorporates more than a negative association to 
“allochthonous” ethnic difference. Instead, Martineau believes the ‘issue’ of hanging around in public 
places is a criticism of social policy, an indictment of individualisation, and a desire for clear limits and 
self-discipline in public places (2006: 28-30). Martineau stresses that there is no one type of youth that 
hangs around, nor one type of adult complainant. Having stated this, Martineau acknowledges that ethnic 
diversity features largely into the hanging-around problematic through the stereotypical identification of 
“allochthonous” youths as lacking Dutch morals and values and their treatment as criminals (see Martineau 
2006: Chapter 6). 
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provides examples of this phenomenon (that is, the association of hanging around in 
public places with “allochthonous” individuals) in her dissertation, where she states:  
On multiple occasions, adults expressed concern that youths might be talking 
about them, fearing that the youth were planning to “do something” to them as 
they passed by; such anxieties are heightened, of course, if a foreign language is 
being spoken. Fears about youth and fears about ethnic minority youth resonate 
off each other (2006: 268). 
 
I too found evidence of this phenomenon. When I spoke to Thaddeus, a 
community worker in a nearby area of Crosswijk, he told me that his biggest problem 
among groups in the neighbourhood was, 
The (presence) of young Moroccan boys who hang around on the street corners, 
making noise and making a mess. They are not typically a problem but if there 
ever is an issue with the group, people (other residents) don’t talk to them. They 
just get angrier and angrier and eventually someone comes to me to complain and 
I have to do something about it in an official capacity. 
 
On another occasion, I was speaking with Sabine, a woman who lived on a street 
close to my house. After attending a neighbourhood meeting with some other residents, 
we walked home a short distance and she began to tell me about her own experiences of 
living in the neighbourhood: 
The neighbourhood had changed so much since I’ve grown up here. I appreciate 
the diversity but there are some things that really irk me. Sometimes, I think, the 
Turkish and Moroccan people who have moved to this country aren’t doing their 
best to integrate. And we don’t need that! Of course, this isn’t all of them that do 
this, but it only takes a few bad eggs to make the entire group seem like a 
problem. For example, my neighbour, she has had some trouble from the foreign 
boys (allochthons) who hang around in the playground here. The other day, she 
was walking down the sidewalk with her shopping when they started yelling and 
harassing her, calling her names like ‘old, fat woman’. She was very upset about 
it. But I wouldn’t say that it’s all allochthon, just some of them. 
 
 Sabine identifies Turkish and Moroccan families as needing to integrate in the 
same breath as faulting the behaviours of problematic “allochthonous” youths in public 
places. While it may be the case that hanging around in public places and spending time 
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in perceived risky or threatened areas characterizes all youths (see Martineau 2006), what 
is important to note for this chapter is that the identity of “allochthonous” youths is more 
often, and overwhelmingly so, connected to unacceptable public behaviours in public 
places. These stereotypes underpin policing strategies in high-risk neighbourhoods in 
Rotterdam and influence the manner in which these individuals are treated and perceived 
by those within the same space.  
Not all stories we collected suggested discrimination against “allochthons” in 
preventative searches. For example, we heard stories of polite police officers that 
demonstrate how different and positive these searches can be. The following is another 
selection from our field notes, in Heemraadsplein, which is also located in Nieuwe 
Westen. On this occasion, it was getting late in the evening, around 10:30 pm and a storm 
was brewing to the east. Carmen and I were making our way back to her house to write 
up our notes when I saw two young men sitting on park benches within an enclosed area 
of the park. We approached them, introduced ourselves and what we were doing in the 
neighbourhood, and asked them if they felt safe in this neighbourhood (Nieuwe Westen): 
The youths said “yes, we feel quite safe in this area”. After asking about 
preventative searches, one of the young males said that “searches happen because 
people carry weapons” and that “these searches are necessary...when I was 
searched they gave me a pamphlet about what a preventative search was, and why 
it was necessary. These searches are only about weapons so they are needed so 
that people don’t do things that are worse”. 
 
From these and other accounts, it can be said that over the past nine years these 
preventative searches have led to many different experiences. These experiences most 
likely depend on the individual who is conducting the searches, the particular purpose of 
the search on that night, the individual being searched, their surroundings, and other 
contextual factors, at any one time. I will now turn to experiences of those who provide 
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and facilitate safety and security features and who try to work with the so-called 
hangjongeren.  
The first story is of a youth worker, a one-time hangjongeren himself, whom we 
spoke with on Mathenesserplein. As we were still speaking with Herron, Shibal, a youth 
worker for the city involved with a youth foundation called Abourakrak walked over to 
us with a big smile on his face. We then had a short conversation with him. Our field 
notes recount: 
Shibal said that he feels safe in this area and thinks that the level of safety was 
much better than it was before. “Before, there was a lot of prostitution and drug 
dealing in this area but now it is much safer. You used to see needles from 
intravenous drug-use all over the streets. But I don’t see that any longer”. Carmen 
then asked him about the preventative searches. He responded “There is no 
problem with it; everybody is searched, even if you’re an Oma (grandmother). 
But generally, this is a good area”.  
 
When we asked him about the general acceptance of youths in the neighbourhood 
he spoke about how the elderly were scared of the youths, and that he too 
experienced this as a youth. He further said that this was just something to be 
expected from older people. He tries to encourage older people to talk to the 
younger generation but this does not usually happen because they are still scared. 
“The different groups tend to avoid each other on the street and the older people 
take a longer route around just to circumvent the group of youth”.  
 
Shibal then told us that his brother is also working as a youth worker and our 
conversation turned to Shibal’s Moroccan background and how this affected his 
decision to become a youth worker. “I was born and raised in Delfshaven and this 
helps me connect to the youth here. It also makes my work important because I 
am able to connect with many of the youth (on the street) who also have 
Moroccan heritage”.  
 
He made a point to tell us that on the whole, youth need more activities in order to 
stay out of trouble. “I am able organise about one activity a month but in between 
that time there is nothing to do. People are bored and it’s a problem that they have 
nothing to do. I try to encourage the young people to use the neighbourhood 
centre but they don’t because it’s too far away from the immediate vicinity and 
it’s indoors, which is not preferred by the youth. But even so, these activities are 
still more than they had before because there was absolutely nothing before” 
(approximately 5-10 years ago).  
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The case of Shibal illustrates how, as part of Rotterdam’s approach to address 
youth crime, members of the community (in this case not only a resident of the 
neighbourhood but a member of the perceived “allochthonous” community), are recruited 
to participate in official programs to ensure neighbourhood safety. Not surprisingly, 
Shibal’s comments reiterate the views of the government that safety is important and the 
attention received by particular groups is not necessarily negative but an objective 
measure to fight crime (especially weapons-related crimes).  
It is also interesting to note that Shibal, like some of the others we interview, 
blames the generation gap and miscommunication, not ethnic background, as the cause of 
fears over hangjongeren. Shibal approves of the act of preventatively searching people 
and further suggests that searches do not target specific groups (“even Omas get 
searched”). Thus, despite research showing that certain security measures unfairly target 
“allochthonous” individuals, not all “allochthons” appear to agree. 
During the time spent in Nieuwe Westen, Carmen and I also had the chance to 
speak with other “allochthons” with official paid positions in city programs. Such was the 
case with young employees from the Watch Out! street security enforcement officers 
program on Hemraadsplein. Watch Out! officers are a group of youth who work in 
tandem with the police as an extra set of ‘eyes and ears’ on the ground and who work in 
addition to the other street-level security enforcement, such as Stadswacht46. When 
speaking to these youths, they mentioned how their “ethnic” background as “allochthons” 
                                                 
46
 Stadswacht, the city guards, are not police officers but are extra security officials on the streets. Their 
powers include holding and searching individuals, fining individuals for infractions, using handcuffs if 
individuals are found in violation of the law and arresting individuals on behalf of the police. These officers 
guard not only the public safety but tax and environmental infractions. For more information see: 
http://www.rotterdam.nl/bevoegdhedenstadswachten.  
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was an important factor in their recruitment for the position47. One of the youths stated 
that although he considered himself to be an “allochthon”, he had grown up as a Dutch 
youth (Nederlands jongeren) in a stereotypically “Dutch” neighbourhood. Now that they 
had moved to the area where they worked, however, this allowed them to know the area 
and the other youths. According to the young men, they were easier going on the youths’ 
infractions than other enforcement officers; a factor which garnered them respect in the 
eyes of the other youth. These young men said that this position could lead to a job in law 
enforcement and in the meantime, it was a good way to make money.  
Like Shibal, these young men believed their heritage worked to their advantage 
when enforcing security and safety measures in public spaces. Despite their perceived 
“allochthonous” identity, these young men continued to uphold security measures that 
arguably target youths with perceived similar social and cultural (or “ethnic”) identities. 
Although they identify themselves as “allochthonous” individuals from the same 
neighbourhood, these men continue to use the same discourse and rhetoric to describe 
nuisances in public spaces (namely nuisances from the hangjongeren), that characterizes 
official discourses. Despite these youths appearing well-integrated and as ‘active citizens’ 
policing inappropriate “allochthonous” behaviour, their inability to carry weapons like 
the other enforcement officers, for example, speaks to their lower placement among the 
hierarchy of enforcement officers. This fact could also open up questions concerning 
their perceived level of integration and acceptance by both “allochthonous” and 
“autochthonous” communities, especially in the situation of having to police 
“allochthonous” behaviours in public places.  
                                                 
47
 The latest FYSAP from 2010 – 2014 emphasizes the role of residents in creating a more safe 
environment in their own city. 
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Now, turning to the official police force, on one occasion, while walking along 
Vierambachtstraat, Carmen and I encountered two Rotterdam-Rijmond police officers, 
one older, one younger. They were walking along the street and stopping to talk to 
different individuals and groups they met along the way. I approached them and told 
them about how we wanted to know more information about the measures of safety in the 
area. The older of the police officers began answering the questions while the younger 
officer stayed a step back watching the street and the individuals sitting at a bar patio not 
too far away. I asked them how safe he believed Nieuwe Westen to be. The older officer 
who had been working in the area for the 20 years echoed the opinions of others in saying 
that things had gotten better in terms of drugs, prostitution and violence, were no longer 
such an issue. Overall, the older officer believed that the preventative searches were 
important because they got the weapons off the street. When talking a bit about the past, 
he said that there were originally problems in the neighbourhood from the other waves of 
immigration. These waves of problematic immigrants began with the Moluccans in the 
70s and the Surinamese after that, but, he said, “once they found their place in this 
society, they adapted well and they’re no longer having any troubles”. He went onto say 
that the Moroccan and Turkish youths of today were also having troubles and “finding 
their place in Dutch society” and went onto say that “the next wave that will have trouble 
will probably be the Polish and Afghanis.”  
This conversation was interesting because the police agent blamed recently 
arrived immigrants perceived to have not adapted for most of the problems in public 
spaces. He acknowledged, however, that there was a process of integration and 
socialisation that ‘new immigrant groups’ had to go through as they found their place 
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within society. It appeared that the “allochthon” category for the Turkish and Moroccan 
groups was not a permanent label, but one that would be passed onto the next wave – 
whom he described as the Polish and Afghanis – who were the next problematic group. In 
this way, it would appear that, at least from the perspective of this seasoned policeman, 
particular groups of “allochthonous” male youths are not innately criminal. This view is 
important because it is consistent with ideas of assimilation and cultural citizenship and 
because it suggests that identification of “allochthonous” youths with undesirable 
behaviours in public places is not a straightforward case of racial profiling or prejudicial 
perceptions. Still, as the majority of the above examples illustrate, the types of behaviours 
favoured in public spaces continued to reinforce “Dutch” standards, rejecting behaviours 
associated most often with “allochthonous” individuals, in particular, youth. 
In this chapter I have argued that security and safety programs in Rotterdam like 
preventative searches or the fining of individuals for gathering in groups of three or more 
(sometimes less), reinforce a scale of belonging in public spaces that discriminates 
against young “allochthonous” individuals. These programs further maintain dominant 
conceptions of how public spaces should be used in everyday life. Security and 
accompanying “civilising” programs (e.g. the Moroccan or Antillean Approach) while 
aiming to reduce fear among the general populace, result in Moroccan, Turkish and 
Antillean male youths being made to feel as if they do not belong.   
Although the majority of security measures and safety approaches were top-down 
measures instead of being community grown initiatives, individuals who worked with 
youth and ‘at risk’ individuals seemed to interpret the laws of securitization and safety in 
their own way. As evidenced by the Watch Out! youth workers, we interviewed their 
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reaction to public infractions would be different and more benign and less confrontational 
than those of the police.  
The experiences addressed in this chapter bring together two threads for future 
discussion in the coming chapters. First, people have the choice to use space in their own 
way regardless of conceptions of how public spaces should be used. This is evident 
through the numerous programs that are directed at improving behaviour and social 
relationships in neighbourhood spaces; the existence of such programs belies an existence 
of divergence uses of such spaces. Second, it has become apparent once again that the 
understanding of how space should be used is inherently bound up with efforts to 
integrate “non-native” populations into Dutch society.  
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CHAPTER 5: “DUTCH” SPATIAL PRACTICES 
 “DUTCHNESS” IN PUBLIC PLACES OF THE NEIGHBOURHOOD 
 
The question of what it means to be Dutch has become increasingly important 
over the last decade in the Netherlands as political and popular discussions have drawn 
attention to this country’s place in the European Union and the importance of immigrant 
integration in the upkeep of a national “imagined community”. This trend can be seen in 
the creation and popularity of nationalistic political parties, for example, the Proud of the 
Netherlands Party, founded in 2007 by ex-immigration minister Rita Verdonk. The 
consequence of questions regarding Dutch identity was also exemplified by the 
passionate public debate that ensued after Dutch Princess Maxima stated, at the release of 
a government report entitled Identifying with the Netherlands, that there was “no one 
single Dutch identity”.  
When speaking of the “Dutch nation” and “national identity”, I find it helpful to 
understand them through the concept of relatedness. Like Anderson’s conception of 
nations as imagined communities, Banks and Gingrich define a “nation” as a “discursive 
idiom within which concepts of relatedness are articulated” (2006: 9). Belonging to a 
national community provides individuals access to resources not available to others. 
Here, I am interested in the struggle for social, cultural, and economic resources (of the 
nation) and the exclusions that are enacted on the basis of a Dutch national identity.  
Social scientists have explored the rise of nationalism in the Netherlands in the 
following contexts: the culturalization of citizenship (Schinkel 2008, 2010, 2011; 
Duyvendak et al. 2010); the use of autochthonous language (Ceuppens and Geschiere 
2006; Geschiere 2009); the treatment of immigrants and non-Dutch practices in the 
public sphere (van Bruinessen 2006; van der Veer 2006, Sunier 2009b); freedom of 
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speech and political practice (Buruma 2006, Sunier and van Ginkle 2006); the integration 
of non-western immigrants (van Nieuwkerk 2004, van Horst 2007, 2008, van den Berg 
2011); and the integration of the second generation  allochthons (Dibbits 2007).  
With regard to the inscription of nationalist sentiments in space and place, there 
are specific national places that foster a personal connection to the nation and in so doing, 
generate feelings of belonging to a national majority (cf. Billig 1995). Examples of such 
places in the Netherlands include: the capital city of Amsterdam; Keukenhof – the 
grounds where the annual Tulip Festival takes place; the windmills at Kinderdijk; and 
national monuments like the Royal Palace in The Hague. While these spaces are 
important in the sense that they provide fodder for nationalistic imagery, the practice of 
nationalism and the connection made to an imagined national community are also 
practiced in ordinary places, such as the neighbourhood. For example, on the national 
holiday of Queen’s Day, public places turn a shade of orange (in reference to the House 
of Orange-Nassau) as neighbourhood stores festoon front window displays with orange 
garlands and residents hang orange Holland flags on the front of their houses. As has 
been noted in other cases (Cerwonka 2004: 29), such individual temporary or permanent 
“inscriptions” on space can support ideas of nationalism and national identities that re-
assert the rights of the dominant group over space within the nation (in this case, the 
Dutch “autochthons”).  
Dutch anthropologist Oskar Verkaaik (2010) demonstrates the importance of 
exploring not just the abstract ideas of nationalistic sentiment but how individuals 
actually practice their nationalism in everyday life. Verkaaik looks at how the Dutch 
naturalisation ceremony, introduced in 2006, recreates ideas of citizenship that exclude 
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participating immigrants from the idea of the Dutch nation. Interestingly, he does this 
from the point of view not of the immigrants who are trying to become citizens and who 
must perform these ceremonies, but from the perspective of those who are facilitating 
these ceremonies. Verkaaik finds that individuals incorporate larger social and political 
discourses of ‘autochthonous cultures’ and ‘European civilization’ into these 
naturalization practices (2010: 70). In so doing, these individuals produce localised, 
everyday understandings of Dutch nationalism.  
While there has been increasing attention given to issues of nationalism in the 
Netherlands, I do not want to overstate this fact as I believe it would be very hard to 
argue that the majority of Dutch individuals, especially those living in city centres such 
as Rotterdam, are particularly patriotic (see also Lechner 2008: 144). Likewise, while this 
study appreciates the increasing importance given to the topic of the Dutch nation in 
Dutch public discourse, I argue that it is more pertinent to speak in terms of ‘Dutchness’ 
as this term alludes to “cultural identity” and notions of belonging associated with the 
“culturalization of citizenship” that deserve to be examined more closely. 
In her study of loitering youth in Amsterdam, Martineau (2006) describes 
Dutchness as a set of qualities and understood norms that work much in the same manner 
as Whiteness: “as with Whiteness, Dutchness is not defined; its qualities are given, it is 
the norm” (2006:308). Furthermore, she discusses how these qualities do not necessarily 
have to be named but are instead made known through the definition of whom and what 
are not to be considered Dutch: 
Scholars of Whiteness (Frankenberg 1993, for example) argue that the power of 
White identity lies in the fact that its qualities are unnamed. Whiteness is what is 
unspoken, unmarked; the ethnic or racial other is the one labeled, for example, as 
“lazy,” “violent,” or “promiscuous” (2006:308). 
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While I have found Martineau’s analysis to be useful, my research led me to reflect on 
how “Dutchness” is not always defined by default but rather it is associated with 
characteristics explicitly identified as “Dutch” and perceived to be lacking among “non-
native” populations in the Netherlands. In this chapter, I will explore two acts, typically 
identified as Dutch dispositions, in order to better understand the process of 
differentiation among individuals living in and using the public places of Rotterdam 
North. Specifically, I will look at the acts of cycling and gardening.  
 
Cycling to Dutchness 
According to the Fiets Beraad, the centre for cycling policy in the Netherlands, 
bicycle use in the Netherlands is impressive (Fietsberaad Factsheet 2009:1)48. Residents 
of the Netherlands put forth impressive statistics concerning cycling: 26 percent of all 
journeys taken in the Netherlands occur by bicycle. The next highest users in Europe are 
the Danes who make 19 percent of their journey on bikes (2009: 1). As for the reasons 
why the Dutch use bicycles, shopping and running errands top the list (22 percent), 
followed by education (18 percent) and everyday commuting (17 percent) (ibid.). 
According to their factsheet, cyclists can be “young and old, rich and poor, (on their way) 
to work, shop or school” (2009: 1). This factsheet goes on to note that cycling is “not a 
political or fashion statement” as it is attributed to “neither a high nor a low status” 
(2009: 4); however, it is a feature that is “highly interwoven with the Dutch culture” 
(2009: 2). This report also states that “immigrants often do not have a cycling tradition” 
and that “people of Surinamese and Antillean descent make approximately 55% fewer 
                                                 
48
 The following information concerning the importance of cycling in the Netherlands comes from the 
Fietsberaad, Fietsberaard Factsheet 1: Importance of cycling in the Netherlands, October 2009. 
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bicycle journeys than native Dutch; Moroccan and Turkish people even 71% and 88%” 
fewer trips (ibid).   
According to Peter Pelzer at the 7th Cycling and Society Symposium in 2010, the 
Netherlands has a ‘bicycling culture’ that consists of both a material and socially-
constructed dimension (2010:1). Pelzer argues that cycling is part of the Dutch ‘national 
habitus49’ (2010: 2). He further argues that cycling should be viewed as a “cultural 
phenomenon that reflects the way in which the bicycle was used in that country to create 
national identification” (2010:3). Pelzer believes that the Dutch have a bicycling culture 
not only due to the importance that cycling takes as a means of transportation but also in 
terms of how the public spaces in the Netherlands are physically constructed (ibid). 
After the structural damage to Rotterdam’s city centre during World War II 
(WWII), the centre was rebuilt to incorporate the use of cars more so than any other large 
city at the time in the Netherlands. City planners designed the streets in a grid-like 
scheme, and over the years, outfitted the majority of the larger city-centre streets with 
separate cycling lanes. Cyclists also benefit from other infrastructure such as bicycle 
traffic lights at intersections, a plethora of bicycle parking areas and rental facilities, and 
an underground tunnel beneath the river Rotte, made specifically for cycling 
transportation. As a cyclist in the city for over a year, cycling in and around Rotterdam 
seemed safer to me than in other cities where cyclists and automobile drivers competed 
for the same road space. Rotterdam’s municipal government and city planners continue to 
make improvements to the city’s cycling infrastructure because cycling is seen as a quick 
                                                 
49
 As per Pelzer’s own definition of Bourdieu’s habitus, that is, the impetus for individuals to cycle because 
they have grown up with bicycling and lived in a context where cycling is naturalised (2010: 2).  
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method of transportation that is environmentally friendly and which has positive health 
benefits for Rotterdam’s residents (Fietsberaad.nl 2007: 3). 
The average number of active cyclists in Rotterdam, however, lags behind the 
national average: 14 percent versus the national 26 percent (Fietsberaad.nl 2010). 
According to the municipal government’s action plan to boost cycling for the years 2007 
to 2010, the culprits for Rotterdam’s low cycling rates include youths and the elderly; 
however, allochthonous individuals are the primary targets for cycling education and 
encouragement by the municipality because they comprise the largest group of non-
cyclists overall with 46 percent of allochthonous individuals not cycling (Fietsberaad.nl 
2007: 35-36).   
 In a study on mobility among ‘ethnic minorities’ in urban centers of the 
Netherlands, Harms (2006), a researcher at the Cultural and Social Planning Bureau in 
the Hague, concluded that immigrants are less mobile than the native Dutch and that this 
group rarely cycles, opting instead to take public transportation (1). The author concludes 
that “people of foreign origin leave the(ir) house more rarely than the ethnic Dutch” and 
that it is “perhaps, cultural factors, like the limited possibilities for Muslim women to go 
out of the house without the consent or without being accompanied by their husbands”, 
that results in such differences in spatial behaviours, particularly when looking at Turkish 
and Moroccan groups (2006: 6, 7).  Notwithstanding the flaws of Harm’s study, his work 
does underscore popular understanding that allochthonous individuals are unwilling or 
unable to cycle. Over the past decade, this perception has become intertwined with the 
discourse of integration (or perceived lack thereof), which takes immigrant women as the 
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target for such naturalization activities as cycling lessons. These lessons are believed to 
serve the purpose of emancipating them through integration into Dutch society. 
 Cycling lessons for immigrant women in the Netherlands have been available 
since the 1980s, and are now supported by foundations such as the National Cycling 
Support Centre (Landelijke Steunpunt Fiets, LSF), founded in 1996 (steunpuntfiets.nl, a). 
According to LSF’s website, cycling lessons were introduced to fulfill these women’s 
wishes to learn how to cycle because this activity is “considered a basic need, especially 
for those who do not have enough money to buy and maintain a car” (ibid). The overall 
aim of the cycling support centre is to facilitate the “integration and emancipation of 
foreign women through practical support of cycling courses throughout the country” 
(ibid). Immigrant women who cycle are therefore thought to be more emancipated from 
“the backwardness” of their culture. To date, this service has supported approximately 
4000 women (ibid).   
In a document containing quotes from past participants that is available through 
the LSF website, one allochthonous cycling participant is quoted as saying “I also think I 
will feel more integrated on a bike,” while another respondent says, “I want to learn to 
cycle because I am the only one walking” (steunpuntfiets.nl, b). The same document 
quotes the coordinator of LSF, Angela van der Kloof, who states that cycling is important 
because “it stimulates women to develop themselves and take part in society” and 
because “it also makes them more self-confident”. As is evident from these citations, the 
act of cycling is defined as a tool of integration. It is also understood as the “Dutch” way 
to traverse public places.  
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Hendrijk, who we have heard from in the Introduction, spoke of the Dutchness of 
cycling as he spoke of his travels in Indonesia: 
In some cultures, a bike is a poor man’s method of transportation but not here in 
the Netherlands. Even our Queen rides her bike sometimes! In Indonesia, when I 
rode a bike, they thought it was very odd that white people, who they assumed 
were rich, were riding bikes! It’s a Dutch custom. We like to ride the bicycle. 
There (in Indonesia), if you have any (social) status, then you ride in the motor 
car. But we always travelled by bicycle or we just walked. (...) This is how the 
Dutch people do it.   
  
Hendrijk’s words, including the reference to ‘our Queen rides her bike’ reproduce 
dominant understandings of biking as a quintessentially Dutch habit.  
In what follows, I provide experiences of bicycling courses at the Bergpolder 
Neighbourhood Centre (BNC) where I took part in teaching cycling to women who 
would be considered allochthonous. These experiences show how discourses of 
integration and the act of cycling through public places are identified as Dutch qualities. 
 
Cycling in Bergpolder 
Cycling lessons at the Bergpolder Neighbourhood Centre (BNC) began in 2009 
and were financially supported through Krachtwijk funding from the district government 
of Rotterdam North.  The cycling lessons were listed as a ‘women-only50’ activity and the 
majority of attendees would be considered allochthonous women.  
These lessons began at 9:30 am, every Friday morning, throughout the entire year, 
and in most weather (although not in icy conditions). My job as a volunteer was to teach 
participants how to balance, to peddle at a steady rate, and to practice how to turn and 
avoid objects. Once these steps are learned, the women graduated to cycling by 
                                                 
50
 This ‘women’s-only’ activity draws on the perception that Muslim women would not attend events that 
included male non-family members. The targeted group for such lessons is non-western allochthonous 
women who are largely seen as being Muslims. 
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themselves through the park. Once confident enough in their abilities, one of the 
volunteers took an advanced group out onto the streets in the neighbourhood of 
Bergpolder to practice their knowledge of street signs and rules of the road in addition to 
gaining experience cycling in traffic. This was often somewhat of a tense ride as the 
streets were often quite busy with traffic from other cyclists and automobile drivers. 
In general, the process took 10 weeks to complete and at the end, participants 
received a certificate of completion made available to us through the local school. This 
operation, while having things in common with the LSF’s lessons, did not require 
participants to wear blue vests with large “L” for Learner (Leerling) and the list of 
cycling rules and regulations was a homemade version of common sense cycling 
conventions. The certificates that were provided upon one’s successful completion of the 
lessons could be used toward the participation portion of government citizenship courses 
(see chapter 2). 
 The majority of the participants at these sessions were women between the ages 
of 25 and 65 years old who had immigrated from Turkey and Morocco. Other 
participants, who were also within the same age group, immigrated from Pakistan, 
Kosovo, Iraq, India, and Iran. During the lessons, it was more common to hear women on 
the plane speak Berber, Arabic, and Turkish rather than Dutch. These women came from 
a variety of family situations although the majority were mothers or grandmothers, and 
lived with their extended family. Few of the Friday morning participants worked. Some 
were in the process of taking integration courses or were students at the local Islamic 
university. Although the majority of these women would have been considered Muslims 
because they wore headscarves, their religious identity and the topic of religion did not 
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surface, to my knowledge, throughout the entire year. Although these women would be 
identified as allochthonous individuals, they had diverse backgrounds and perceptions, 
and of course, cycling abilities. 
Besides myself, there were three other cycling instructors, two of whom ran the 
sessions from the beginning. Henny, in her early 40s, was an extremely busy individual. 
She was a mother of two children who worked full-time, was an active member of the 
Socialist Party in Rotterdam North, wrote articles for political magazines, and was on the 
board of directors for her union. Despite these commitments, Henny continued to help 
out with the cycling lessons because, according to her, “participating in these lessons 
allows me to see where the money from the policies is going”. She also said: 
The Bobos (the higher-ups) say they are in touch with what is going on at the 
street level because they have advisors or read reports, but in actuality, they have 
no clue as to what’s really going on. Coming out to the biking lessons lets you 
know what’s really going on.   
 
Henny first became involved with volunteering in the neighbourhood with 
projects located at her children’s school. Henny first started by giving basic Dutch 
lessons to some of the other mothers at the school, however, these activities eventually 
turned into cycling lessons. She described this during our interview: 
One of the mothers, who wasn’t born here, said to me, “everybody here cycles”. I 
didn’t notice this, but they did. So then they asked me if I could give them some 
bicycling lessons. I gave some just to these women (the mothers of her children’s 
classmates) at first. I mean, I bike myself, I gave my children lessons, and then I 
gave lessons to a few people that were in the class. It wasn’t like we have at the 
BNC. (...) 
  
Mr. Z asked me if it was possible for people to help get some bicycling lessons at 
the centre (Mr. Z was the director of the Moroccan Cultural Center for Rotterdam 
North which became the BNC in 2009). I remembered the lessons from before 
and thought that these classes could be very beneficial for the women and that the 
women really had fun when they did them. So Tieneke and I put the activity on 
one of the BNC activity schedules and asked people in the neighbourhood to 
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come out. It was not Mr. Z’s thing anymore, but it has become quite famous. We 
started last summer, on the fourth of July 2009 and it’s been about a year now and 
we’ve reached 60 or 70 women.  
 
Henny’s reason for volunteering and facilitating these lessons are a mix of personal and 
professional interests. As an active person in the neighbourhood, Henny revealed that she 
was often sought out by others to facilitate projects in the neighbourhood. She 
highlighted this fact when she said, “once you begin, they kind of know you, you know, 
and then they just keep coming back!” For Henny, cycling is something that is 
pleasurable for the women and is something that is asked for by the community (whether 
it was her participants in the Dutch class from school or Mr. Z who also lives in the 
neighbourhood).  
 In her dialogue, Henny mentions another volunteer, Tieneke, who was (and 
remains) the head of the volunteering organization Willpower Works. This organisation 
was responsible for facilitating the majority of the activities held at the neighbourhood 
centre. Another volunteer, Beren, was an intern for Willpower Works. Born and raised in 
Rotterdam and with Turkish heritage, Beren would help communicate with some of the 
attendees who spoke better Turkish than Dutch. The last volunteer was a man named 
Mert, who had immigrated to the Netherlands 23 years ago from Ankara, Turkey. Mert 
was the only male presence on these mornings and his job included providing 
refreshments and maintaining the bicycles before and after the lessons. The volunteers 
with whom I worked saw themselves as primarily serving the participants and catering to 
their expressed needs.  
During one of the morning coffee breaks, I asked the women why it was that they 
participated in these lessons. The majority said that it was because they found it 
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“gezellig”. Gezellig is a catch-all phrase in Dutch that has no strict translation into 
English. It gives the sense of cosiness and also implies that one is comfortable and in the 
company of friends. At my prompting to elaborate, one woman, Hayat, a mother of three 
who lived in the neighbouring district of Old North and who was in her late 30s, said that 
these lessons were useful because she learned other information as well, and then 
elaborated: “For example, if I have a question about forms from the government or about 
my son’s or daughters’ report cards, then I can bring them here and ask one of the women 
here to help.” With this statement, Hayat waved around to the entire group that included 
both participants and volunteers thus implying everyone who was present. One other 
woman, Marie, a woman in her late 50s who immigrated to the Netherlands from the 
Cape Verde Islands, answered that she wanted to learn how to bicycle because “it would 
allow me to do my job better.” Marie works part-time as a care giver to elderly 
individuals throughout the city. “It would be cheaper and quicker if I don’t have to wait 
for tram or buses”.  
 On the particular day that I asked the above questions, I learned from the group 
that there was a concurrent information session being held at the local school where many 
of the participants’ children were enrolled. Henny asked why it was that they were not 
using those sessions as a resource as well. One of the women, Hasna, a woman who 
emigrated from Morocco, was in her early 40s and had four children, answered that she 
did not go because “the time conflicted with the bicycling lesson” to which many of the 
other women laughed and agreed. “Besides”, she said “we can learn just as much here”.  
 On yet another occasion, there was a woman there who came to the bicycling 
lessons, who already knew how to cycle. She stayed all day, arriving at 9:30 am with the 
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other participants, joining the group on the plane and finally helping bring one of the 
bicycles back to the garage after the lesson. When I asked her why she participated since 
she already knew how to cycle, she answered: “My neighbour told me to come by 
because it’s very gezellig here on Friday mornings51”.  
From the above quotes, and from the general feeling that I garnered as a 
participant and observer in these lessons, a strong sense of community was fostered 
during these Friday morning sessions. In some cases, participants in the cycling lessons 
became volunteers for Willpower Works or joined other programs at the neighbourhood 
center such as the conversation circle to better their Dutch language skills (of which I was 
also a participant) or brought their children to the homework-help programs. Thus, these 
lessons succeeded in broadening women’s social networks, providing them with an 
additional means of transportation (a factor dependent on their access to a personal 
bicycle) as per the mandate of these lessons. While emancipation or integration are 
typically understood to be the driving force behind the funding of such programs around 
the country (according to the LSF website, there are over 300 lessons run through the 
LSF organization and these do not include the cycling lessons run by community groups 
such as ours), the idea of emancipation was not discussed as a motivator by the 
participants.  
Despite the lack of interest in integration and emancipation on the part of lesson 
participants, it was clear that for those “autochthons” who organized and guided the 
classes, these were central goals. Thus, when speaking with Hendrijk about his past 
                                                 
51
 It is important that she makes the distinction between Friday and Monday because cycling lessons are 
also given on Mondays , in the same space, however, with different volunteers and with a different group of 
participants (although if there were scheduling conflicts it was common for participants to go to the other 
lesson). 
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experiences working in social policy fields for Rotterdam’s municipal government, he 
commented: 
The bicycling lessons took a lot of time and effort. We had to arrange the 
bicycles, get people to teach the lessons, and other things. I arranged things more 
than actually taught any lessons. After a while, I thought the project had failed 
because I didn’t see any immigrant women cycling in the area. Then one day, I 
saw one of the men who taught these lessons and he said that he was still giving 
diplomas out, but that the women did not cycle very much after the lessons had 
finished. To which I said “Shit! Then these women did not really understand the 
intention of cycling.” When I heard that they were going to start bicycling lessons 
at the Bergpolder Neighbourhood Centre (BNC), I said “Good! Get out there and 
start doing it!” because you can see the backwardness of these people who live 
very small lives because they don’t get out. They don’t know many people. The 
more backward the person is, the smaller their life is. 
 
From this perspective, it was clear that the purpose of these lessons was to emancipate the 
participants from their backwards lifestyle and to get them (visibly) out into the 
neighbourhood, broadening their exposure to the world. Scholars have demonstrated that 
this emancipation discourse that presumes “backward” allochthonous women versus 
“liberated” autochthonous women in the Netherlands is popular in the mainstream media 
(Roggeband and Verloo 2007; Moors 2009; van den Berg and Schinkle 2009).  
 It was for their potential as “assimilationist tools” that biking lessons were indeed 
officially supported. Although the initial request for biking lessons was made by the 
director of what was then Moroccan Cultural Centre of Rotterdam North (later the BNC), 
Henny had to request funds from the municipal government to run the lessons. They were 
eventually supported using Krachtwijk funding and then facilitated through the 
neighbourhood centre and Willpower Works volunteers. 
 Participation in biking lessons was complicated by larger narratives concerning 
the importance of integration into Dutch society or the emancipation of allochthonous 
women. While these narratives, on the one hand, helped create the opportunity to have 
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these lessons by providing rationale for funding, they also indirectly influence 
participants’ behaviour in multiple ways. For example, during my time on the plane, I 
often heard Tieneke reassert the integrationist mission of the classes by insisting that 
everyone speak Dutch during the cycling lessons and coffee breaks. She would often say, 
“Come on Ladies! You must speak Dutch! Speak Dutch!” On one occasion, Tieneke was 
approached by two of the participants, one of which was trying to translate the intentions 
of the other. Tieneke stopped the ‘translator’ in mid-sentence and said, “No, no, you” 
pointing to the woman who did not speak Dutch very well, “try to tell me what it is you 
mean in Dutch. That is what you’re supposed to do here.” Tieneke’s insistence on the use 
of the Dutch language for communication during this activity, when she notes that is 
what you’re supposed to do here, connects the purpose of these lessons not just with 
cycling but with speaking the Dutch language—both traits associated with an ideal Dutch 
identity  
As suggested by Verkaaik (2010), it is important to understand how individuals 
take social and political discourses of Dutchness and practice them in everyday life as it 
shows how Dutchness is reproduced in everyday places of the neighbourhood. I found 
that Tieneke’s definition of Dutchness included the ability to speak in Dutch and not to 
speak Turkish or Berber during neighbourhood activities. According to both her and 
Henny, bicycling provided new opportunities for “allochthonous” women who were 
thought to be lacking movement in certain ways. Regardless of intention, the actions and 
interactions among the volunteers and the participants reinforced notions of ideal Dutch 
behaviour. 
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Next, I will show how gardening and the appreciation of greenery in urban 
neighbourhoods are used in a similar way to construct notions of Dutchness and to mark 
the difference between natives and non-natives of the nation.  
 
Greening of Public Places in Rotterdam’s Neighbourhoods 
Although images of tulips and polders52 are brought to mind when one thinks of 
the Dutch landscape, it was the availability and appeal of neighbourhood green spaces 
and personal gardens in the city that were of importance to the residents with whom I 
spoke. Gardens were often the places where I conducted interviews from early spring 
until late fall. I was also frequently asked to sit for a cup of tea and a biscuit on the 
balcony of a friend or colleague, which were almost always covered with potted plants, 
hanging trellises, and various other garden fixtures such as water falls, bird baths, or a 
Dutch garden gnome (kabouter).  
One newspaper article entitled Gardening in the Netherlands: “I wouldn’t want to 
be without a garden” (2010) alludes to the importance of gardening in the Netherlands. 
The author, Philip Smet, states that the Dutch spent nearly 4.2 billion Euros on garden-
related products in the year 2009, which was approximately the same amount as was 
spent during the previous two years (2010). The author was surprised that such amounts 
were spent despite the poor state of the economy in the Netherlands and throughout 
Europe: “That means that around 570 Euros a year per household is spent on gardens and 
balconies (...). The economic crisis may have meant Dutch people are eating out less or 
booking cheaper holidays (but) they’re not scrimping on their gardens” (Smet 2010). Few 
                                                 
52
 A polder is a piece of low-lying land reclaimed from the sea or from a river and is protected by dikes. In 
general, the Dutch are world renown for their water engineering skills. 
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scholars, however, have taken the opportunity to pursue this area for research. In 
answering the question of what would make decorating one’s house important to the 
understanding of belonging, I turned to research concerning the practice of window 
dressings in the Netherlands. 
According to van der Horst and Messing (2006), there are significant differences 
in the practices of window decorating in which the ‘Dutch’ practice is to use lace or net 
curtains and/or to adorn one’s windows with plants and decorations (2, 6). In their study, 
the authors came to the conclusion that it was not only the design of curtains but their use 
that signalled the type of residents who occupied the home. The practice of keeping one’s 
curtains open throughout the day and into the evening, was related to opinions of ‘decent’ 
Dutch behaviours of tidiness, respectability, and community involvement, which were 
thought to be a part of “normal Dutch standards” (2006: 4). On the other hand, residents 
had the impression that immigrants tended to close their curtains or use ‘inappropriate 
materials’ such as bed sheets or plastic window coverings to create a defined distinction 
between the public and private space (ibid: 4-6). The researchers found that when 
residents covered their windows from view, their respectability was put into question by 
other neighbours. Those whose respectability was most often put into question were 
typically immigrant households. Upon further elaboration, the covering of windows was 
seen to be a sign of immigrants’ overall lack of attachment to the immediate community 
and to the Netherlands at large. The researchers found that residents were identified as 
either ‘immigrant’ or ‘native’ according to how they dressed and used window coverings; 
in so doing, one’s window dressings had come to indicate one’s ‘level’ of embeddedness 
in society and one’s aspirations for community involvement (van der Horst and Messing 
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2006:10). Van der Horst and Messing’s findings are applicable to the act of greening 
urban spaces in the neighbourhood, which is also understood as a “spatial practice” that 
signals belonging to the Netherlands.   
According to Lia Karsten, a scholar in the Geography, Planning, and 
Development program at the University of Amsterdam, urban gardens and street greenery 
are features of middle-class households. Karsten, who also did her research in Rotterdam 
North, writes that there: “it is quite customary to put some big pots with plants next to the 
front door. It is clear that these families consider the public space around their home as an 
extension of their private space.” She adds that in this way, “Together with their 
neighbours they (the residents of Rotterdam North) are gradually constructing new 
communal spaces” (Karsten 2009: 325).  
The creation of this communal space entails beautifying the immediate vicinity of 
one’s house through such measures as “communal gardening or placing benches on 
sidewalks to sit and watch the kids or enjoy a drink and a chat out in front of the house” 
(2009: 325). Karsten goes on to describe these communal areas in wealthier 
neighbourhoods as typically “low-traffic, green streets with playable space” (2009:324). 
These spaces work to create what Karsten calls ‘a friendly green appeal’ (ibid), which as 
my research shows, is often associated with “autochthonous”, more affluent, residential 
areas.  
A resident of Bergpolder, Kaatje, described these “friendly green appeal” areas as 
she talked about the various physical environments to be found in different 
neighbourhoods of Rotterdam. She commented: 
I’ve lived on the north side of the Bergselaan (a street that runs across the top of 
Rotterdam North through Liskwartier and Bergpolder) and when you cross the 
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small canal, there is a little area that turns into a dead end. The traffic is slow 
there because the families in the area made a small playground for children. There 
are benches there, flowers, and potted-plants everywhere. It creates such a 
different atmosphere. There are a lot of neighbourhoods (like this) where people 
come and put their chairs out and talk to each other. (...)  
 
You know the houses are bigger there (in Liskwartier) …. the streets in front are 
rather child proof and they can go out there during the weekend to meet with their 
neighbours. That is a big difference between Bergpolder and Liskwartier. 
 
In pointing out that Liskwartier, with its greenery and welcoming streets, had a different 
atmosphere from Bergpolder, Kaatje was reiterating what I heard many times during my 
research: that there were affluent streets in Liskwartier as opposed to the modest streets in 
Bergpolder. Neighbourhoods such as Bergpolder, and other Krachtwijken like it, were 
known to have little in the way of street greenery.  
Despite its reputation as the most industrialized city in the Netherlands, 
Rotterdam has the most square feet of green space per resident (41m2) of any of the 
Randstad cities; these green spaces, however, are concentrated in several large park areas 
(Inbo 2007: 9-11). Certain neighbourhoods, especially those built directly after World 
War II, have very few green spaces. Green spaces in the neighbourhood and throughout 
the city are thought to add to the liveability and sociability of a neighbourhood, which is 
also thought to attract middle and upper-class residents (Gemeentee Rotterdam 2007: 60-
61). Renewal plans throughout the city, which as we saw in Chapter 3 strive to retain 
higher class residents, now incorporate greening projects; for example, in the Bergpolder 
South project apartment buildings were being torn down to make way for garden plots for 
local residents (MPBZ 2010). This trend to appeal to middle-class families to stay in the 
city through the creation of green spaces is evident from the list of greening initiatives in 
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the neighbourhood supported by the district government, which included the building of 
sidewalk gardens.  
Sidewalk gardens, or geveltuinen, are government sponsored gardens that are 
created, as the name suggests, by taking up tiles from the sidewalk against the side of 
one’s house. This space is then filled with planting soil and surrounded by the up-lifted 
tiles which act as a perimeter. Although quite narrow, this bed can be used to grow 
flowers and shrubbery. Residents of Bergpolder and Liskwartier can sign up for such a 
garden through the government website or by submitting a request form that is printed in 
the Liskwartier’s and Bergpolder’s local newspaper, the Bolwerk. Once one’s application 
is processed, city-works employees arrive at the house and dig out the front garden.  
The government also sponsored a ‘Sidewalk Garden Day’ held at the Bergpolder 
Neighbourhood Center, at which I volunteered in the spring of 2010. On this day, pre-
registered residents could present themselves and collect free supplies for their gardens, 
for example, soil, watering cans, and plants. They also had the opportunity to ask 
gardening advice from those volunteers who were knowledgeable about gardening. In the 
neighbourhood of Bergpolder, the funding for this greening endeavour was made 
available through Krachtwijk funding (available until January 2012). 
Kaatje, who described the family spaces above, was a Bergpolder resident for the 
last 6 years, in a house she owned by herself. Kaatje, who was in her mid-30s, would be 
classified as a middle-income resident. Having grown up on a farm in the countryside, 
she was interested in gardening and volunteered for Bergpolder’s Sidewalk Garden 
events. In 2009, she became very involved as one of the head co-ordinators. She 
described her experience as follows:  
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Some people approached Viona (a community support worker) asking to have 
front gardens put in. Through another friend of mine, I eventually ended up at a 
Krachtwijk meeting in the neighbourhood and one of the volunteer options was to 
help out with a neighbourhood sidewalk garden day (geveltuinendag). So I signed 
up to help with a group of three others. My job was to get residents to sign-up and 
to raise awareness. I drove around the neighbourhood on this man-powered cart 
with a huge front bucket that was loaded with flowers in the front. I went door to 
door to ask residents to take part. In addition to what I was doing, our team wrote 
articles in the local newspaper, we put up posters in the neighbourhood, and 
handed out fliers. 
 
Due to lack of interest from Bergpolder residents, however, the first sidewalk garden 
event was also opened up to Liskwartier residents, who apparently, gladly participated. 
As Kaatje said,  
The reason why we’re doing this is to make Bergpolder a nicer place to live. 
We’re paying for it through the krachtwijk funding so it should only be for 
Bergpolder residents (as only Bergpolder is a Krachtwijk neighbourhood, while 
Liskwartier is not). Besides, the people in Liskwartier don’t need this kind of 
stimulation. They already have beautiful sidewalk gardens and there are more 
families and more people who are motivated to get out there and maintain their 
gardens. Here in Bergpolder, there is a lot of turnover of residents and so there 
isn’t a lot of draw for people to maintain their houses or put in a garden to make 
the street and neighbourhood look nicer. So we need to get people to come and 
take advantage of programs like the sidewalk gardens. We need to stimulate 
people here! 
 
Kaatje’s comments describe the act of greening the local sidewalks and streets as a way 
to improve the liveability and sociability of the neighbourhood. Kaatje’s recognition of 
Bergpolder’s ‘need for stimulus’ reiterates popular impressions that residents there, who 
tend to be mostly “allochthons”, need to be taught to become “active citizens”. Further, 
Kaatje’s distinction of short-term versus long-term residents was described to me on 
other occasions as a distinction between renters and owners (of houses) in the 
neighbourhood, with the latter being thought to care more about the state of their homes 
and the surrounding neighbourhood and who were identified as middle-class, long term 
residents.  
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 The practice of greening neighbourhood spaces in Rotterdam was also supported 
through the municipal Opzoomer program. The term Opzoomer refers to neighbourhood 
initiatives originally started by the mixed income residents of Opzoomer Street in 
Rotterdam, who took it upon themselves to improve the sociability and liveability of their 
street53. The residents concentrated on three areas for improvement: the insecurity of the 
street, the lack of green spaces, and the asocial relationships among the neighbours. 
Residents’ projects included increasing the amount of greenery on the street by installing 
garden boxes along the front of residents’ houses. Upon seeing the positive outcome of 
this street’s social initiatives, the municipal government provided some financial support 
to the residents of Opzoomer Street, which in 1994 developed into a city-wide project.  
According to the official website for Opzoomer, there are now over 1800 
Opzoomerstraten (streets taking part in the program), or approximately 16 percent of the 
entire Rotterdam population who are active in such initiatives (opzoomermee.nl). In order 
to take part in the Opzoomer program, a resident must fill out the appropriate 
documentation that includes required items, budgetary plans, and interested participants. 
One can access these forms from the Opzoomer website and drop off the completed form 
at the local municipal government for approval54. Street refurbishment activities 
sponsored through Opzoomer initiatives included: cleaning and greening the street; street 
art; creating child-friendly spaces; or increasing feelings of safety through projects that 
addressed physical shortcomings, e.g. adding more lighting to the street, or throwing a 
neighbourhood party in order to get to know one another better. The following is a 
                                                 
53
 The following information can be found in Julien van Ostaaijen’s overview of Opzoomer activities in his 
work “Aversion and Accommodation” situated in Rotterdam (2010). 
54
 It is important to note that the Opzoomer process in itself is quite involved and requires that applicants 
must be able to speak Dutch well enough to navigate such an online bureaucratic system.  
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description of an Opzoomer experience in Liskwartier that deals specifically with giving 
a neighbourhood space, a friendly green appeal. 
Frescia is an older woman living on the Bergselaan, an affluent street in 
Liskwartier, and who would be considered an “autochthon”. Walking up to her doorway 
for our interview, I noticed large potted plants that flanked her front door and the large 
rose bush underneath her window which hinted at her affinity for greenery in the 
neighbourhood. Frescia had participated in Opzooomer activities for a number of years as 
was apparent from the ‘Opzoomer Star’ placed on the front of her house just beside her 
front door (see more below). Although Frescia and her neighbours took part in many 
activities supported by Opzoomer over the years, their largest project was to take over the 
maintenance of the treed berm55, which divides the north side of the street from the 
southern side. Frescia explained: 
The government no longer wanted to maintain the berm in between our street and 
had decided that they would prefer to pave it over. The residents on my street 
thought that it would be a shame to lose this green space since there isn’t much as 
it is. Instead, we proposed that through the Opzoomer funds that we as neighbours 
would take care of it. We used the Opzoomer funds to maintain the trees, cutting 
branches when we needed to and that kind of thing, and now we use it to replace 
gardening tools and other maintenance equipment. We had the idea to put a 
cobbled pathway in the middle of the trees where people from the street could 
walk and enjoy the trees. Some of my other neighbours have since made small 
alcoves where there are special flower beds that they’ve planted themselves and 
benches for sitting. It’s like a little oasis in the middle of the street. (...) On a 
whole, the Opzoomer funds were very useful for this project. (...) This project 
keeps the neighbours on the street together. It’s even become popular with the 
newer neighbours on the street as well. 
 
This treed oasis, as Frescia described it, with its carved out spaces for sitting and 
admiring small garden plots has created the same ‘urban haven’ described by Karsten. 
Although the berm is a public space, and not as exclusive as one’s doorstep would be, 
                                                 
55
 A berm is a man-made path or strip beside a pathway or roadway.  
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this area served the same function by providing a space for the residents of the street 
which brought them together through the act of gardening. Frescia’s role in the project, 
however, was privileged as highlighted by the presence of the Opzoomer Star outside her 
front door.  
When travelling the streets of Bergpolder and Liskwartier, and throughout 
Rotterdam, I often saw an ‘Opzoomer Star’ (Opzoomer Ster) on the facade of houses that 
were typically overflowing with greenery, benches, potted plants and other garden 
features. According to the Opzoomer website, streets can apply for these stars “to make it 
clear that your street is willing to help create a liveable city”. Any street that has 
previously participated in the program can apply for such a star. Once approved, 
neighbours can hang one of these plaques in their street and receive money to celebrate 
the unveiling of the star (see Opzoomer ‘Star’ below). 
 
Photo A and B, Opzoomer Star (with permission by the photographer) 
When I asked Frescia about what the star meant to her, she said that her 
Opzoomer Star was hung outside her house to mark the accomplishments of their berm 
project (in which she took a leading role) as judged by the goals of the overall Opzoomer 
program. These goals include having achieved resident participation, social cohesion, and 
demonstrating active citizenship. When I was speaking with Theo, who would also be 
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considered an “autochthon” and who was also a participant in Opzoomer greening 
initiatives in his own neighbourhood of Old West in the city centre, he indicated that his 
Opzoomer Star was meant to designate those houses that had become popular through 
community activities or those parts of the neighbourhood that had been brought out of 
‘urban anonymity’.  
From my own perspective, however, these stars seemed to be awarded to those 
houses that had created a particular green visual aesthetic within urban neighbourhoods 
as designed by government officials from the Opzoomer program and urban designers. 
Seen in this light, the Opzoomer Star works to further identify and privilege those spaces 
with “green friendly appeal” in a way that fosters feelings of exclusivity for 
“autochthons” or well-integrated “allochthon” residents and residential areas. Those 
spaces/citizens who do not receive such recognition can be perceived as not abiding by 
the standards of aesthetic “Dutch” taste. This is apparent in the following example.  
After arriving as a guest at an acquaintance’s house in Bergpolder, I commented 
to the host on how nice his front garden looked. True to Karsten’s descriptions, the front 
door was flanked with large potted plants and a large flowering bush that grew out of the 
sidewalk garden set underneath the front window. In response to my compliment, 
Adriaan, long-time resident of Rotterdam North and owner of the house, replied: 
I spend a lot of time on my gardens because it’s such a nice thing to do as my 
hobby. I really wish, though, that other residents around here (in Bergpolder) 
would take some time and try to do things with their front gardens as well. You 
can tell from a mile away those houses that do not have Dutch people living in 
them. It brings down the value of the whole neighbourhood!  
 
When Adriaan identified particular houses as Dutch according to whether or not they 
have a front garden or visible greenery, he reinforces the understanding that gardens and 
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greening public spaces are a part of the construct of Dutchness that differentiates between 
natives and non-natives of the nation.  
In his discussion of domestic gardens in Vienna, Robert Rotenberg argues that 
gardens can be read as statements which express household and personal identities in a 
manner that can contest and/or demonstrate one’s belonging to different classes (1999). 
In the same regard, Allaine Cerwonka (2004) argues that gardening practices, specifically 
those associated with creating native species gardens in Australia can be used to express 
belonging and attachment to a national “authentic” community.  
Although more research is needed in order to fully understand the influence of 
friendly green spaces in Rotterdam North, the comments by Adriaan and others who took 
part in neighbourhood greening initiatives suggest that having a front garden or engaging 
in “greening” projects is marker of “autochthonous” status and active citizenship. As seen 
through the examples in this section, the green initiatives and gardening projects 
described in this chapter were most often taken advantage of by those with a good 
working knowledge of Dutch who could navigate the bureaucracy and red tape of the 
district government, and in so doing, impressed the importance of a Dutch style of 
gardening56.  
This chapter’s exploration  of two activities perceived to be “Dutch” 
characteristics - cycling through public places and decorating the outside of one’s house 
with gardens and street greenery - demonstrates that there are standard traits  by which 
“Dutchness” is explicitly judged by “autochthons” in Rotterdam. The spatial practices of 
                                                 
56
 It should be noted that there are other gardening initiatives, such as the creation of community gardens, 
that according to other studies (van Lieshout and Aarts 2008) in fact promote more egalitarian exchanges 
between “allochthons” and “autochthons” and where there seems to be more room given to the expression 
of “ethnic” difference. 
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riding bikes and keeping front gardens, the latter of which was also linked with class 
identity, worked to define who does, and who does not, belong to the majority 
community. Furthermore, “allochthonous” individuals who did not engage in such spatial 
practices were not considered to live up to the ideal of a good, active “Dutch” citizen. In 
the next chapter, spatial practices, such as the ones mentioned here, will be further 
contextualised in terms of current Dutch debates about the ‘culturalization of citizenship’. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SPACE AND PLACE IN THE DISCUSSION OF BELONGING 
  
Geert Wilders, leader of the Party for Freedom, PVV, which is one of three 
governing parties in the national coalition, is one of the most outspoken figureheads 
against immigration from ‘Muslim countries’ and what he sees as the ‘Islamification’ of 
the Netherlands. Both Dutch and international media outlets frequently report on 
Wilders’ outspokenness and his political antics. Wilders’ trial and subsequent acquittal 
from hate speech charges laid against him when he likened the Koran to Mein Kampf and 
Islam to Nazism (Waterfield 2011), or his call to parliament to calculate the cost of 
integrating non-western immigrants (Rijlaarsdam and Staal 2009), which he later 
estimated to be approximately six to ten billion Euros per year (Radio Worldwide 
Netherlands 2010) are obvious examples of his anti-immigrant and Islamophobic stances. 
Following the Immigration Minister’s refusal to produce specific cost analysis (Blass 
2009), Wilders made a splash by calling for the Minister to be criminally charged for 
failing to provide such information to the public (Radio Netherlands/Expatica 2009). 
Most recently, in the summer of 2011, Wilders’ potential role in Anders Behring 
Breivik’s killing spree in Norway (as Breivik was a huge fan of Wilders) (Hochgemuth 
2011), garnered him still more media attention, both positive and negative. The 
acceptance of his party into the national coalition had many commentators worrying that 
this event signalled an ‘end to tolerance’ in the Netherlands (Cendrowicz 2010). 
Although Wilders’ popularity could also be attributed to his fiscal and anti-European 
Union political stances, or to his attention to the rights of the retired generation, it is his 
stance on Islam and immigration that continues to hold the focus of media attention 
(Vossen 2010). This larger political context and social milieu shapes everyday realities 
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for residents and influences the national and local-level politics of belonging to the 
imagined community of the Netherlands. It is also this political and social context that 
informed this research, which considered how non-western immigrants and Muslims, 
known as “allochthons”, are seen as peripheral members to the majority community and 
how their lives are ultimately influenced by racist prejudices and ethnocentrism 
camouflaged as a discourse on “cultural citizenship”. 
Wilders’ campaign to assimilate “allochthonous” individuals according to ‘Dutch 
cultural values and norms’ demonstrates how citizenship is increasingly defined 
according to selective idealized cultural norms. This cultural trend is a shift away from 
older paradigms based on pluralism and multicultural ideals, which are identified as 
principles of a liberal democratic society characterized also as civic nationalism, where 
one's citizenship, at least in theory, implies individual rights, and where one's “ethnic”, 
cultural, or religious background are deemed irrelevant. In the last decade, however, 
a plethora of regulations and programs pertaining to immigration and citizenship in the 
Netherlands have been adopted by  governmental bodies, that in practice assume that the 
“nation”, its citizenry, and “culture” are one and the same thing, or more precisely that 
national identity is measured by the enactment of “Dutch” cultural traits. This trend is 
reflected in the notion of “cultural citizenship” used by scholars when writing about 
immigrants and minority groups in the Netherlands. These new requirements and 
demands to “act” Dutch, especially in public spaces and which are imposed on 
immigrants and those considered “allochthons”, lead to exclusionary practices that 
reinforce boundaries between “us” and “them.” These requirements ultimately promote 
racialized notions of citizenship and conservative nationalist sentiments as is evident in 
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official and popular discourse as well as in the everyday uses and meanings of public 
spaces by ordinary citizens.  
In particular, immigrants from Turkey and Morocco, and Muslims in general, are 
seen as those who are most in need of being disciplined into Dutch “culture”. 
Considering the increasing securitization of borders and public environments, as well as 
the rise of Islamophobia following September 11th in New York and the murder of Theo 
van Gogh in Amsterdam, physical and visible signs, such as clothing (especially veiling 
practices), render even those with citizenship, marginal and suspect, since they do not fit 
into a uniform or homogenized “Dutch” social and cultural landscape. 
Although other scholars have explored integration and the politics of belonging 
concerning non-western immigrants in Rotterdam and elsewhere in the Netherlands (see 
for example, van den Berg 2011, de Koning 2010, Sunier 2009b, van Bruinessen 2006), 
this project took a unique approach, which among other things, explored belonging by 
considering how individuals use, access, and understand public places. Drawing on 
Lefebvre’s theoretical approach to space, I have argued that larger social and political 
discourses concerning the difference and non-belonging of “allochthonous” individuals 
were reproduced in neighbourhood public places through government-led integration 
programs and urban gentrification projects. Importantly, I also found that this difference 
was similarly reproduced through the everyday spatial practices of ordinary 
“autochthonous” inhabitants.  
Using spatial practices as a means to approach this question of belonging and its 
effect on understandings of citizenship, Chapter 2 explored government-sponsored 
integration programs that sought to teach “allochthonous” individuals how to 
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appropriately use and comport themselves while in public places. Chapter 3 looked at 
government-led gentrification projects and resident initiatives that sought to renovate the 
neighbourhood and which resulted in an understanding of “autochthonous” individuals as 
ideal ‘active citizens’. Chapter 4 explored how “allochthonous” youths were policed in 
public places due to their perceived misuse of such spaces and how they, in turn, 
contested such policing. This chapter further explores how an understanding of “safe” 
and “unsafe” public spaces connected to the distinction between “allochthons” and 
“autochthons”. Chapter 5 examined attempts at promoting stereotypical “Dutch” 
behaviours, such as bicycling and greening one’s home, that were targeted to 
“allochthons”. This chapter argues that these practices are yet another way in which 
dominant understandings of Dutchness are reinforced.  
As discussed in my introduction and background chapters, this exclusionary 
project of citizenship was actively supported through government initiatives where 
citizenship education and integration programs were used to teach residents how to be 
‘active citizens’ and to reinforce the importance of participating in civic society. Because 
such education is directed at “allochthonous” individuals alone, this education marks 
these individuals as different and as lacking the ability to create strong social 
relationships outside their established social network. Although the declared goal of such 
courses is to foster social cohesion among all inhabitants of the Netherlands, integration 
courses can come across as stigmatizing for those singled out to participate, as Hilde the 
integration teacher suggested.  
The attempt to indoctrinate “allochthons” to adopt ‘appropriate’ behaviours and 
proper methods of public comportment were also found on the streets of problematic 
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neighbourhoods in Rotterdam. Government sponsored initiatives, such as the MMdS 
program, had the effect of categorizing entire streets of mostly “allochthonous” 
individuals as insufficiently socialized and integrated, which further marked them as 
‘outsiders’ and poor participants in a “Dutch” society.  
The underlying aim and political ideology of integration measures have been to 
assimilate particular “ethnic” and “religious” identities. This is important because 
although programs seeking to create social cohesion and community integration among 
all inhabitants of Rotterdam at a quick glance can appear unbiased, they are in actuality 
designed for “allochthonous” individuals alone.  
The project to assimilate “allochthonous” individuals and behaviours was not just 
supported through government initiatives, however, but also through the everyday 
practices of “autochthonous” individuals. As argued by Florida (2002) and later 
confirmed in the Dutch context, there is a minority of middle-class individuals - 
“autochthons” - who are willing to create connections with lower income communities  - 
of “allochthons” (van der Graaf and Veldboer 2009). In my own work, for example, 
Tieneke and Henny’s time spent teaching “allochthonous” women how to bicycle is 
evidence of the fact that middle-class residents are willing to help those in ‘other’ 
communities. Despite the intention to serve these individuals (for example, to teach them 
an independent and cost effective method by which to get around the city), however, their 
practices, intentional or not, reinforced dominant notions of proper behaviour in public 
spaces that are associated with “Dutch” culture (for example, in the necessity to speak 
Dutch while in public places of the neighbourhood). In this way, my dissertation shows 
how citizens who volunteer to help integrate their fellow neighbours with the best of 
200 
 
intentions, may in fact contribute to reproducing the very social distinctions they are 
trying to dissolve. While there are other possible outcomes from such integration 
programming, these findings open up questions for future research that could focus on 
how these activities are experienced by “autochthonous” and “allochthonous” individuals 
alike. 
The accounts depicted in this work reveal that the participation process for 
neighbourhood projects, activities, and groups was designed to best accommodate 
“autochthonous” residents. Chapter 3 focused on the creation of neighbourhood spaces 
and determined that “autochthonous” individuals were better able to take advantage of 
place-making opportunities in the neighbourhood due to the design of these events. 
Furthermore, through an investigation of bottom-up initiatives, for example the 
participation process surrounding the regeneration project of Bergpolder South or 
Josephine’s VH initiative, it became apparent that certain individuals knew how to ‘work 
the system’ and were better equipped to provide input and influence the design and 
conception of public places. That these knowledgeable individuals were not 
representative of the community that lived in the areas where these projects were to take 
place is significant. For example, while most residents living in Bergpolder South would 
be identified as “allochthonous”, the majority of those involved in participation initiatives 
lived outside the area and would be considered “autochthonous”. Thus, throughout this 
dissertation, it was found that “autochthonous” individuals had the most say over spatial 
projects in neighbourhood. This finding is in line with research from van de Wijdeven 
and Hendriks (2009) who described how community participation projects in the 
Netherlands worked to include only a portion of the community.  
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Therefore, participating in civil society and being an ‘active citizen’ were 
important themes throughout this dissertation and proved to be two important factors 
determining one’s belonging and perceived loyalty to the majority community of the 
Netherlands. Importantly, this research has shown that non-western immigrants and 
Dutch Muslims do in fact participate; however, they typically participate at different 
times and for different organizations than those individuals who are busy with 
neighbourhood activities (aside from integration activities). This was evident in Chapter 2 
which showed that “allochthonous” participants of the Dutch language lessons may not 
come to the evening meetings for the Bergpolder South project, but do volunteer their 
time during the day at the Bergpolder Neighbourhood Centre (BNC). It is therefore 
important to acknowledge the significance of ‘visible participation’ as an important factor 
in the politics surrounding the perceived belonging of “allochthonous” individuals to the 
imagined community of the “nation”. 
In general, what also became apparent through my research in the neighbourhood 
is that despite living in close proximity, there was little spontaneous interaction among 
“allochthonous” and “autochthonous” individuals outside of, for example, designated 
times for integration projects in the neighbourhood center. This finding is supported by 
other research in the Dutch context where scholars looked at the connections among 
neighbours and the creation of close social bonds within particular geographic areas (van 
der Graaf and Veldboer 2009; Musterd and Pinkster 2009; van Eijk 2010). Thus, despite 
the increased attention and funding provided to boost levels of social cohesion in 
voluntary neighbourhood activities and neighbourhood groups, for example in the case of 
Krachtwijk funding, there was little evidence of increased social cohesion. 
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My work also highlighted the fact that ordinary citizens were generally unwilling 
to discuss particular prejudices against “allochthonous” individuals, instead opting to 
discuss their displeasure with integration or diversification of their society in an abstract 
sense. Many conversations and experiences presented in this dissertation, however, 
illustrated people’s use of larger social and political discourses popularized by right-wing 
politicians in everyday discussions that make use of exclusionary cultural definitions of 
citizenship.  
Finally, this dissertation illustrates alternative uses of space that suggest that 
“allochthonous” individuals regularly contest dominant understandings of how public 
space should be used (for example, when “allochthonous” youth use public street corners 
as a place to hang out, or when “allochthonous” women wear headscarves in public 
places). Therefore, despite the deployment of resources to impose dominant 
understandings of proper comportment in public space, my research reaffirms de 
Certeau’s insights that even the least powerful individuals manage to assert their own 
uses and understandings of space. Although discourses of difference and belonging do 
not prevent individuals’ innovative and creative uses and interpretations of public places, 
they influence one’s spatial opportunities and capabilities in space. 
... 
Rotterdam’s unique conservative political past and aggressive social integration 
policies make it an important site to explore changing notions of citizenship and how 
these lead to  hierarchical differentiation reflected in the use and meaning of public space, 
between those considered authentically Dutch and  Muslim and non-western immigrant 
populations. Although this research was conducted in specific Rotterdam 
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neighbourhoods, its findings have implications throughout Rotterdam and other large 
cities in the Netherlands. Similar trends are unravelling in other European countries, in 
Australia, and other industrialized western countries including in North America. My 
work can contribute to research projects in these societies, which use space to shed light 
on the xenophobic trend that sees immigrants, refugees and Muslims in general, as 
threatening local cultures, economics and national security.  
Therefore, in addition to opening up understandings of citizenship, as proposed by 
Dutch sociologists as a solution to the issue of belonging in Dutch society, the 
ethnographic material brought forth in this project speaks to the importance of space as a 
means to find grounds for interaction and belonging. Space, its diverse uses, and 
meanings ascribed to it, remain an under-explored avenue by which to promote a more 
inclusive society, where space can provide opportunities for more inclusive belonging for 
the whole community. This is important because place and space has long been 
associated with rights and belonging to the community of the “nation” (Said 2000). The 
ability to influence the construction of space is a promising measure toward redefining 
and recreating discourses that affect one’s position, understanding, and experiences of 
belonging in today’s social and political climate in the Netherlands; this particular point 
is important when understandings how the acquisition of “spatial capital” (Centner 2008) 
can influence contemporary debates in the Netherlands that concern the ‘culturalization 
of citizenship’. Such a discussion brings together the themes of immigrant integration, 
citizenship, participation, and belonging in the Netherlands. 
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How Space Factors into Debates on the ‘Culturalization of Citizenship’ 
In the on-line description of their Culturalization of Citizenship research project, one of 
the lead researchers, Evelien Tonkens, is quoted as saying that the “culturalization (of 
citizenship) is not necessarily a bad thing”57. She goes on to say:  
Someone like Geert Wilders preaches a certain type of culturalization that 
excludes people – either you assimilate entirely, or you’re out. The left-wing 
parties then respond by saying: down with the culturalization of citizenship, it 
only leads to exclusion; we need to focus on work, education and housing. In 
practice, however, culturalization is much broader. People like Ahmed Aboutaleb 
and Ahmed Marcouch emphasise the positive aspects: culturalization offers ethnic 
minorities’ access to society’s cultural capital, allowing them to participate fully. 
Seen in that light, culturalization has a great deal to offer and leads to inclusion 
rather than exclusion” (van Bochove 2009, UvA website, emphasis my own).  
 
By access to cultural capital, Tonkens is referring to the ability of those not-yet 
incorporated (“allochthons”) to gain cultural capital (possibly through varying forms of 
cultural assimilation?) in order to be included in the majority community. This appears to 
be a rather one-sided solution and one that is neither clearly drawn out in terms of how 
this can be actually achieved without assimilating to Dutch cultural ideals, nor a solution 
for the majority of those individuals who come to mind when the term “allochthon” is 
used, for example, Turkish or Moroccan immigrants who are visibly Muslim.  
This latter point is evident in Tonkens’ examples of those individuals who are 
positive role models for such cultural capital. Tonkens uses Ahmed Aboutaleb, the mayor 
of Rotterdam, and Ahmed Marcouch, a Parliamentary Minister, both of whom have 
Moroccan heritage. It is difficult to see how these two men, who are extremely privileged 
individuals, are supposed to stand for the ultimate obtainment of cultural capital and as 
role models for such a diverse community, the majority of who are of lower socio-
economic standing and who have varying levels of cultural capital in the eyes of the 
                                                 
57
 http://www.jwduyvendak.nl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=60&Itemid=74 
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majority community. It seems almost hypocritical to write that culturalization is “not 
necessarily a bad thing” when the ‘winners’ of that culturalization will be vastly 
outweighed by the everyday ‘losers’ of such a campaign; a campaign that seeks to 
identify difference and ultimately influence one’s perceptions of themselves and others in 
the process. In agreement with the authors, I feel there needs to be an inclusive approach 
taken to citizenship; yet, the authors seem to ignore the power imbalances at play in their 
“solution”. 
During a recent conference presentation, Tonkens and Hurenkamp note that 
capital is often thought to be achievable through activities where diverse individuals 
(“autochthonous” and “allochthonous”) work together on local projects, for example, by 
sweeping the streets together or by saying hello to one’s neighbour. These local forms of 
participation, and the social networks made through them, are generally recognized58 by 
the larger community as efforts to be part of Dutch society (Hurenkamp et al. 2011: 207). 
The position held by Tonkens and Hurenkamp exemplifies the new understanding of 
citizenship, which is increasingly departing from the notion of diversity as meaning 
living together with difference, and towards a society where new comers are made to feel 
they need to assimilate “culturally” to be accepted as Dutch citizens. 
In line with Duyvendak et al. (2010) and Tonkens and Hurenkamp (2011), I argue 
that the trend of culturalization of citizenship should be curbed because it results in the 
exclusion of predominantly “allochthonous” individuals. I would argue, however, that 
their solution (to bolster visible participation of those typically seen as “allochthonous” 
residents, for the purpose of gaining social and cultural capital) does not put enough 
                                                 
58
 It is important to note that their proposed solution takes a spatial approach in order to acquire belonging 
because performing these acts requires the act to be in a public space that will then include conceived uses 
and associated understandings of such a place.  
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emphasis on spatial politics, which this dissertation shows to be a significant feature in 
the politics of belonging and understanding of difference. I would suggest that cultural 
attributes of citizenship have been ‘spatialized’ and that we need to look further into 
spatial practices as a means to revamp understandings of citizenship.  
When examining space as a factor that that influences Dutch “culture” and its 
citizenship project, future projects with an alternative vision could include: the 
deconstruction and by implication diversification of the conception of  appropriate 
behaviours in public places; the creation of  places that serve as communal spaces; and 
the incorporation of those existing “ethnic” and religious spaces into the imagined Dutch 
landscape and fabric of Dutch cultural identity - a process that would involve state and 
civil institutions  working to shed off the “culture-centric” approach, to expand what it 
means to be “Dutch” and to become inclusive in identifying who is a Dutch citizen, 
thereby dismantling distinctions in between “allochthon” and “autochthon” citizens, but 
maintaining a vision of living together with, and not despite, the difference. Transforming 
understandings of the imagined Dutch landscape is an area that would benefit from future 
research not only for studies of spatial practices but also in research concerning 
integration and politics of belonging. 
Changing the understanding of specifically demarcated spaces, however, does not 
address one’s ability to capitalize on place-making projects. In order to do this, one has to 
have enough capital (in the Bourdieudian sense) and, as argued by the Duyvendak et al. 
(2010) and Tonkens and Hurenkamp (2011), this social, cultural, and economic capital is 
linked to the phenomenon of the ‘culturalization of citizenship’. I argue that having 
“spatial capital” is also important to facilitate larger community belonging.  
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Ryan Centner’s theory of place-making, outlined in the introduction, shows how 
the privileged are able to access and ‘take place’, a finding that is reiterated in my own 
investigations of spatial practices in the neighbourhood. Centner’s view of place-making 
addresses how conceptualisations of space are juxtaposed with individuals’ reactions and 
own uses and experiences of such places (2008: 196). Centner has convincingly argued 
that dominating space, and defining it for a particular community, is a form of making 
and taking that space (Centner 2010: 295). 
As articulated throughout this dissertation, individuals perceived as being 
“autochthonous” are more spatially privileged in their ability to create and build public 
places in the neighbourhood than individuals who would be perceived as 
“allochthonous”. This is due to their perceived social, cultural, economic capital which 
coincides with their belonging to the majority community of the “nation”. Working from 
Centner’s understanding of “spatial capital”, I argue that one potential avenue to pursue 
in respect to the current exclusive (cultural) notion of citizenship in the Netherlands, is to 
bolster the ability of those ‘not-yet incorporated’ individuals (“allochthonous” 
individuals) to make neighbourhood places, for example, by diversifying the method by 
which resident feedback is collected. Although having “allochthonous” individuals watch 
over  their local public places and become ‘active citizens’ are ways by which to gain 
“spatial capital”, changing the ways participation is solicited and promoted and re-
evaluating the understandings of the imagined Dutch landscape, are two ways in which 
those individuals living in the Netherlands can create a more inclusive understanding of 
Dutch citizenship and belonging that does not place the ‘solution’ at the feet of 
“allochthonous” individuals.    
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As argued by anthropologists of space and place and autochthony scholars alike 
(see Bender 1998; Malkki 1992; Geschiere 2006; 2009), there is a long history of 
associating the physical space of the nation with the imagined community of that nation. 
The territorialisation of the nation is a process by which people compete for power by 
laying claims to land and resources and become, or already are, positioned within or 
outside the national imagined community (Cerwonka 2004: 30). This imagined 
community is associated with a particular national “culture”, a phenomenon which in the 
Dutch case speaks to the current cultural construction of citizenship. Equal access in 
distributing and producing spatial capital among all residents of Rotterdam, then, 
addresses the issue of Duyvendak et al. (2010) who argued that local activities should be 
recognised in national projects of belonging, but who did not provide a method as to how 
exactly this could be accomplished. 
The importance of gaining spatial capital, then, is not just in the making of place 
by those with privilege but in influencing the acquisition of other forms of capital, which 
are thought to be fostering a restorative notion of citizen in the Netherlands. By using 
constructivist approaches toward space, it is plausible that the connection between nation, 
space, and identity can be disarticulated from one another, and rearticulated toward a 
more inclusive understanding based on diversity and difference and not uniformity and a 
mono-cultural vision of society. 
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